diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
index 88152f214f48..302b5ed616a6 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
 - nr_open
 - overflowuid
 - overflowgid
+- pipe-user-pages-hard
+- pipe-user-pages-soft
 - protected_hardlinks
 - protected_symlinks
 - suid_dumpable
@@ -159,6 +161,27 @@ The default is 65534.
 
 ==============================================================
 
+pipe-user-pages-hard:
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes.
+Once this limit is reached, no new pipes may be allocated until usage goes
+below the limit again. When set to 0, no limit is applied, which is the default
+setting.
+
+==============================================================
+
+pipe-user-pages-soft:
+
+Maximum total number of pages a non-privileged user may allocate for pipes
+before the pipe size gets limited to a single page. Once this limit is reached,
+new pipes will be limited to a single page in size for this user in order to
+limit total memory usage, and trying to increase them using fcntl() will be
+denied until usage goes below the limit again. The default value allows to
+allocate up to 1024 pipes at their default size. When set to 0, no limit is
+applied.
+
+==============================================================
+
 protected_hardlinks:
 
 A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6155aaf6342a..939dfae7bb5f 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 VERSION = 3
 PATCHLEVEL = 14
-SUBLEVEL = 72
+SUBLEVEL = 73
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Remembering Coco
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0dd3b79b15c3..ec33df500f86 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -733,8 +733,8 @@ static int vfp_set(struct task_struct *target,
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
 	thread->vfpstate.hard = new_vfp;
+	vfp_flush_hwstate(thread);
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
index 3605b844ad87..efe9964ea9b4 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ extern unsigned int vced_count, vcei_count;
  * User space process size: 2GB. This is hardcoded into a few places,
  * so don't change it unless you know what you are doing.
  */
-#define TASK_SIZE	0x7fff8000UL
+#define TASK_SIZE	0x80000000UL
 #endif
 
 #ifdef __KERNEL__
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
index d7c0acb35ec2..8d49614d600d 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		break;
 	}
 
-	if (modify && R1(regs->iir))
+	if (ret == 0 && modify && R1(regs->iir))
 		regs->gr[R1(regs->iir)] = newbase;
 
 
@@ -677,6 +677,14 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	if (ret)
 	{
+		/*
+		 * The unaligned handler failed.
+		 * If we were called by __get_user() or __put_user() jump
+		 * to it's exception fixup handler instead of crashing.
+		 */
+		if (!user_mode(regs) && fixup_exception(regs))
+			return;
+
 		printk(KERN_CRIT "Unaligned handler failed, ret = %d\n", ret);
 		die_if_kernel("Unaligned data reference", regs, 28);
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
index 92c538d5ed19..940b15703885 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg.h
@@ -680,7 +680,7 @@
 #define   MMCR0_FCWAIT	0x00000002UL /* freeze counter in WAIT state */
 #define   MMCR0_FCHV	0x00000001UL /* freeze conditions in hypervisor mode */
 #define SPRN_MMCR1	798
-#define SPRN_MMCR2	769
+#define SPRN_MMCR2	785
 #define SPRN_MMCRA	0x312
 #define   MMCRA_SDSYNC	0x80000000UL /* SDAR synced with SIAR */
 #define   MMCRA_SDAR_DCACHE_MISS 0x40000000UL
@@ -715,13 +715,13 @@
 #define SPRN_PMC6	792
 #define SPRN_PMC7	793
 #define SPRN_PMC8	794
-#define SPRN_SIAR	780
-#define SPRN_SDAR	781
 #define SPRN_SIER	784
 #define   SIER_SIPR		0x2000000	/* Sampled MSR_PR */
 #define   SIER_SIHV		0x1000000	/* Sampled MSR_HV */
 #define   SIER_SIAR_VALID	0x0400000	/* SIAR contents valid */
 #define   SIER_SDAR_VALID	0x0200000	/* SDAR contents valid */
+#define SPRN_SIAR	796
+#define SPRN_SDAR	797
 #define SPRN_TACR	888
 #define SPRN_TCSCR	889
 #define SPRN_CSIGR	890
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
index 83da53fde6b5..6700b83b7259 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/eeh_pseries.c
@@ -615,29 +615,50 @@ static int pseries_eeh_configure_bridge(struct eeh_pe *pe)
 {
 	int config_addr;
 	int ret;
+	/* Waiting 0.2s maximum before skipping configuration */
+	int max_wait = 200;
 
 	/* Figure out the PE address */
 	config_addr = pe->config_addr;
 	if (pe->addr)
 		config_addr = pe->addr;
 
-	/* Use new configure-pe function, if supported */
-	if (ibm_configure_pe != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
-	} else if (ibm_configure_bridge != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
-		ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_bridge, 3, 1, NULL,
-				config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
-				BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
-	} else {
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
+	while (max_wait > 0) {
+		/* Use new configure-pe function, if supported */
+		if (ibm_configure_pe != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+			ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_pe, 3, 1, NULL,
+					config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
+					BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
+		} else if (ibm_configure_bridge != RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE) {
+			ret = rtas_call(ibm_configure_bridge, 3, 1, NULL,
+					config_addr, BUID_HI(pe->phb->buid),
+					BUID_LO(pe->phb->buid));
+		} else {
+			return -EFAULT;
+		}
 
-	if (ret)
-		pr_warning("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%d-PE#%x (%d)\n",
-			__func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr, ret);
+		if (!ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		/*
+		 * If RTAS returns a delay value that's above 100ms, cut it
+		 * down to 100ms in case firmware made a mistake.  For more
+		 * on how these delay values work see rtas_busy_delay_time
+		 */
+		if (ret > RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2 &&
+		    ret <= RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MAX)
+			ret = RTAS_EXTENDED_DELAY_MIN+2;
+
+		max_wait -= rtas_busy_delay_time(ret);
+
+		if (max_wait < 0)
+			break;
+
+		rtas_busy_delay(ret);
+	}
 
+	pr_warn("%s: Unable to configure bridge PHB#%d-PE#%x (%d)\n",
+		__func__, pe->phb->global_number, pe->addr, ret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 8db66424be97..6cb4ce77df19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3029,6 +3029,11 @@ static int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_debugregs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	if (dbgregs->flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (dbgregs->dr6 & ~0xffffffffull)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (dbgregs->dr7 & ~0xffffffffull)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	memcpy(vcpu->arch.db, dbgregs->db, sizeof(vcpu->arch.db));
 	vcpu->arch.dr6 = dbgregs->dr6;
 	kvm_update_dr6(vcpu);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
index 0237ab58f242..a39ee43d1a79 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/ccp-crypto-aes-xts.c
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
 	struct ccp_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(req->base.tfm);
 	struct ccp_aes_req_ctx *rctx = ablkcipher_request_ctx(req);
 	unsigned int unit;
+	u32 unit_size;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!ctx->u.aes.key_len)
@@ -134,11 +135,17 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
 	if (!req->info)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	for (unit = 0; unit < ARRAY_SIZE(unit_size_map); unit++)
-		if (!(req->nbytes & (unit_size_map[unit].size - 1)))
-			break;
+	unit_size = CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST;
+	if (req->nbytes <= unit_size_map[0].size) {
+		for (unit = 0; unit < ARRAY_SIZE(unit_size_map); unit++) {
+			if (!(req->nbytes & (unit_size_map[unit].size - 1))) {
+				unit_size = unit_size_map[unit].value;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
-	if ((unit_size_map[unit].value == CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST) ||
+	if ((unit_size == CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE__LAST) ||
 	    (ctx->u.aes.key_len != AES_KEYSIZE_128)) {
 		/* Use the fallback to process the request for any
 		 * unsupported unit sizes or key sizes
@@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ static int ccp_aes_xts_crypt(struct ablkcipher_request *req,
 	rctx->cmd.engine = CCP_ENGINE_XTS_AES_128;
 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.action = (encrypt) ? CCP_AES_ACTION_ENCRYPT
 					   : CCP_AES_ACTION_DECRYPT;
-	rctx->cmd.u.xts.unit_size = unit_size_map[unit].value;
+	rctx->cmd.u.xts.unit_size = unit_size;
 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.key = &ctx->u.aes.key_sg;
 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.key_len = ctx->u.aes.key_len;
 	rctx->cmd.u.xts.iv = &rctx->iv_sg;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
index 7645a3ce3854..b2af06444c2d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/ef10.c
@@ -451,6 +451,17 @@ fail:
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static void efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
+{
+	struct efx_channel *channel;
+	struct efx_tx_queue *tx_queue;
+
+	/* All our existing PIO buffers went away */
+	efx_for_each_channel(channel, efx)
+		efx_for_each_channel_tx_queue(tx_queue, channel)
+			tx_queue->piobuf = NULL;
+}
+
 #else /* !EFX_USE_PIO */
 
 static int efx_ef10_alloc_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx, unsigned int n)
@@ -467,6 +478,10 @@ static void efx_ef10_free_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
 {
 }
 
+static void efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(struct efx_nic *efx)
+{
+}
+
 #endif /* EFX_USE_PIO */
 
 static void efx_ef10_remove(struct efx_nic *efx)
@@ -698,6 +713,7 @@ static void efx_ef10_reset_mc_allocations(struct efx_nic *efx)
 	nic_data->must_realloc_vis = true;
 	nic_data->must_restore_filters = true;
 	nic_data->must_restore_piobufs = true;
+	efx_ef10_forget_old_piobufs(efx);
 	nic_data->rx_rss_context = EFX_EF10_RSS_CONTEXT_INVALID;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/dcache.c b/fs/dcache.c
index 9b235362efcd..47c06888dc05 100644
--- a/fs/dcache.c
+++ b/fs/dcache.c
@@ -1500,7 +1500,7 @@ struct dentry *d_alloc(struct dentry * parent, const struct qstr *name)
 	struct dentry *dentry = __d_alloc(parent->d_sb, name);
 	if (!dentry)
 		return NULL;
-
+	dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
 	spin_lock(&parent->d_lock);
 	/*
 	 * don't need child lock because it is not subject
@@ -2352,7 +2352,6 @@ static void __d_rehash(struct dentry * entry, struct hlist_bl_head *b)
 {
 	BUG_ON(!d_unhashed(entry));
 	hlist_bl_lock(b);
-	entry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
 	hlist_bl_add_head_rcu(&entry->d_hash, b);
 	hlist_bl_unlock(b);
 }
@@ -2536,6 +2535,7 @@ static void __d_move(struct dentry * dentry, struct dentry * target)
 
 	/* ... and switch the parents */
 	if (IS_ROOT(dentry)) {
+		dentry->d_flags |= DCACHE_RCUACCESS;
 		dentry->d_parent = target->d_parent;
 		target->d_parent = target;
 		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&target->d_child);
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
index f1ea610362c6..9b661a4ccee7 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/kthread.c
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/wait.h>
 #include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
 #include "ecryptfs_kernel.h"
 
 struct ecryptfs_open_req {
@@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
 	flags |= IS_RDONLY(lower_dentry->d_inode) ? O_RDONLY : O_RDWR;
 	(*lower_file) = dentry_open(&req.path, flags, cred);
 	if (!IS_ERR(*lower_file))
-		goto out;
+		goto have_file;
 	if ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR((*lower_file));
 		goto out;
@@ -165,8 +166,16 @@ int ecryptfs_privileged_open(struct file **lower_file,
 	mutex_unlock(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.mux);
 	wake_up(&ecryptfs_kthread_ctl.wait);
 	wait_for_completion(&req.done);
-	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file))
+	if (IS_ERR(*lower_file)) {
 		rc = PTR_ERR(*lower_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+have_file:
+	if ((*lower_file)->f_op->mmap == NULL) {
+		fput(*lower_file);
+		*lower_file = NULL;
+		rc = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
+	}
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/fs/pipe.c b/fs/pipe.c
index a03801186366..fff8057a0809 100644
--- a/fs/pipe.c
+++ b/fs/pipe.c
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@ unsigned int pipe_max_size = 1048576;
  */
 unsigned int pipe_min_size = PAGE_SIZE;
 
+/* Maximum allocatable pages per user. Hard limit is unset by default, soft
+ * matches default values.
+ */
+unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
+unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS * INR_OPEN_CUR;
+
 /*
  * We use a start+len construction, which provides full use of the 
  * allocated memory.
@@ -795,20 +801,49 @@ pipe_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
 	return retval;
 }
 
+static void account_pipe_buffers(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
+                                 unsigned long old, unsigned long new)
+{
+	atomic_long_add(new - old, &pipe->user->pipe_bufs);
+}
+
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(struct user_struct *user)
+{
+	return pipe_user_pages_soft &&
+	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_soft;
+}
+
+static bool too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(struct user_struct *user)
+{
+	return pipe_user_pages_hard &&
+	       atomic_long_read(&user->pipe_bufs) >= pipe_user_pages_hard;
+}
+
 struct pipe_inode_info *alloc_pipe_info(void)
 {
 	struct pipe_inode_info *pipe;
 
 	pipe = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_inode_info), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (pipe) {
-		pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS, GFP_KERNEL);
+		unsigned long pipe_bufs = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
+		struct user_struct *user = get_current_user();
+
+		if (!too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(user)) {
+			if (too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(user))
+				pipe_bufs = 1;
+			pipe->bufs = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pipe_buffer) * pipe_bufs, GFP_KERNEL);
+		}
+
 		if (pipe->bufs) {
 			init_waitqueue_head(&pipe->wait);
 			pipe->r_counter = pipe->w_counter = 1;
-			pipe->buffers = PIPE_DEF_BUFFERS;
+			pipe->buffers = pipe_bufs;
+			pipe->user = user;
+			account_pipe_buffers(pipe, 0, pipe_bufs);
 			mutex_init(&pipe->mutex);
 			return pipe;
 		}
+		free_uid(user);
 		kfree(pipe);
 	}
 
@@ -819,6 +854,8 @@ void free_pipe_info(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, 0);
+	free_uid(pipe->user);
 	for (i = 0; i < pipe->buffers; i++) {
 		struct pipe_buffer *buf = pipe->bufs + i;
 		if (buf->ops)
@@ -1209,6 +1246,7 @@ static long pipe_set_size(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned long nr_pages)
 			memcpy(bufs + head, pipe->bufs, tail * sizeof(struct pipe_buffer));
 	}
 
+	account_pipe_buffers(pipe, pipe->buffers, nr_pages);
 	pipe->curbuf = 0;
 	kfree(pipe->bufs);
 	pipe->bufs = bufs;
@@ -1280,6 +1318,11 @@ long pipe_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && size > pipe_max_size) {
 			ret = -EPERM;
 			goto out;
+		} else if ((too_many_pipe_buffers_hard(pipe->user) ||
+			    too_many_pipe_buffers_soft(pipe->user)) &&
+		           !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
+			ret = -EPERM;
+			goto out;
 		}
 		ret = pipe_set_size(pipe, nr_pages);
 		break;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
index fb8579d35cd4..47533013a772 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_inode.c
@@ -3098,7 +3098,7 @@ xfs_iflush(
 	 */
 	error = xfs_imap_to_bp(mp, NULL, &ip->i_imap, &dip, &bp, XBF_TRYLOCK,
 			       0);
-	if (error == -EAGAIN) {
+	if (error == EAGAIN) {
 		xfs_ifunlock(ip);
 		return error;
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
index a3e215bb0241..7741efa43b35 100644
--- a/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
+++ b/include/linux/netfilter/x_tables.h
@@ -239,11 +239,18 @@ void xt_unregister_match(struct xt_match *target);
 int xt_register_matches(struct xt_match *match, unsigned int n);
 void xt_unregister_matches(struct xt_match *match, unsigned int n);
 
+int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
+			   unsigned int target_offset,
+			   unsigned int next_offset);
+
 int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
 		   bool inv_proto);
 int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *, unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto,
 		    bool inv_proto);
 
+void *xt_copy_counters_from_user(const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
+				 struct xt_counters_info *info, bool compat);
+
 struct xt_table *xt_register_table(struct net *net,
 				   const struct xt_table *table,
 				   struct xt_table_info *bootstrap,
@@ -421,7 +428,7 @@ void xt_compat_init_offsets(u_int8_t af, unsigned int number);
 int xt_compat_calc_jump(u_int8_t af, unsigned int offset);
 
 int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match);
-int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
+void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
 			      unsigned int *size);
 int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m,
 			    void __user **dstptr, unsigned int *size);
@@ -431,6 +438,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
 				unsigned int *size);
 int xt_compat_target_to_user(const struct xt_entry_target *t,
 			     void __user **dstptr, unsigned int *size);
+int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
+				  unsigned int target_offset,
+				  unsigned int next_offset);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
 #endif /* _X_TABLES_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
index ab5752692113..b3374f63bc36 100644
--- a/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
+++ b/include/linux/pipe_fs_i.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct pipe_buffer {
  *	@fasync_readers: reader side fasync
  *	@fasync_writers: writer side fasync
  *	@bufs: the circular array of pipe buffers
+ *	@user: the user who created this pipe
  **/
 struct pipe_inode_info {
 	struct mutex mutex;
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@ struct pipe_inode_info {
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_readers;
 	struct fasync_struct *fasync_writers;
 	struct pipe_buffer *bufs;
+	struct user_struct *user;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -140,6 +142,8 @@ void pipe_unlock(struct pipe_inode_info *);
 void pipe_double_lock(struct pipe_inode_info *, struct pipe_inode_info *);
 
 extern unsigned int pipe_max_size, pipe_min_size;
+extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_hard;
+extern unsigned long pipe_user_pages_soft;
 int pipe_proc_fn(struct ctl_table *, int, void __user *, size_t *, loff_t *);
 
 
diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 7d6152a6700c..77ac8b6a5b68 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ struct user_struct {
 #endif
 	unsigned long locked_shm; /* How many pages of mlocked shm ? */
 	unsigned long unix_inflight;	/* How many files in flight in unix sockets */
+	atomic_long_t pipe_bufs;  /* how many pages are allocated in pipe buffers */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
 	struct key *uid_keyring;	/* UID specific keyring */
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index c1b26e176aa6..df9eab6928d9 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1668,6 +1668,20 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
 		.proc_handler	= &pipe_proc_fn,
 		.extra1		= &pipe_min_size,
 	},
+	{
+		.procname	= "pipe-user-pages-hard",
+		.data		= &pipe_user_pages_hard,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(pipe_user_pages_hard),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+	},
+	{
+		.procname	= "pipe-user-pages-soft",
+		.data		= &pipe_user_pages_soft,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(pipe_user_pages_soft),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_doulongvec_minmax,
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index f95b6f93814b..42155b1af373 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -355,11 +355,25 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_arp *arp)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct arpt_arp uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->arp, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+}
+
+static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
+			     const void *entry0,
+			     const struct arpt_entry *target)
+{
+	struct arpt_entry *iter;
+
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
+		 if (iter == target)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
 }
 
 /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
@@ -398,11 +412,10 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				|= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct arpt_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->arp)) ||
-			    visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -435,6 +448,8 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				size = e->next_offset;
 				e = (struct arpt_entry *)
 					(entry0 + pos + size);
+				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
+					return 0;
 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
 				pos += size;
 			} else {
@@ -454,9 +469,15 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
 						 pos, newpos);
+					e = (struct arpt_entry *)
+						(entry0 + newpos);
+					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
+						return 0;
 				} else {
 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
+					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
+						return 0;
 				}
 				e = (struct arpt_entry *)
 					(entry0 + newpos);
@@ -470,25 +491,6 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
-{
-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
-
-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static inline int check_target(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t = arpt_get_target(e);
@@ -518,10 +520,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 					t->u.user.revision);
@@ -547,7 +545,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->arp))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = arpt_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -566,9 +564,11 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -580,6 +580,14 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+				     e->next_offset);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -588,9 +596,9 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -680,10 +688,8 @@ static int translate_table(struct xt_table_info *newinfo, void *entry0,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0)) {
-		duprintf("Looping hook\n");
+	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, repl->valid_hooks, entry0))
 		return -ELOOP;
-	}
 
 	/* Finally, each sanity check must pass */
 	i = 0;
@@ -1076,6 +1082,9 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1116,56 +1125,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
-	unsigned int num_counters;
-	const char *name;
-	int size;
-	void *ptmp;
 	struct xt_table *t;
 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
 	int ret = 0;
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct arpt_entry *iter;
 	unsigned int addend;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
 
-	if (compat) {
-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		ptmp = &tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
-	}
+	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
+	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
+		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
 
-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	if (compat) {
-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
-		name = compat_tmp.name;
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
-		name = tmp.name;
-	}
-
-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
-	if (!paddc)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, name);
+	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, NFPROTO_ARP, tmp.name);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
 		goto free;
@@ -1173,7 +1144,7 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 
 	local_bh_disable();
 	private = t->private;
-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
+	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_up_free;
 	}
@@ -1199,6 +1170,18 @@ static int do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+struct compat_arpt_replace {
+	char				name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
+	u32				valid_hooks;
+	u32				num_entries;
+	u32				size;
+	u32				hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+	u32				underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
+	u32				num_counters;
+	compat_uptr_t			counters;
+	struct compat_arpt_entry	entries[0];
+};
+
 static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
@@ -1207,24 +1190,22 @@ static inline void compat_release_entry(struct compat_arpt_entry *e)
 	module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
 }
 
-static inline int
+static int
 check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				  unsigned int *size,
 				  const unsigned char *base,
-				  const unsigned char *limit,
-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
-				  const char *name)
+				  const unsigned char *limit)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	unsigned int entry_offset;
-	int ret, off, h;
+	int ret, off;
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_arpt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_arpt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1236,8 +1217,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+					    e->next_offset);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1261,17 +1245,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 	if (ret)
 		goto release_target;
 
-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
-	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
-	}
-
-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
-	e->comefrom = 0;
 	return 0;
 
 release_target:
@@ -1280,18 +1253,17 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int
+static void
 compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
+			    unsigned int *size,
 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	struct arpt_entry *de;
 	unsigned int origsize;
-	int ret, h;
+	int h;
 
-	ret = 0;
 	origsize = *size;
 	de = (struct arpt_entry *)*dstptr;
 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct arpt_entry));
@@ -1312,144 +1284,81 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_arpt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
 	}
-	return ret;
 }
 
-static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
-				  unsigned int valid_hooks,
-				  struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
+static int translate_compat_table(struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
 				  void **pentry0,
-				  unsigned int total_size,
-				  unsigned int number,
-				  unsigned int *hook_entries,
-				  unsigned int *underflows)
+				  const struct compat_arpt_replace *compatr)
 {
 	unsigned int i, j;
 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
 	struct compat_arpt_entry *iter0;
-	struct arpt_entry *iter1;
+	struct arpt_replace repl;
 	unsigned int size;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	info = *pinfo;
 	entry0 = *pentry0;
-	size = total_size;
-	info->number = number;
-
-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
 
 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
 	j = 0;
 	xt_compat_lock(NFPROTO_ARP);
-	xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, number);
+	xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP, compatr->num_entries);
 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
 							entry0,
-							entry0 + total_size,
-							hook_entries,
-							underflows,
-							name);
+							entry0 + compatr->size);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		++j;
 	}
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (j != number) {
+	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
-			 j, number);
+			 j, compatr->num_entries);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
-			continue;
-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
-				 i, underflows[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-	}
-
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
 	if (!newinfo)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	newinfo->number = number;
+	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
 		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
 		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
 	}
 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
 	pos = entry1;
-	size = total_size;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
+		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+					    newinfo, entry1);
+
+	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone */
+
 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
 	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
-	if (ret)
-		goto free_newinfo;
 
-	ret = -ELOOP;
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
-		goto free_newinfo;
+	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
 
-	i = 0;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-		ret = check_target(iter1, name);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-		++i;
-		if (strcmp(arpt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
-			++newinfo->stacksize;
-	}
-	if (ret) {
-		/*
-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
-		 * entries need only release.
-		 */
-		int skip = i;
-		j -= i;
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
-			if (skip-- > 0)
-				continue;
-			if (j-- == 0)
-				break;
-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
-		}
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-			if (i-- == 0)
-				break;
-			cleanup_entry(iter1);
-		}
-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-		return ret;
+	for (i = 0; i < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
+		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
 	}
 
-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
+	repl.num_counters = 0;
+	repl.counters = NULL;
+	repl.size = newinfo->size;
+	ret = translate_table(newinfo, entry1, &repl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_newinfo;
 
 	*pinfo = newinfo;
 	*pentry0 = entry1;
@@ -1458,31 +1367,18 @@ static int translate_compat_table(const char *name,
 
 free_newinfo:
 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-out:
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	return ret;
+out_unlock:
+	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
+	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		if (j-- == 0)
 			break;
 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
 	}
 	return ret;
-out_unlock:
-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(NFPROTO_ARP);
-	xt_compat_unlock(NFPROTO_ARP);
-	goto out;
 }
 
-struct compat_arpt_replace {
-	char				name[XT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN];
-	u32				valid_hooks;
-	u32				num_entries;
-	u32				size;
-	u32				hook_entry[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
-	u32				underflow[NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS];
-	u32				num_counters;
-	compat_uptr_t			counters;
-	struct compat_arpt_entry	entries[0];
-};
-
 static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
 			     unsigned int len)
 {
@@ -1500,6 +1396,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1513,10 +1412,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
 		goto free_newinfo;
 	}
 
-	ret = translate_compat_table(tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
-				     tmp.underflow);
+	ret = translate_compat_table(&newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_newinfo;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 99e810f84671..82b6bc4f9167 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -168,11 +168,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
 /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
 #undef FWINV
 }
 
@@ -229,11 +230,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ipt_entry *s, const struct ipt_entry *e,
 	} else if (s == e) {
 		(*rulenum)++;
 
-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+		if (unconditional(s) &&
 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
-		   t->verdict < 0 &&
-		   unconditional(&s->ip)) {
+		   t->verdict < 0) {
 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
 				? comments[NF_IP_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
@@ -439,6 +439,19 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 #endif
 }
 
+static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
+			     const void *entry0,
+			     const struct ipt_entry *target)
+{
+	struct ipt_entry *iter;
+
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
+		 if (iter == target)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
    there are loops.  Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
 static int
@@ -472,11 +485,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ipt_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 && unconditional(&e->ip)) ||
-			    visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -517,6 +529,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				size = e->next_offset;
 				e = (struct ipt_entry *)
 					(entry0 + pos + size);
+				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
+					return 0;
 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
 				pos += size;
 			} else {
@@ -535,9 +549,15 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
 						 pos, newpos);
+					e = (struct ipt_entry *)
+						(entry0 + newpos);
+					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
+						return 0;
 				} else {
 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
+					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
+						return 0;
 				}
 				e = (struct ipt_entry *)
 					(entry0 + newpos);
@@ -565,27 +585,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
-{
-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
-
-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
-	    e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
 check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
 {
 	const struct ipt_ip *ip = par->entryinfo;
@@ -662,10 +661,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -709,7 +704,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->ip))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = ipt_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -729,9 +724,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -743,6 +740,14 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+				     e->next_offset);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -751,9 +756,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1263,6 +1268,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1304,56 +1312,18 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
-	unsigned int num_counters;
-	const char *name;
-	int size;
-	void *ptmp;
 	struct xt_table *t;
 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
 	int ret = 0;
 	void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ipt_entry *iter;
 	unsigned int addend;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
-
-	if (compat) {
-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		ptmp = &tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
-	}
-
-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	if (compat) {
-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
-		name = compat_tmp.name;
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
-		name = tmp.name;
-	}
+	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
+	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
+		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
 
-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
-	if (!paddc)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, name);
+	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET, tmp.name);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
 		goto free;
@@ -1361,7 +1331,7 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user,
 
 	local_bh_disable();
 	private = t->private;
-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
+	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_up_free;
 	}
@@ -1440,7 +1410,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ipt_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
 
 static int
 compat_find_calc_match(struct xt_entry_match *m,
-		       const char *name,
 		       const struct ipt_ip *ip,
 		       unsigned int hookmask,
 		       int *size)
@@ -1476,21 +1445,19 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				  unsigned int *size,
 				  const unsigned char *base,
-				  const unsigned char *limit,
-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
-				  const char *name)
+				  const unsigned char *limit)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	unsigned int entry_offset;
 	unsigned int j;
-	int ret, off, h;
+	int ret, off;
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ipt_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1502,8 +1469,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
+					    e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1511,8 +1481,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
 	j = 0;
 	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name,
-					     &e->ip, e->comefrom, &off);
+		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, &e->ip, e->comefrom,
+					     &off);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			goto release_matches;
 		++j;
@@ -1535,17 +1505,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
-	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
-	}
-
-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
-	e->comefrom = 0;
 	return 0;
 
 out:
@@ -1559,19 +1518,18 @@ release_matches:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int
+static void
 compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
+			    unsigned int *size,
 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	struct ipt_entry *de;
 	unsigned int origsize;
-	int ret, h;
+	int h;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = 0;
 	origsize = *size;
 	de = (struct ipt_entry *)*dstptr;
 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct ipt_entry));
@@ -1580,198 +1538,104 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ipt_entry *e, void **dstptr,
 	*dstptr += sizeof(struct ipt_entry);
 	*size += sizeof(struct ipt_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ipt_entry);
 
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			return ret;
-	}
+	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e)
+		xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
+
 	de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
 	t = compat_ipt_get_target(e);
 	target = t->u.kernel.target;
 	xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
 
 	de->next_offset = e->next_offset - (origsize - *size);
+
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->hook_entry[h])
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] -= origsize - *size;
 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
 	}
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-compat_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name)
-{
-	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
-	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
-	unsigned int j;
-	int ret = 0;
-
-	j = 0;
-	mtpar.net	= net;
-	mtpar.table     = name;
-	mtpar.entryinfo = &e->ip;
-	mtpar.hook_mask = e->comefrom;
-	mtpar.family    = NFPROTO_IPV4;
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = check_match(ematch, &mtpar);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			goto cleanup_matches;
-		++j;
-	}
-
-	ret = check_target(e, net, name);
-	if (ret)
-		goto cleanup_matches;
-	return 0;
-
- cleanup_matches:
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		if (j-- == 0)
-			break;
-		cleanup_match(ematch, net);
-	}
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int
 translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
-		       const char *name,
-		       unsigned int valid_hooks,
 		       struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
 		       void **pentry0,
-		       unsigned int total_size,
-		       unsigned int number,
-		       unsigned int *hook_entries,
-		       unsigned int *underflows)
+		       const struct compat_ipt_replace *compatr)
 {
 	unsigned int i, j;
 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
 	struct compat_ipt_entry *iter0;
-	struct ipt_entry *iter1;
+	struct ipt_replace repl;
 	unsigned int size;
 	int ret;
 
 	info = *pinfo;
 	entry0 = *pentry0;
-	size = total_size;
-	info->number = number;
-
-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
 
 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
 	j = 0;
 	xt_compat_lock(AF_INET);
-	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, number);
+	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET, compatr->num_entries);
 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
 							entry0,
-							entry0 + total_size,
-							hook_entries,
-							underflows,
-							name);
+							entry0 + compatr->size);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		++j;
 	}
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (j != number) {
+	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
-			 j, number);
+			 j, compatr->num_entries);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
-			continue;
-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
-				 i, underflows[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-	}
-
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
 	if (!newinfo)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	newinfo->number = number;
+	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
-		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
+		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
+		newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
 	}
 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
 	pos = entry1;
-	size = total_size;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
+		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+					    newinfo, entry1);
+
+	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone.
+	 * entry1/newinfo contains a 64bit ruleset that looks exactly as
+	 * generated by 64bit userspace.
+	 *
+	 * Call standard translate_table() to validate all hook_entrys,
+	 * underflows, check for loops, etc.
+	 */
 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
 	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
-	if (ret)
-		goto free_newinfo;
 
-	ret = -ELOOP;
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
-		goto free_newinfo;
+	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
 
-	i = 0;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-		ret = compat_check_entry(iter1, net, name);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-		++i;
-		if (strcmp(ipt_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
-			++newinfo->stacksize;
-	}
-	if (ret) {
-		/*
-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
-		 * entries need only release.
-		 */
-		int skip = i;
-		j -= i;
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
-			if (skip-- > 0)
-				continue;
-			if (j-- == 0)
-				break;
-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
-		}
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-			if (i-- == 0)
-				break;
-			cleanup_entry(iter1, net);
-		}
-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-		return ret;
+	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
+		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
 	}
 
-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
+	repl.num_counters = 0;
+	repl.counters = NULL;
+	repl.size = newinfo->size;
+	ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, entry1, &repl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_newinfo;
 
 	*pinfo = newinfo;
 	*pentry0 = entry1;
@@ -1780,17 +1644,16 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
 
 free_newinfo:
 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-out:
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	return ret;
+out_unlock:
+	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
+	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		if (j-- == 0)
 			break;
 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
 	}
 	return ret;
-out_unlock:
-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET);
-	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET);
-	goto out;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -1810,6 +1673,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1824,10 +1690,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		goto free_newinfo;
 	}
 
-	ret = translate_compat_table(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
-				     tmp.underflow);
+	ret = translate_compat_table(net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_newinfo;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index e080fbbbc0e5..67d5e86dd84c 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -195,11 +195,12 @@ get_entry(const void *base, unsigned int offset)
 
 /* All zeroes == unconditional rule. */
 /* Mildly perf critical (only if packet tracing is on) */
-static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6)
+static inline bool unconditional(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	static const struct ip6t_ip6 uncond;
 
-	return memcmp(ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
+	return e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+	       memcmp(&e->ipv6, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
 }
 
 static inline const struct xt_entry_target *
@@ -255,11 +256,10 @@ get_chainname_rulenum(const struct ip6t_entry *s, const struct ip6t_entry *e,
 	} else if (s == e) {
 		(*rulenum)++;
 
-		if (s->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+		if (unconditional(s) &&
 		    strcmp(t->target.u.kernel.target->name,
 			   XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
-		    t->verdict < 0 &&
-		    unconditional(&s->ipv6)) {
+		    t->verdict < 0) {
 			/* Tail of chains: STANDARD target (return/policy) */
 			*comment = *chainname == hookname
 				? comments[NF_IP6_TRACE_COMMENT_POLICY]
@@ -449,6 +449,19 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
 #endif
 }
 
+static bool find_jump_target(const struct xt_table_info *t,
+			     const void *entry0,
+			     const struct ip6t_entry *target)
+{
+	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
+
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter, entry0, t->size) {
+		 if (iter == target)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
 /* Figures out from what hook each rule can be called: returns 0 if
    there are loops.  Puts hook bitmask in comefrom. */
 static int
@@ -482,11 +495,10 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 			e->comefrom |= ((1 << hook) | (1 << NF_INET_NUMHOOKS));
 
 			/* Unconditional return/END. */
-			if ((e->target_offset == sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) &&
+			if ((unconditional(e) &&
 			     (strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
 				     XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0) &&
-			     t->verdict < 0 &&
-			     unconditional(&e->ipv6)) || visited) {
+			     t->verdict < 0) || visited) {
 				unsigned int oldpos, size;
 
 				if ((strcmp(t->target.u.user.name,
@@ -527,6 +539,8 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				size = e->next_offset;
 				e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
 					(entry0 + pos + size);
+				if (pos + size >= newinfo->size)
+					return 0;
 				e->counters.pcnt = pos;
 				pos += size;
 			} else {
@@ -545,9 +559,15 @@ mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 					/* This a jump; chase it. */
 					duprintf("Jump rule %u -> %u\n",
 						 pos, newpos);
+					e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
+						(entry0 + newpos);
+					if (!find_jump_target(newinfo, entry0, e))
+						return 0;
 				} else {
 					/* ... this is a fallthru */
 					newpos = pos + e->next_offset;
+					if (newpos >= newinfo->size)
+						return 0;
 				}
 				e = (struct ip6t_entry *)
 					(entry0 + newpos);
@@ -574,27 +594,6 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 	module_put(par.match->me);
 }
 
-static int
-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
-{
-	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
-
-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
-	    e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
-	if (e->target_offset + t->u.target_size > e->next_offset)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int check_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
 {
 	const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6 = par->entryinfo;
@@ -673,10 +672,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -720,7 +715,7 @@ static bool check_underflow(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	unsigned int verdict;
 
-	if (!unconditional(&e->ipv6))
+	if (!unconditional(e))
 		return false;
 	t = ip6t_get_target_c(e);
 	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) != 0)
@@ -740,9 +735,11 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p\n", e);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -754,6 +751,14 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	err = xt_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems, e->target_offset,
+				     e->next_offset);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -762,9 +767,9 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
 		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h]) {
 			if (!check_underflow(e)) {
-				pr_err("Underflows must be unconditional and "
-				       "use the STANDARD target with "
-				       "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
+				pr_debug("Underflows must be unconditional and "
+					 "use the STANDARD target with "
+					 "ACCEPT/DROP\n");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
@@ -1273,6 +1278,9 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 	/* overflow check */
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1314,56 +1322,17 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
 	unsigned int i, curcpu;
 	struct xt_counters_info tmp;
 	struct xt_counters *paddc;
-	unsigned int num_counters;
-	char *name;
-	int size;
-	void *ptmp;
 	struct xt_table *t;
 	const struct xt_table_info *private;
 	int ret = 0;
 	const void *loc_cpu_entry;
 	struct ip6t_entry *iter;
 	unsigned int addend;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
-
-	if (compat) {
-		ptmp = &compat_tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct compat_xt_counters_info);
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		ptmp = &tmp;
-		size = sizeof(struct xt_counters_info);
-	}
-
-	if (copy_from_user(ptmp, user, size) != 0)
-		return -EFAULT;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-	if (compat) {
-		num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
-		name = compat_tmp.name;
-	} else
-#endif
-	{
-		num_counters = tmp.num_counters;
-		name = tmp.name;
-	}
-
-	if (len != size + num_counters * sizeof(struct xt_counters))
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	paddc = vmalloc(len - size);
-	if (!paddc)
-		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (copy_from_user(paddc, user + size, len - size) != 0) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-		goto free;
-	}
-
-	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, name);
+	paddc = xt_copy_counters_from_user(user, len, &tmp, compat);
+	if (IS_ERR(paddc))
+		return PTR_ERR(paddc);
+	t = xt_find_table_lock(net, AF_INET6, tmp.name);
 	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(t)) {
 		ret = t ? PTR_ERR(t) : -ENOENT;
 		goto free;
@@ -1372,7 +1341,7 @@ do_add_counters(struct net *net, const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
 
 	local_bh_disable();
 	private = t->private;
-	if (private->number != num_counters) {
+	if (private->number != tmp.num_counters) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto unlock_up_free;
 	}
@@ -1452,7 +1421,6 @@ compat_copy_entry_to_user(struct ip6t_entry *e, void __user **dstptr,
 
 static int
 compat_find_calc_match(struct xt_entry_match *m,
-		       const char *name,
 		       const struct ip6t_ip6 *ipv6,
 		       unsigned int hookmask,
 		       int *size)
@@ -1488,21 +1456,19 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 				  struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 				  unsigned int *size,
 				  const unsigned char *base,
-				  const unsigned char *limit,
-				  const unsigned int *hook_entries,
-				  const unsigned int *underflows,
-				  const char *name)
+				  const unsigned char *limit)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	unsigned int entry_offset;
 	unsigned int j;
-	int ret, off, h;
+	int ret, off;
 
 	duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
-	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
+	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
+	    (unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
 		duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -1514,8 +1480,11 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	ret = xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(e, e->elems,
+					    e->target_offset, e->next_offset);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1523,8 +1492,8 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
 	j = 0;
 	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name,
-					     &e->ipv6, e->comefrom, &off);
+		ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, &e->ipv6, e->comefrom,
+					     &off);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			goto release_matches;
 		++j;
@@ -1547,17 +1516,6 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
-	/* Check hooks & underflows */
-	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
-			newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
-		if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
-			newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
-	}
-
-	/* Clear counters and comefrom */
-	memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
-	e->comefrom = 0;
 	return 0;
 
 out:
@@ -1571,18 +1529,17 @@ release_matches:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static int
+static void
 compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
-			    unsigned int *size, const char *name,
+			    unsigned int *size,
 			    struct xt_table_info *newinfo, unsigned char *base)
 {
 	struct xt_entry_target *t;
 	struct ip6t_entry *de;
 	unsigned int origsize;
-	int ret, h;
+	int h;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = 0;
 	origsize = *size;
 	de = (struct ip6t_entry *)*dstptr;
 	memcpy(de, e, sizeof(struct ip6t_entry));
@@ -1591,11 +1548,9 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
 	*dstptr += sizeof(struct ip6t_entry);
 	*size += sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
 
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			return ret;
-	}
+	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e)
+		xt_compat_match_from_user(ematch, dstptr, size);
+
 	de->target_offset = e->target_offset - (origsize - *size);
 	t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
 	xt_compat_target_from_user(t, dstptr, size);
@@ -1607,181 +1562,82 @@ compat_copy_entry_from_user(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e, void **dstptr,
 		if ((unsigned char *)de - base < newinfo->underflow[h])
 			newinfo->underflow[h] -= origsize - *size;
 	}
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int compat_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net,
-			      const char *name)
-{
-	unsigned int j;
-	int ret = 0;
-	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
-	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
-
-	j = 0;
-	mtpar.net	= net;
-	mtpar.table     = name;
-	mtpar.entryinfo = &e->ipv6;
-	mtpar.hook_mask = e->comefrom;
-	mtpar.family    = NFPROTO_IPV6;
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		ret = check_match(ematch, &mtpar);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			goto cleanup_matches;
-		++j;
-	}
-
-	ret = check_target(e, net, name);
-	if (ret)
-		goto cleanup_matches;
-	return 0;
-
- cleanup_matches:
-	xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
-		if (j-- == 0)
-			break;
-		cleanup_match(ematch, net);
-	}
-	return ret;
 }
 
 static int
 translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
-		       const char *name,
-		       unsigned int valid_hooks,
 		       struct xt_table_info **pinfo,
 		       void **pentry0,
-		       unsigned int total_size,
-		       unsigned int number,
-		       unsigned int *hook_entries,
-		       unsigned int *underflows)
+		       const struct compat_ip6t_replace *compatr)
 {
 	unsigned int i, j;
 	struct xt_table_info *newinfo, *info;
 	void *pos, *entry0, *entry1;
 	struct compat_ip6t_entry *iter0;
-	struct ip6t_entry *iter1;
+	struct ip6t_replace repl;
 	unsigned int size;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	info = *pinfo;
 	entry0 = *pentry0;
-	size = total_size;
-	info->number = number;
-
-	/* Init all hooks to impossible value. */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		info->hook_entry[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-		info->underflow[i] = 0xFFFFFFFF;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	info->number = compatr->num_entries;
 
 	duprintf("translate_compat_table: size %u\n", info->size);
 	j = 0;
 	xt_compat_lock(AF_INET6);
-	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET6, number);
+	xt_compat_init_offsets(AF_INET6, compatr->num_entries);
 	/* Walk through entries, checking offsets. */
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		ret = check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(iter0, info, &size,
 							entry0,
-							entry0 + total_size,
-							hook_entries,
-							underflows,
-							name);
+							entry0 + compatr->size);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			goto out_unlock;
 		++j;
 	}
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (j != number) {
+	if (j != compatr->num_entries) {
 		duprintf("translate_compat_table: %u not %u entries\n",
-			 j, number);
+			 j, compatr->num_entries);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	/* Check hooks all assigned */
-	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		/* Only hooks which are valid */
-		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << i)))
-			continue;
-		if (info->hook_entry[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid hook entry %u %u\n",
-				 i, hook_entries[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-		if (info->underflow[i] == 0xFFFFFFFF) {
-			duprintf("Invalid underflow %u %u\n",
-				 i, underflows[i]);
-			goto out_unlock;
-		}
-	}
-
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(size);
 	if (!newinfo)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	newinfo->number = number;
+	newinfo->number = compatr->num_entries;
 	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
-		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = info->hook_entry[i];
-		newinfo->underflow[i] = info->underflow[i];
+		newinfo->hook_entry[i] = compatr->hook_entry[i];
+		newinfo->underflow[i] = compatr->underflow[i];
 	}
 	entry1 = newinfo->entries[raw_smp_processor_id()];
 	pos = entry1;
-	size = total_size;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
-		ret = compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
-						  name, newinfo, entry1);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-	}
+	size = compatr->size;
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size)
+		compat_copy_entry_from_user(iter0, &pos, &size,
+					    newinfo, entry1);
+
+	/* all module references in entry0 are now gone. */
 	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
 	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
-	if (ret)
-		goto free_newinfo;
 
-	ret = -ELOOP;
-	if (!mark_source_chains(newinfo, valid_hooks, entry1))
-		goto free_newinfo;
+	memcpy(&repl, compatr, sizeof(*compatr));
 
-	i = 0;
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-		ret = compat_check_entry(iter1, net, name);
-		if (ret != 0)
-			break;
-		++i;
-		if (strcmp(ip6t_get_target(iter1)->u.user.name,
-		    XT_ERROR_TARGET) == 0)
-			++newinfo->stacksize;
-	}
-	if (ret) {
-		/*
-		 * The first i matches need cleanup_entry (calls ->destroy)
-		 * because they had called ->check already. The other j-i
-		 * entries need only release.
-		 */
-		int skip = i;
-		j -= i;
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, newinfo->size) {
-			if (skip-- > 0)
-				continue;
-			if (j-- == 0)
-				break;
-			compat_release_entry(iter0);
-		}
-		xt_entry_foreach(iter1, entry1, newinfo->size) {
-			if (i-- == 0)
-				break;
-			cleanup_entry(iter1, net);
-		}
-		xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-		return ret;
+	for (i = 0; i < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; i++) {
+		repl.hook_entry[i] = newinfo->hook_entry[i];
+		repl.underflow[i] = newinfo->underflow[i];
 	}
 
-	/* And one copy for every other CPU */
-	for_each_possible_cpu(i)
-		if (newinfo->entries[i] && newinfo->entries[i] != entry1)
-			memcpy(newinfo->entries[i], entry1, newinfo->size);
+	repl.num_counters = 0;
+	repl.counters = NULL;
+	repl.size = newinfo->size;
+	ret = translate_table(net, newinfo, entry1, &repl);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_newinfo;
 
 	*pinfo = newinfo;
 	*pentry0 = entry1;
@@ -1790,17 +1646,16 @@ translate_compat_table(struct net *net,
 
 free_newinfo:
 	xt_free_table_info(newinfo);
-out:
-	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, total_size) {
+	return ret;
+out_unlock:
+	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
+	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
+	xt_entry_foreach(iter0, entry0, compatr->size) {
 		if (j-- == 0)
 			break;
 		compat_release_entry(iter0);
 	}
 	return ret;
-out_unlock:
-	xt_compat_flush_offsets(AF_INET6);
-	xt_compat_unlock(AF_INET6);
-	goto out;
 }
 
 static int
@@ -1820,6 +1675,9 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters))
 		return -ENOMEM;
+	if (tmp.num_counters == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0;
 
 	newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size);
@@ -1834,10 +1692,7 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, unsigned int len)
 		goto free_newinfo;
 	}
 
-	ret = translate_compat_table(net, tmp.name, tmp.valid_hooks,
-				     &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, tmp.size,
-				     tmp.num_entries, tmp.hook_entry,
-				     tmp.underflow);
+	ret = translate_compat_table(net, &newinfo, &loc_cpu_entry, &tmp);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto free_newinfo;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index b50ae296537d..038304f796d8 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1783,7 +1783,9 @@ static void get_tcp6_sock(struct seq_file *seq, struct sock *sp, int i)
 	destp = ntohs(inet->inet_dport);
 	srcp  = ntohs(inet->inet_sport);
 
-	if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS) {
+	if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_RETRANS ||
+	    icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_EARLY_RETRANS ||
+	    icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_LOSS_PROBE) {
 		timer_active	= 1;
 		timer_expires	= icsk->icsk_timeout;
 	} else if (icsk->icsk_pending == ICSK_TIME_PROBE0) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
index 227aa11e8409..1393af786e15 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/x_tables.c
@@ -435,6 +435,47 @@ int xt_check_match(struct xt_mtchk_param *par,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_check_match);
 
+/** xt_check_entry_match - check that matches end before start of target
+ *
+ * @match: beginning of xt_entry_match
+ * @target: beginning of this rules target (alleged end of matches)
+ * @alignment: alignment requirement of match structures
+ *
+ * Validates that all matches add up to the beginning of the target,
+ * and that each match covers at least the base structure size.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
+ */
+static int xt_check_entry_match(const char *match, const char *target,
+				const size_t alignment)
+{
+	const struct xt_entry_match *pos;
+	int length = target - match;
+
+	if (length == 0) /* no matches */
+		return 0;
+
+	pos = (struct xt_entry_match *)match;
+	do {
+		if ((unsigned long)pos % alignment)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (length < (int)sizeof(struct xt_entry_match))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (pos->u.match_size < sizeof(struct xt_entry_match))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (pos->u.match_size > length)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		length -= pos->u.match_size;
+		pos = ((void *)((char *)(pos) + (pos)->u.match_size));
+	} while (length > 0);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 int xt_compat_add_offset(u_int8_t af, unsigned int offset, int delta)
 {
@@ -504,13 +545,14 @@ int xt_compat_match_offset(const struct xt_match *match)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_offset);
 
-int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
-			      unsigned int *size)
+void xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
+			       unsigned int *size)
 {
 	const struct xt_match *match = m->u.kernel.match;
 	struct compat_xt_entry_match *cm = (struct compat_xt_entry_match *)m;
 	int pad, off = xt_compat_match_offset(match);
 	u_int16_t msize = cm->u.user.match_size;
+	char name[sizeof(m->u.user.name)];
 
 	m = *dstptr;
 	memcpy(m, cm, sizeof(*cm));
@@ -524,10 +566,12 @@ int xt_compat_match_from_user(struct xt_entry_match *m, void **dstptr,
 
 	msize += off;
 	m->u.user.match_size = msize;
+	strlcpy(name, match->name, sizeof(name));
+	module_put(match->me);
+	strncpy(m->u.user.name, name, sizeof(m->u.user.name));
 
 	*size += off;
 	*dstptr += msize;
-	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_from_user);
 
@@ -558,8 +602,125 @@ int xt_compat_match_to_user(const struct xt_entry_match *m,
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_compat_match_to_user);
+
+/* non-compat version may have padding after verdict */
+struct compat_xt_standard_target {
+	struct compat_xt_entry_target t;
+	compat_uint_t verdict;
+};
+
+int xt_compat_check_entry_offsets(const void *base, const char *elems,
+				  unsigned int target_offset,
+				  unsigned int next_offset)
+{
+	long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;
+	const struct compat_xt_entry_target *t;
+	const char *e = base;
+
+	if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
+	if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+	    COMPAT_XT_ALIGN(target_offset + sizeof(struct compat_xt_standard_target)) != next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* compat_xt_entry match has less strict aligment requirements,
+	 * otherwise they are identical.  In case of padding differences
+	 * we need to add compat version of xt_check_entry_match.
+	 */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_match) != sizeof(struct xt_entry_match));
+
+	return xt_check_entry_match(elems, base + target_offset,
+				    __alignof__(struct compat_xt_entry_match));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_compat_check_entry_offsets);
 #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */
 
+/**
+ * xt_check_entry_offsets - validate arp/ip/ip6t_entry
+ *
+ * @base: pointer to arp/ip/ip6t_entry
+ * @elems: pointer to first xt_entry_match, i.e. ip(6)t_entry->elems
+ * @target_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->target_offset
+ * @next_offset: the arp/ip/ip6_t->next_offset
+ *
+ * validates that target_offset and next_offset are sane and that all
+ * match sizes (if any) align with the target offset.
+ *
+ * This function does not validate the targets or matches themselves, it
+ * only tests that all the offsets and sizes are correct, that all
+ * match structures are aligned, and that the last structure ends where
+ * the target structure begins.
+ *
+ * Also see xt_compat_check_entry_offsets for CONFIG_COMPAT version.
+ *
+ * The arp/ip/ip6t_entry structure @base must have passed following tests:
+ * - it must point to a valid memory location
+ * - base to base + next_offset must be accessible, i.e. not exceed allocated
+ *   length.
+ *
+ * A well-formed entry looks like this:
+ *
+ * ip(6)t_entry   match [mtdata]  match [mtdata] target [tgdata] ip(6)t_entry
+ * e->elems[]-----'                              |               |
+ *                matchsize                      |               |
+ *                                matchsize      |               |
+ *                                               |               |
+ * target_offset---------------------------------'               |
+ * next_offset---------------------------------------------------'
+ *
+ * elems[]: flexible array member at end of ip(6)/arpt_entry struct.
+ *          This is where matches (if any) and the target reside.
+ * target_offset: beginning of target.
+ * next_offset: start of the next rule; also: size of this rule.
+ * Since targets have a minimum size, target_offset + minlen <= next_offset.
+ *
+ * Every match stores its size, sum of sizes must not exceed target_offset.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure.
+ */
+int xt_check_entry_offsets(const void *base,
+			   const char *elems,
+			   unsigned int target_offset,
+			   unsigned int next_offset)
+{
+	long size_of_base_struct = elems - (const char *)base;
+	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
+	const char *e = base;
+
+	/* target start is within the ip/ip6/arpt_entry struct */
+	if (target_offset < size_of_base_struct)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (target_offset + sizeof(*t) > next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	t = (void *)(e + target_offset);
+	if (t->u.target_size < sizeof(*t))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (target_offset + t->u.target_size > next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 &&
+	    XT_ALIGN(target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target)) != next_offset)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return xt_check_entry_match(elems, base + target_offset,
+				    __alignof__(struct xt_entry_match));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xt_check_entry_offsets);
+
 int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par,
 		    unsigned int size, u_int8_t proto, bool inv_proto)
 {
@@ -610,6 +771,80 @@ int xt_check_target(struct xt_tgchk_param *par,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_check_target);
 
+/**
+ * xt_copy_counters_from_user - copy counters and metadata from userspace
+ *
+ * @user: src pointer to userspace memory
+ * @len: alleged size of userspace memory
+ * @info: where to store the xt_counters_info metadata
+ * @compat: true if we setsockopt call is done by 32bit task on 64bit kernel
+ *
+ * Copies counter meta data from @user and stores it in @info.
+ *
+ * vmallocs memory to hold the counters, then copies the counter data
+ * from @user to the new memory and returns a pointer to it.
+ *
+ * If @compat is true, @info gets converted automatically to the 64bit
+ * representation.
+ *
+ * The metadata associated with the counters is stored in @info.
+ *
+ * Return: returns pointer that caller has to test via IS_ERR().
+ * If IS_ERR is false, caller has to vfree the pointer.
+ */
+void *xt_copy_counters_from_user(const void __user *user, unsigned int len,
+				 struct xt_counters_info *info, bool compat)
+{
+	void *mem;
+	u64 size;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+	if (compat) {
+		/* structures only differ in size due to alignment */
+		struct compat_xt_counters_info compat_tmp;
+
+		if (len <= sizeof(compat_tmp))
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		len -= sizeof(compat_tmp);
+		if (copy_from_user(&compat_tmp, user, sizeof(compat_tmp)) != 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+		strlcpy(info->name, compat_tmp.name, sizeof(info->name));
+		info->num_counters = compat_tmp.num_counters;
+		user += sizeof(compat_tmp);
+	} else
+#endif
+	{
+		if (len <= sizeof(*info))
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+		len -= sizeof(*info);
+		if (copy_from_user(info, user, sizeof(*info)) != 0)
+			return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+		info->name[sizeof(info->name) - 1] = '\0';
+		user += sizeof(*info);
+	}
+
+	size = sizeof(struct xt_counters);
+	size *= info->num_counters;
+
+	if (size != (u64)len)
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+	mem = vmalloc(len);
+	if (!mem)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	if (copy_from_user(mem, user, len) == 0)
+		return mem;
+
+	vfree(mem);
+	return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(xt_copy_counters_from_user);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 int xt_compat_target_offset(const struct xt_target *target)
 {
@@ -625,6 +860,7 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
 	struct compat_xt_entry_target *ct = (struct compat_xt_entry_target *)t;
 	int pad, off = xt_compat_target_offset(target);
 	u_int16_t tsize = ct->u.user.target_size;
+	char name[sizeof(t->u.user.name)];
 
 	t = *dstptr;
 	memcpy(t, ct, sizeof(*ct));
@@ -638,6 +874,9 @@ void xt_compat_target_from_user(struct xt_entry_target *t, void **dstptr,
 
 	tsize += off;
 	t->u.user.target_size = tsize;
+	strlcpy(name, target->name, sizeof(name));
+	module_put(target->me);
+	strncpy(t->u.user.name, name, sizeof(t->u.user.name));
 
 	*size += off;
 	*dstptr += tsize;
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index fd9373c9f057..d6231f219edc 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -2651,6 +2651,7 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
 	struct netlink_callback *cb;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
 	struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
+	struct module *module;
 	int len, err = -ENOBUFS;
 	int alloc_size;
 
@@ -2700,9 +2701,11 @@ static int netlink_dump(struct sock *sk)
 		cb->done(cb);
 
 	nlk->cb_running = false;
+	module = cb->module;
+	skb = cb->skb;
 	mutex_unlock(nlk->cb_mutex);
-	module_put(cb->module);
-	consume_skb(cb->skb);
+	module_put(module);
+	consume_skb(skb);
 	return 0;
 
 errout_skb:
diff --git a/net/wireless/wext-core.c b/net/wireless/wext-core.c
index 87dd619fb2e9..1c9a505b7019 100644
--- a/net/wireless/wext-core.c
+++ b/net/wireless/wext-core.c
@@ -954,8 +954,29 @@ static int wireless_process_ioctl(struct net *net, struct ifreq *ifr,
 			return private(dev, iwr, cmd, info, handler);
 	}
 	/* Old driver API : call driver ioctl handler */
-	if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl)
-		return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
+	if (dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+		if (info->flags & IW_REQUEST_FLAG_COMPAT) {
+			int ret = 0;
+			struct iwreq iwr_lcl;
+			struct compat_iw_point *iwp_compat = (void *) &iwr->u.data;
+
+			memcpy(&iwr_lcl, iwr, sizeof(struct iwreq));
+			iwr_lcl.u.data.pointer = compat_ptr(iwp_compat->pointer);
+			iwr_lcl.u.data.length = iwp_compat->length;
+			iwr_lcl.u.data.flags = iwp_compat->flags;
+
+			ret = dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, (void *) &iwr_lcl, cmd);
+
+			iwp_compat->pointer = ptr_to_compat(iwr_lcl.u.data.pointer);
+			iwp_compat->length = iwr_lcl.u.data.length;
+			iwp_compat->flags = iwr_lcl.u.data.flags;
+
+			return ret;
+		} else
+#endif
+			return dev->netdev_ops->ndo_do_ioctl(dev, ifr, cmd);
+	}
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 }
 
