diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index 9605dbd4b5b5..141a7bb58b80 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -484,6 +484,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 Date:		January 2018
 Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
 Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
@@ -496,8 +497,7 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulnerabilities
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
 
-		Details about the l1tf file can be found in
-		Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+		See also: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
 
 What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ffc064c1ec68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+========================
+Hardware vulnerabilities
+========================
+
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
+possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
+are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   l1tf
+   mds
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..31653a9f0e1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
+========================
+
+L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
+speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
+when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
+for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
+     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
+
+   - The Intel XEON PHI family
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
+     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
+     available by end of 2018.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
+
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
+   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
+   =============  =================  ==============================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
+table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
+then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
+data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
+by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
+
+While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
+a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
+data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
+opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
+similar to the Meltdown attack.
+
+While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
+allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
+works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
+works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
+extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+1. Malicious user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
+   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
+   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
+   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
+   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
+   deterministic and more practical.
+
+   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
+   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
+   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
+   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
+
+   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
+   malicious user space applications.
+
+2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
+   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
+   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
+   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
+
+   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
+   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
+   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
+   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
+   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
+   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
+   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
+   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
+
+   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
+   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
+   effective (shadow) page tables.
+
+   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
+   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
+   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
+   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
+   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
+   are described in the next sections.
+
+   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
+   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
+
+.. _l1tf_sys_info:
+
+L1TF system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  ===========================   ===============================
+  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
+  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
+  ===========================   ===============================
+
+If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
+information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
+
+  - SMT status:
+
+    =====================  ================
+    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
+    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
+    =====================  ================
+
+  - L1D Flush mode:
+
+    ================================  ====================================
+    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
+
+    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
+
+    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
+    ================================  ====================================
+
+The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
+
+
+Host mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
+user space running on the host.
+
+
+Guest mitigation mechanisms
+---------------------------
+
+.. _l1d_flush:
+
+1. L1D flush on VMENTER
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
+   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
+
+   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
+   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
+   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
+   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
+   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
+   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
+   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
+   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
+   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
+   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
+
+   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
+    - conditional ('cond')
+    - unconditional ('always')
+
+   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
+   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
+   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
+   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
+   address space layout of the hypervisor.
+
+   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
+   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
+   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
+   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
+
+   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
+   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
+
+   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
+   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
+   attackable again.
+
+   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
+   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
+   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+.. _guest_confinement:
+
+2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
+   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
+   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
+   host tasks can run on these cores.
+
+   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
+   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
+   restricted parts of the host memory.
+
+   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
+   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
+   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
+   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
+   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
+   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
+   the code.
+
+   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
+   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
+   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
+   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
+   scenarios.
+
+   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
+   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
+
+.. _interrupt_isolation:
+
+3. Interrupt affinity
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
+   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
+   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
+   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
+   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
+
+   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
+   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
+
+   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
+   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
+   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
+   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
+   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
+   is no way to make general assumptions.
+
+   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
+   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
+   available at:
+
+   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
+
+.. _smt_control:
+
+4. SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
+   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
+   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
+   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
+   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
+
+   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
+   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
+   control SMT.
+
+   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
+
+     =========== ==========================================================
+     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
+		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
+		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
+		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
+		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
+		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
+		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
+		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
+
+     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
+		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
+     =========== ==========================================================
+
+   The sysfs interface provides two files:
+
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
+
+     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
+     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
+
+	==============  ===================================================
+	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
+			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
+			restrictions.
+
+	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
+			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
+			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
+			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
+
+	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+
+	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
+			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
+			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
+	==============  ===================================================
+
+     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
+     state are:
+
+     - on
+     - off
+     - forceoff
+
+   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
+
+     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
+     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
+
+   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
+   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+5. Disabling EPT
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
+  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
+  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
+  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
+  KPTI is enabled.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
+address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
+
+.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
+time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
+		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
+		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
+		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
+		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
+
+  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
+		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
+		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
+
+		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
+		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
+		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
+		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
+		disabled.
+
+  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
+		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
+
+  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
+		warnings.
+		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
+		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
+
+
+.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
+
+Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
+-------------------------------------------------------------
+
+The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
+entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
+
+The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
+following arguments:
+
+  ============  ==============================================================
+  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
+
+  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
+		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
+		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
+		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
+
+  never		Disables the mitigation
+  ============  ==============================================================
+
+The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
+parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
+file:
+
+/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
+
+The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
+line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
+module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
+
+.. _mitigation_selection:
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. No virtualization in use
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
+   action is required.
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
+   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
+   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
+
+   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
+   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
+   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
+  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
+
+  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
+  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
+  VMENTER is not required.
+
+  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
+
+3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
+"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
+  mitigations can be employed:
+
+  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
+
+    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
+    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
+
+    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Guest confinement:
+
+    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
+    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
+    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
+    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
+    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
+
+  - Interrupt isolation:
+
+    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
+    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
+    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
+    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
+    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
+    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
+    which might expose valuable information. See
+    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
+
+The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
+certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
+carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
+available:
+
+  - Disabling SMT:
+
+    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
+    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
+    above mitigation methods.
+
+    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
+    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
+    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
+    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
+
+  - Disabling EPT:
+
+    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
+    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
+    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
+    significant.
+
+    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
+    parameter.
+
+3.4. Nested virtual machines
+""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
+
+When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
+the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
+machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
+guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
+bare metal hypervisor it will:
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
+   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
+   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
+   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
+   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
+   nested virtual machine;
+
+ - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
+   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
+
+
+.. _default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
+    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
+    to ~16TB.
+
+  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
+    a guest.
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
+
+  The rationale for this choice is:
+
+  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
+    unattended updates.
+
+  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
+    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
+    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
+
+    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
+    on their machines blindly.
+
+  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
+    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
+    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
+    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
+    be possible, then the default might be different.
+
+  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
+    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
+    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
+    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
+    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
+    kind of scenarios.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3a796c0d3a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+MDS - Microarchitectural Data Sampling
+======================================
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+unprivileged speculative access to data which is available in various CPU
+internal buffers.
+
+Affected processors
+-------------------
+
+This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
+vulnerability is not present on:
+
+   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
+
+   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
+
+   - Some Atoms (Bonnell, Saltwell, Goldmont, GoldmontPlus)
+
+   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO bit set in the
+     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR.
+
+Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the MDS
+vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`mds_sys_info`.
+
+Not all processors are affected by all variants of MDS, but the mitigation
+is identical for all of them so the kernel treats them as a single
+vulnerability.
+
+Related CVEs
+------------
+
+The following CVE entries are related to the MDS vulnerability:
+
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+   CVE-2018-12126  MSBDS  Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12130  MFBDS  Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling
+   CVE-2018-12127  MLPDS  Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling
+   CVE-2019-11091  MDSUM  Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory
+   ==============  =====  ===================================================
+
+Problem
+-------
+
+When performing store, load, L1 refill operations, processors write data
+into temporary microarchitectural structures (buffers). The data in the
+buffer can be forwarded to load operations as an optimization.
+
+Under certain conditions, usually a fault/assist caused by a load
+operation, data unrelated to the load memory address can be speculatively
+forwarded from the buffers. Because the load operation causes a fault or
+assist and its result will be discarded, the forwarded data will not cause
+incorrect program execution or state changes. But a malicious operation
+may be able to forward this speculative data to a disclosure gadget which
+allows in turn to infer the value via a cache side channel attack.
+
+Because the buffers are potentially shared between Hyper-Threads cross
+Hyper-Thread attacks are possible.
+
+Deeper technical information is available in the MDS specific x86
+architecture section: :ref:`Documentation/x86/mds.rst <mds>`.
+
+
+Attack scenarios
+----------------
+
+Attacks against the MDS vulnerabilities can be mounted from malicious non
+priviledged user space applications running on hosts or guest. Malicious
+guest OSes can obviously mount attacks as well.
+
+Contrary to other speculation based vulnerabilities the MDS vulnerability
+does not allow the attacker to control the memory target address. As a
+consequence the attacks are purely sampling based, but as demonstrated with
+the TLBleed attack samples can be postprocessed successfully.
+
+Web-Browsers
+^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  It's unclear whether attacks through Web-Browsers are possible at
+  all. The exploitation through Java-Script is considered very unlikely,
+  but other widely used web technologies like Webassembly could possibly be
+  abused.
+
+
+.. _mds_sys_info:
+
+MDS system information
+-----------------------
+
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current MDS
+status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
+mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+
+         The mitigation is enabled on a best effort basis. See :ref:`vmwerv`
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+         enabled.
+
+If the processor is vulnerable then the following information is appended
+to the above information:
+
+    ========================  ============================================
+    'SMT vulnerable'          SMT is enabled
+    'SMT mitigated'           SMT is enabled and mitigated
+    'SMT disabled'            SMT is disabled
+    'SMT Host state unknown'  Kernel runs in a VM, Host SMT state unknown
+    ========================  ============================================
+
+.. _vmwerv:
+
+Best effort mitigation mode
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  If the processor is vulnerable, but the availability of the microcode based
+  mitigation mechanism is not advertised via CPUID the kernel selects a best
+  effort mitigation mode.  This mode invokes the mitigation instructions
+  without a guarantee that they clear the CPU buffers.
+
+  This is done to address virtualization scenarios where the host has the
+  microcode update applied, but the hypervisor is not yet updated to expose
+  the CPUID to the guest. If the host has updated microcode the protection
+  takes effect otherwise a few cpu cycles are wasted pointlessly.
+
+  The state in the mds sysfs file reflects this situation accordingly.
+
+
+Mitigation mechanism
+-------------------------
+
+The kernel detects the affected CPUs and the presence of the microcode
+which is required.
+
+If a CPU is affected and the microcode is available, then the kernel
+enables the mitigation by default. The mitigation can be controlled at boot
+time via a kernel command line option. See
+:ref:`mds_mitigation_control_command_line`.
+
+.. _cpu_buffer_clear:
+
+CPU buffer clearing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The mitigation for MDS clears the affected CPU buffers on return to user
+  space and when entering a guest.
+
+  If SMT is enabled it also clears the buffers on idle entry when the CPU
+  is only affected by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant, because the
+  other variants cannot be protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks.
+
+  For CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS the user space, guest and idle
+  transition mitigations are sufficient and SMT is not affected.
+
+.. _virt_mechanism:
+
+Virtualization mitigation
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The protection for host to guest transition depends on the L1TF
+  vulnerability of the CPU:
+
+  - CPU is affected by L1TF:
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is enabled and up to date microcode is
+    available, the L1D flush mitigation is automatically protecting the
+    guest transition.
+
+    If the L1D flush mitigation is disabled then the MDS mitigation is
+    invoked explicit when the host MDS mitigation is enabled.
+
+    For details on L1TF and virtualization see:
+    :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <mitigation_control_kvm>`.
+
+  - CPU is not affected by L1TF:
+
+    CPU buffers are flushed before entering the guest when the host MDS
+    mitigation is enabled.
+
+  The resulting MDS protection matrix for the host to guest transition:
+
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+   L1TF         MDS   VMX-L1FLUSH   Host MDS     MDS-State
+
+   Don't care   No    Don't care    N/A          Not affected
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Off          Vulnerable
+
+   Yes          Yes   Disabled      Full         Mitigated
+
+   Yes          Yes   Enabled       Don't care   Mitigated
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Off          Vulnerable
+
+   No           Yes   N/A           Full         Mitigated
+  ============ ===== ============= ============ =================
+
+  This only covers the host to guest transition, i.e. prevents leakage from
+  host to guest, but does not protect the guest internally. Guests need to
+  have their own protections.
+
+.. _xeon_phi:
+
+XEON PHI specific considerations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  The XEON PHI processor family is affected by MSBDS which can be exploited
+  cross Hyper-Threads when entering idle states. Some XEON PHI variants allow
+  to use MWAIT in user space (Ring 3) which opens an potential attack vector
+  for malicious user space. The exposure can be disabled on the kernel
+  command line with the 'ring3mwait=disable' command line option.
+
+  XEON PHI is not affected by the other MDS variants and MSBDS is mitigated
+  before the CPU enters a idle state. As XEON PHI is not affected by L1TF
+  either disabling SMT is not required for full protection.
+
+.. _mds_smt_control:
+
+SMT control
+^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+  All MDS variants except MSBDS can be attacked cross Hyper-Threads. That
+  means on CPUs which are affected by MFBDS or MLPDS it is necessary to
+  disable SMT for full protection. These are most of the affected CPUs; the
+  exception is XEON PHI, see :ref:`xeon_phi`.
+
+  Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but the impact
+  depends on the type of workloads.
+
+  See the relevant chapter in the L1TF mitigation documentation for details:
+  :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst <smt_control>`.
+
+
+.. _mds_mitigation_control_command_line:
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+
+The kernel command line allows to control the MDS mitigations at boot
+time with the option "mds=". The valid arguments for this option are:
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+  full		If the CPU is vulnerable, enable all available mitigations
+		for the MDS vulnerability, CPU buffer clearing on exit to
+		userspace and when entering a VM. Idle transitions are
+		protected as well if SMT is enabled.
+
+		It does not automatically disable SMT.
+
+  full,nosmt	The same as mds=full, with SMT disabled on vulnerable
+		CPUs.  This is the complete mitigation.
+
+  off		Disables MDS mitigations completely.
+
+  ============  =============================================================
+
+Not specifying this option is equivalent to "mds=full".
+
+
+Mitigation selection guide
+--------------------------
+
+1. Trusted userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   If all userspace applications are from a trusted source and do not
+   execute untrusted code which is supplied externally, then the mitigation
+   can be disabled.
+
+
+2. Virtualization with trusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The same considerations as above versus trusted user space apply.
+
+3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   The protection depends on the state of the L1TF mitigations.
+   See :ref:`virt_mechanism`.
+
+   If the MDS mitigation is enabled and SMT is disabled, guest to host and
+   guest to guest attacks are prevented.
+
+.. _mds_default_mitigations:
+
+Default mitigations
+-------------------
+
+  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
+
+  - Enable CPU buffer clearing
+
+  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
+  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted code. The same rationale as
+  for L1TF applies.
+  See :ref:`Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln//l1tf.rst <default_mitigations>`.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
index 0a491676685e..42247516962a 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/index.rst
@@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ etc.
    kernel-parameters
    devices
 
-This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
-possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
-are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
+This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and their mitigations.
 
 .. toctree::
    :maxdepth: 1
 
-   l1tf
+   hw-vuln/index
 
 Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
 problems and bugs in particular.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 2b8ee90bb644..c7937f379d22 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2141,7 +2141,7 @@
 
 			Default is 'flush'.
 
-			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
 
 	l2cr=		[PPC]
 
@@ -2387,6 +2387,32 @@
 			Format: <first>,<last>
 			Specifies range of consoles to be captured by the MDA.
 
+	mds=		[X86,INTEL]
+			Control mitigation for the Micro-architectural Data
+			Sampling (MDS) vulnerability.
+
+			Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an exploit against CPU
+			internal buffers which can forward information to a
+			disclosure gadget under certain conditions.
+
+			In vulnerable processors, the speculatively
+			forwarded data can be used in a cache side channel
+			attack, to access data to which the attacker does
+			not have direct access.
+
+			This parameter controls the MDS mitigation. The
+			options are:
+
+			full       - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+			full,nosmt - Enable MDS mitigation and disable
+				     SMT on vulnerable CPUs
+			off        - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+
+			Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+			mds=full.
+
+			For details see: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst
+
 	mem=nn[KMG]	[KNL,BOOT] Force usage of a specific amount of memory
 			Amount of memory to be used when the kernel is not able
 			to see the whole system memory or for test.
@@ -2544,6 +2570,40 @@
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			[X86,PPC,S390] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86,PPC]
+					       nospectre_v1 [PPC]
+					       nobp=0 [S390]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
+					       l1tf=off [X86]
+					       mds=off [X86]
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
+
+			auto,nosmt
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, disabling SMT
+				if needed.  This is for users who always want to
+				be fully mitigated, even if it means losing SMT.
+				Equivalent to: l1tf=flush,nosmt [X86]
+					       mds=full,nosmt [X86]
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
deleted file mode 100644
index 9af977384168..000000000000
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/l1tf.rst
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
-========================
-
-L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
-speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
-when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
-for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
-
-Affected processors
--------------------
-
-This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
-vulnerability is not present on:
-
-   - Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
-
-   - Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
-
-   - A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
-     Penwell, Pineview, Silvermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
-
-   - The Intel XEON PHI family
-
-   - Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
-     IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
-     by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
-     available by end of 2018.
-
-Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
-vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
-
-Related CVEs
-------------
-
-The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
-
-   =============  =================  ==============================
-   CVE-2018-3615  L1 Terminal Fault  SGX related aspects
-   CVE-2018-3620  L1 Terminal Fault  OS, SMM related aspects
-   CVE-2018-3646  L1 Terminal Fault  Virtualization related aspects
-   =============  =================  ==============================
-
-Problem
--------
-
-If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
-table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
-then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
-data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
-by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
-
-While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
-a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
-data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
-opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
-similar to the Meltdown attack.
-
-While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
-allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
-works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
-works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
-extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
-
-
-Attack scenarios
-----------------
-
-1. Malicious user space
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
-   PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
-   application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
-   In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
-   encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
-   deterministic and more practical.
-
-   The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
-   inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
-   impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
-   marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
-
-   A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
-   malicious user space applications.
-
-2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
-   OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
-   space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
-   PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
-
-   A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
-   multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
-   HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
-   share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
-   only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
-   on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
-   the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
-   core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
-
-   If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
-   only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
-   effective (shadow) page tables.
-
-   While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
-   mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
-   can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
-   mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
-   deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
-   are described in the next sections.
-
-   The default mitigations and the rationale for choosing them are explained
-   at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
-
-.. _l1tf_sys_info:
-
-L1TF system information
------------------------
-
-The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
-status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
-mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
-
-/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
-
-The possible values in this file are:
-
-  ===========================   ===============================
-  'Not affected'		The processor is not vulnerable
-  'Mitigation: PTE Inversion'	The host protection is active
-  ===========================   ===============================
-
-If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
-information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
-
-  - SMT status:
-
-    =====================  ================
-    'VMX: SMT vulnerable'  SMT is enabled
-    'VMX: SMT disabled'    SMT is disabled
-    =====================  ================
-
-  - L1D Flush mode:
-
-    ================================  ====================================
-    'L1D vulnerable'		      L1D flushing is disabled
-
-    'L1D conditional cache flushes'   L1D flush is conditionally enabled
-
-    'L1D cache flushes'		      L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
-    ================================  ====================================
-
-The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
-
-
-Host mitigation mechanism
--------------------------
-
-The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
-user space running on the host.
-
-
-Guest mitigation mechanisms
----------------------------
-
-.. _l1d_flush:
-
-1. L1D flush on VMENTER
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
-   the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
-
-   Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
-   by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
-   data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
-   bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
-   frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
-   performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
-   scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
-   minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
-   confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
-   application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
-
-   The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
-    - conditional ('cond')
-    - unconditional ('always')
-
-   The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
-   only audited code paths before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
-   paths have been verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
-   interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
-   address space layout of the hypervisor.
-
-   Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
-   maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
-   mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
-   workload scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
-
-   The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
-   defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
-
-   **Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
-   sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
-   attackable again.
-
-   L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
-   line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
-   and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-.. _guest_confinement:
-
-2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
-   guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
-   that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
-   host tasks can run on these cores.
-
-   If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
-   the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
-   restricted parts of the host memory.
-
-   Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
-   host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
-   of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
-   which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
-   threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
-   declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
-   the code.
-
-   **Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
-   the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
-   negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
-   scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
-   scenarios.
-
-   For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
-   of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
-
-   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
-
-.. _interrupt_isolation:
-
-3. Interrupt affinity
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
-   true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
-   interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
-   devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
-   queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
-
-   Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
-   which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
-
-   Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
-   guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
-   configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
-   of the interrupts it can be assumed that they won't expose interesting
-   information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
-   is no way to make general assumptions.
-
-   Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
-   /proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
-   available at:
-
-   https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
-
-.. _smt_control:
-
-4. SMT control
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
-   completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
-   the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
-   The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
-   of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
-
-   The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
-   to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
-   control SMT.
-
-   The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
-
-     =========== ==========================================================
-     nosmt	 Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
-		 kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
-		 boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
-		 core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
-		 activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
-		 to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
-		 to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
-		 again.  "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
-
-     nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt" but it does not allow to
-		 undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
-     =========== ==========================================================
-
-   The sysfs interface provides two files:
-
-   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
-   - /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
-
-   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
-
-     This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
-     ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
-
-	==============  ===================================================
-	on		SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
-			logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
-			restrictions.
-
-	off		SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
-			the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
-			and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
-			online a non-primary sibling is rejected
-
-	forceoff	Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
-			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
-
-	notsupported	The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
-			not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
-			Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
-	==============  ===================================================
-
-     The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
-     state are:
-
-     - on
-     - off
-     - forceoff
-
-   /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
-
-     This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
-     physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
-
-   SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
-   line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
-   :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
-
-5. Disabling EPT
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-  Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
-  with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
-  managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
-  significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
-  KPTI is enabled.
-
-  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
-address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
-
-.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
-
-Mitigation control on the kernel command line
----------------------------------------------
-
-The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
-time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
-
-  ============  =============================================================
-  full		Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
-		vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
-		the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  full,force	Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
-		control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
-		(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
-
-  flush		Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
-		mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  flush,nosmt	Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
-		i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
-
-		SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
-		is still possible after boot.  Hypervisors will issue a
-		warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
-		insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
-		disabled.
-
-  flush,nowarn	Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
-		started in a potentially insecure configuration.
-
-  off		Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
-		warnings.
-		It also drops the swap size and available RAM limit restrictions
-		on both hypervisor and bare metal.
-
-  ============  =============================================================
-
-The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
-
-
-.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
-
-Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
--------------------------------------------------------------
-
-The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
-entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
-
-The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
-following arguments:
-
-  ============  ==============================================================
-  always	L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
-
-  cond		Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
-		VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
-		interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
-		which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
-
-  never		Disables the mitigation
-  ============  ==============================================================
-
-The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
-parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
-file:
-
-/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
-
-The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
-line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
-module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
-
-
-Mitigation selection guide
---------------------------
-
-1. No virtualization in use
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
-   action is required.
-
-2. Virtualization with trusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-   If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
-   guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
-   protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
-
-   To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
-   administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
-   sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
-   :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-
-3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
-^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
-
-3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
-  the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
-
-  Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
-  :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
-  the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
-  VMENTER is not required.
-
-  EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
-
-3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
-"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-  If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
-  mitigations can be employed:
-
-  - L1D flushing on VMENTER:
-
-    L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
-    is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
-
-    Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-  - Guest confinement:
-
-    Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
-    are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
-    significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
-    still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
-    :ref:`guest_confinement`.
-
-  - Interrupt isolation:
-
-    Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
-    further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
-    of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
-    about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
-    affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
-    the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
-    which might expose valuable information. See
-    :ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
-
-The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
-certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
-carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
-available:
-
-  - Disabling SMT:
-
-    Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
-    amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
-    above mitigation methods.
-
-    SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
-    parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
-    time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
-    :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
-
-  - Disabling EPT:
-
-    Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
-    not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
-    enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
-    significant.
-
-    EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
-    parameter.
-
-3.4. Nested virtual machines
-""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
-
-When nested virtualization is in use, three operating systems are involved:
-the bare metal hypervisor, the nested hypervisor and the nested virtual
-machine.  VMENTER operations from the nested hypervisor into the nested
-guest will always be processed by the bare metal hypervisor. If KVM is the
-bare metal hypervisor it will:
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested hypervisor to the
-   nested virtual machine, so that the nested hypervisor's secrets are not
-   exposed to the nested virtual machine;
-
- - Flush the L1D cache on every switch from the nested virtual machine to
-   the nested hypervisor; this is a complex operation, and flushing the L1D
-   cache avoids that the bare metal hypervisor's secrets are exposed to the
-   nested virtual machine;
-
- - Instruct the nested hypervisor to not perform any L1D cache flush. This
-   is an optimization to avoid double L1D flushing.
-
-
-.. _default_mitigations:
-
-Default mitigations
--------------------
-
-  The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
-
-  - PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
-    unconditionally and cannot be controlled. The swap storage is limited
-    to ~16TB.
-
-  - L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
-    a guest.
-
-  The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
-  SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
-
-  The rationale for this choice is:
-
-  - Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
-    unattended updates.
-
-  - If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
-    just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
-    guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
-
-    There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
-    on their machines blindly.
-
-  - It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
-    impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
-    mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
-    control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
-    be possible, then the default might be different.
-
-  - The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
-    analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
-    mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
-    machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
-    There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
-    kind of scenarios.
diff --git a/Documentation/index.rst b/Documentation/index.rst
index 80a421cb935e..3511400dc092 100644
--- a/Documentation/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/index.rst
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ implementation.
    :maxdepth: 2
 
    sh/index
+   x86/index
 
 Filesystem Documentation
 ------------------------
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/conf.py b/Documentation/x86/conf.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..33c5c3142e20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/conf.py
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# -*- coding: utf-8; mode: python -*-
+
+project = "X86 architecture specific documentation"
+
+tags.add("subproject")
+
+latex_documents = [
+    ('index', 'x86.tex', project,
+     'The kernel development community', 'manual'),
+]
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/index.rst b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef389dcf1b1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/index.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+==========================
+x86 architecture specifics
+==========================
+
+.. toctree::
+   :maxdepth: 1
+
+   mds
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..534e9baa4e1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) mitigation
+=================================================
+
+.. _mds:
+
+Overview
+--------
+
+Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) is a family of side channel attacks
+on internal buffers in Intel CPUs. The variants are:
+
+ - Microarchitectural Store Buffer Data Sampling (MSBDS) (CVE-2018-12126)
+ - Microarchitectural Fill Buffer Data Sampling (MFBDS) (CVE-2018-12130)
+ - Microarchitectural Load Port Data Sampling (MLPDS) (CVE-2018-12127)
+ - Microarchitectural Data Sampling Uncacheable Memory (MDSUM) (CVE-2019-11091)
+
+MSBDS leaks Store Buffer Entries which can be speculatively forwarded to a
+dependent load (store-to-load forwarding) as an optimization. The forward
+can also happen to a faulting or assisting load operation for a different
+memory address, which can be exploited under certain conditions. Store
+buffers are partitioned between Hyper-Threads so cross thread forwarding is
+not possible. But if a thread enters or exits a sleep state the store
+buffer is repartitioned which can expose data from one thread to the other.
+
+MFBDS leaks Fill Buffer Entries. Fill buffers are used internally to manage
+L1 miss situations and to hold data which is returned or sent in response
+to a memory or I/O operation. Fill buffers can forward data to a load
+operation and also write data to the cache. When the fill buffer is
+deallocated it can retain the stale data of the preceding operations which
+can then be forwarded to a faulting or assisting load operation, which can
+be exploited under certain conditions. Fill buffers are shared between
+Hyper-Threads so cross thread leakage is possible.
+
+MLPDS leaks Load Port Data. Load ports are used to perform load operations
+from memory or I/O. The received data is then forwarded to the register
+file or a subsequent operation. In some implementations the Load Port can
+contain stale data from a previous operation which can be forwarded to
+faulting or assisting loads under certain conditions, which again can be
+exploited eventually. Load ports are shared between Hyper-Threads so cross
+thread leakage is possible.
+
+MDSUM is a special case of MSBDS, MFBDS and MLPDS. An uncacheable load from
+memory that takes a fault or assist can leave data in a microarchitectural
+structure that may later be observed using one of the same methods used by
+MSBDS, MFBDS or MLPDS.
+
+Exposure assumptions
+--------------------
+
+It is assumed that attack code resides in user space or in a guest with one
+exception. The rationale behind this assumption is that the code construct
+needed for exploiting MDS requires:
+
+ - to control the load to trigger a fault or assist
+
+ - to have a disclosure gadget which exposes the speculatively accessed
+   data for consumption through a side channel.
+
+ - to control the pointer through which the disclosure gadget exposes the
+   data
+
+The existence of such a construct in the kernel cannot be excluded with
+100% certainty, but the complexity involved makes it extremly unlikely.
+
+There is one exception, which is untrusted BPF. The functionality of
+untrusted BPF is limited, but it needs to be thoroughly investigated
+whether it can be used to create such a construct.
+
+
+Mitigation strategy
+-------------------
+
+All variants have the same mitigation strategy at least for the single CPU
+thread case (SMT off): Force the CPU to clear the affected buffers.
+
+This is achieved by using the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW
+instruction in combination with a microcode update. The microcode clears
+the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is executed.
+
+For virtualization there are two ways to achieve CPU buffer
+clearing. Either the modified VERW instruction or via the L1D Flush
+command. The latter is issued when L1TF mitigation is enabled so the extra
+VERW can be avoided. If the CPU is not affected by L1TF then VERW needs to
+be issued.
+
+If the VERW instruction with the supplied segment selector argument is
+executed on a CPU without the microcode update there is no side effect
+other than a small number of pointlessly wasted CPU cycles.
+
+This does not protect against cross Hyper-Thread attacks except for MSBDS
+which is only exploitable cross Hyper-thread when one of the Hyper-Threads
+enters a C-state.
+
+The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
+
+    mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
+
+The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
+(idle) transitions.
+
+As a special quirk to address virtualization scenarios where the host has
+the microcode updated, but the hypervisor does not (yet) expose the
+MD_CLEAR CPUID bit to guests, the kernel issues the VERW instruction in the
+hope that it might actually clear the buffers. The state is reflected
+accordingly.
+
+According to current knowledge additional mitigations inside the kernel
+itself are not required because the necessary gadgets to expose the leaked
+data cannot be controlled in a way which allows exploitation from malicious
+user space or VM guests.
+
+Kernel internal mitigation modes
+--------------------------------
+
+ ======= ============================================================
+ off      Mitigation is disabled. Either the CPU is not affected or
+          mds=off is supplied on the kernel command line
+
+ full     Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is
+          advertised in CPUID.
+
+ vmwerv	  Mitigation is enabled. CPU is affected and MD_CLEAR is not
+	  advertised in CPUID. That is mainly for virtualization
+	  scenarios where the host has the updated microcode but the
+	  hypervisor does not expose MD_CLEAR in CPUID. It's a best
+	  effort approach without guarantee.
+ ======= ============================================================
+
+If the CPU is affected and mds=off is not supplied on the kernel command
+line then the kernel selects the appropriate mitigation mode depending on
+the availability of the MD_CLEAR CPUID bit.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+
+1. Return to user space
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
+   on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
+   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
+   mds_user_clear.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
+   most of the kernel to user space transitions. There are a few exceptions
+   which are not invoking prepare_exit_to_usermode() on return to user
+   space. These exceptions use the paranoid exit code.
+
+   - Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI):
+
+     Access to sensible data like keys, credentials in the NMI context is
+     mostly theoretical: The CPU can do prefetching or execute a
+     misspeculated code path and thereby fetching data which might end up
+     leaking through a buffer.
+
+     But for mounting other attacks the kernel stack address of the task is
+     already valuable information. So in full mitigation mode, the NMI is
+     mitigated on the return from do_nmi() to provide almost complete
+     coverage.
+
+   - Double fault (#DF):
+
+     A double fault is usually fatal, but the ESPFIX workaround, which can
+     be triggered from user space through modify_ldt(2) is a recoverable
+     double fault. #DF uses the paranoid exit path, so explicit mitigation
+     in the double fault handler is required.
+
+   - Machine Check Exception (#MC):
+
+     Another corner case is a #MC which hits between the CPU buffer clear
+     invocation and the actual return to user. As this still is in kernel
+     space it takes the paranoid exit path which does not clear the CPU
+     buffers. So the #MC handler repopulates the buffers to some
+     extent. Machine checks are not reliably controllable and the window is
+     extremly small so mitigation would just tick a checkbox that this
+     theoretical corner case is covered. To keep the amount of special
+     cases small, ignore #MC.
+
+   - Debug Exception (#DB):
+
+     This takes the paranoid exit path only when the INT1 breakpoint is in
+     kernel space. #DB on a user space address takes the regular exit path,
+     so no extra mitigation required.
+
+
+2. C-State transition
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+   When a CPU goes idle and enters a C-State the CPU buffers need to be
+   cleared on affected CPUs when SMT is active. This addresses the
+   repartitioning of the store buffer when one of the Hyper-Threads enters
+   a C-State.
+
+   When SMT is inactive, i.e. either the CPU does not support it or all
+   sibling threads are offline CPU buffer clearing is not required.
+
+   The idle clearing is enabled on CPUs which are only affected by MSBDS
+   and not by any other MDS variant. The other MDS variants cannot be
+   protected against cross Hyper-Thread attacks because the Fill Buffer and
+   the Load Ports are shared. So on CPUs affected by other variants, the
+   idle clearing would be a window dressing exercise and is therefore not
+   activated.
+
+   The invocation is controlled by the static key mds_idle_clear which is
+   switched depending on the chosen mitigation mode and the SMT state of
+   the system.
+
+   The buffer clear is only invoked before entering the C-State to prevent
+   that stale data from the idling CPU from spilling to the Hyper-Thread
+   sibling after the store buffer got repartitioned and all entries are
+   available to the non idle sibling.
+
+   When coming out of idle the store buffer is partitioned again so each
+   sibling has half of it available. The back from idle CPU could be then
+   speculatively exposed to contents of the sibling. The buffers are
+   flushed either on exit to user space or on VMENTER so malicious code
+   in user space or the guest cannot speculatively access them.
+
+   The mitigation is hooked into all variants of halt()/mwait(), but does
+   not cover the legacy ACPI IO-Port mechanism because the ACPI idle driver
+   has been superseded by the intel_idle driver around 2010 and is
+   preferred on all affected CPUs which are expected to gain the MD_CLEAR
+   functionality in microcode. Aside of that the IO-Port mechanism is a
+   legacy interface which is only used on older systems which are either
+   not affected or do not receive microcode updates anymore.
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 26c92f892d24..f6c763aff4f3 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 VERSION = 5
 PATCHLEVEL = 1
-SUBLEVEL = 0
+SUBLEVEL = 3
 EXTRAVERSION =
 NAME = Shy Crocodile
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
index c7e1a7837706..6fb2214333a2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
@@ -23,26 +23,34 @@
 
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 
+#define FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS	128 /* What's the largest number you can think of? */
+
 #define __futex_atomic_op(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg)		\
 do {									\
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;				\
+									\
 	uaccess_enable();						\
 	asm volatile(							\
 "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"					\
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"						\
 	insn "\n"							\
 "2:	stlxr	%w0, %w3, %2\n"						\
-"	cbnz	%w0, 1b\n"						\
-"	dmb	ish\n"							\
+"	cbz	%w0, 3f\n"						\
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w0\n"					\
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"						\
+"	mov	%w0, %w7\n"						\
 "3:\n"									\
+"	dmb	ish\n"							\
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"					\
 "	.align	2\n"							\
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w5\n"						\
+"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"						\
 "	b	3b\n"							\
 "	.popsection\n"							\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)						\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)						\
-	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)	\
-	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT)					\
+	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp),	\
+	  "+r" (loops)							\
+	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)			\
 	: "memory");							\
 	uaccess_disable();						\
 } while (0)
@@ -57,23 +65,23 @@ arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, int *oval, u32 __user *_uaddr)
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case FUTEX_OP_SET:
-		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ADD:
-		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_OR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ANDN:
-		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, ~oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_XOR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -93,6 +101,7 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *_uaddr,
 			      u32 oldval, u32 newval)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;
 	u32 val, tmp;
 	u32 __user *uaddr;
 
@@ -104,20 +113,24 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval, u32 __user *_uaddr,
 	asm volatile("// futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic\n"
 "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"
-"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w4\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 3f\n"
-"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w5, %2\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 1b\n"
-"	dmb	ish\n"
+"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w5\n"
+"	cbnz	%w3, 4f\n"
+"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w6, %2\n"
+"	cbz	%w3, 3f\n"
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w3\n"
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"
+"	mov	%w0, %w8\n"
 "3:\n"
+"	dmb	ish\n"
+"4:\n"
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"
-"	b	3b\n"
+"5:	mov	%w0, %w7\n"
+"	b	4b\n"
 "	.popsection\n"
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)
-	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)
-	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 5b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
+	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp), "+r" (loops)
+	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)
 	: "memory");
 	uaccess_disable();
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgalloc.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgalloc.h
index 138bc2ecc0c4..ba188797d940 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgalloc.h
@@ -81,6 +81,9 @@ static inline pgd_t *pgd_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm)
 
 	pgd = kmem_cache_alloc(PGT_CACHE(PGD_INDEX_SIZE),
 			       pgtable_gfp_flags(mm, GFP_KERNEL));
+	if (unlikely(!pgd))
+		return pgd;
+
 	/*
 	 * Don't scan the PGD for pointers, it contains references to PUDs but
 	 * those references are not full pointers and so can't be recognised by
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg_booke.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg_booke.h
index eb2a33d5df26..e382bd6ede84 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg_booke.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/reg_booke.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 #if defined(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3E_64)
 #define MSR_64BIT	MSR_CM
 
-#define MSR_		(MSR_ME | MSR_CE)
+#define MSR_		(MSR_ME | MSR_RI | MSR_CE)
 #define MSR_KERNEL	(MSR_ | MSR_64BIT)
 #define MSR_USER32	(MSR_ | MSR_PR | MSR_EE)
 #define MSR_USER64	(MSR_USER32 | MSR_64BIT)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_book3s.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_book3s.S
index 7f5ac2e8581b..36178000a2f2 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_book3s.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/idle_book3s.S
@@ -170,6 +170,9 @@ core_idle_lock_held:
 	bne-	core_idle_lock_held
 	blr
 
+/* Reuse an unused pt_regs slot for IAMR */
+#define PNV_POWERSAVE_IAMR	_DAR
+
 /*
  * Pass requested state in r3:
  *	r3 - PNV_THREAD_NAP/SLEEP/WINKLE in POWER8
@@ -200,6 +203,12 @@ pnv_powersave_common:
 	/* Continue saving state */
 	SAVE_GPR(2, r1)
 	SAVE_NVGPRS(r1)
+
+BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+	mfspr	r5, SPRN_IAMR
+	std	r5, PNV_POWERSAVE_IAMR(r1)
+END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)
+
 	mfcr	r5
 	std	r5,_CCR(r1)
 	std	r1,PACAR1(r13)
@@ -924,6 +933,17 @@ BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
 END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_HVMODE)
 	REST_NVGPRS(r1)
 	REST_GPR(2, r1)
+
+BEGIN_FTR_SECTION
+	/* IAMR was saved in pnv_powersave_common() */
+	ld	r5, PNV_POWERSAVE_IAMR(r1)
+	mtspr	SPRN_IAMR, r5
+	/*
+	 * We don't need an isync here because the upcoming mtmsrd is
+	 * execution synchronizing.
+	 */
+END_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S)
+
 	ld	r4,PACAKMSR(r13)
 	ld	r5,_LINK(r1)
 	ld	r6,_CCR(r1)
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index b33bafb8fcea..70568ccbd9fd 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
 	enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
 		 security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
 
-	if (!no_nospec)
+	if (!no_nospec && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
 early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
 void setup_spectre_v2(void)
 {
-	if (no_spectrev2)
+	if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_mitigations_off())
 		do_btb_flush_fixups();
 	else
 		btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
 
 	stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
 
-	if (!no_stf_barrier)
+	if (!no_stf_barrier && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		stf_barrier_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index ba404dd9ce1d..4f49e1a3594c 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
 
 	enabled_flush_types = types;
 
-	if (!no_rfi_flush)
+	if (!no_rfi_flush && !cpu_mitigations_off())
 		rfi_flush_enable(enable);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
index bdddaae96559..649135cbedd5 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/nospec-branch.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 static int __init nobp_setup_early(char *str)
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ early_param("nospectre_v2", nospectre_v2_setup_early);
 
 void __init nospec_auto_detect(void)
 {
-	if (test_facility(156)) {
+	if (test_facility(156) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		/*
 		 * The machine supports etokens.
 		 * Disable expolines and disable nobp.
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/common.c b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
index 7bc105f47d21..19f650d729f5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/common.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/vdso.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/syscalls.h>
@@ -212,6 +213,8 @@ __visible inline void prepare_exit_to_usermode(struct pt_regs *regs)
 #endif
 
 	user_enter_irqoff();
+
+	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #define SYSCALL_EXIT_WORK_FLAGS				\
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 981ff9479648..75f27ee2c263 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EDX), word 18 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW	(18*32+ 2) /* AVX-512 Neural Network Instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS	(18*32+ 3) /* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */
+#define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR		(18*32+10) /* VERW clears CPU buffers */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT	(18*32+13) /* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG		(18*32+18) /* Intel PCONFIG */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		(18*32+26) /* "" Speculation Control (IBRS + IBPB) */
@@ -382,5 +383,7 @@
 #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2		X86_BUG(16) /* CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack with indirect branches */
 #define X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS	X86_BUG(17) /* CPU is affected by speculative store bypass attack */
 #define X86_BUG_L1TF			X86_BUG(18) /* CPU is affected by L1 Terminal Fault */
+#define X86_BUG_MDS			X86_BUG(19) /* CPU is affected by Microarchitectural data sampling */
+#define X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY		X86_BUG(20) /* CPU is only affected by the  MSDBS variant of BUG_MDS */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
index 058e40fed167..8a0e56e1dcc9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 
 #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
 
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+
 /* Provide __cpuidle; we can't safely include <linux/cpu.h> */
 #define __cpuidle __attribute__((__section__(".cpuidle.text")))
 
@@ -54,11 +56,13 @@ static inline void native_irq_enable(void)
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_safe_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("sti; hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
 static inline __cpuidle void native_halt(void)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	asm volatile("hlt": : :"memory");
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index ca5bc0eacb95..20f7da552e90 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_MSR_INDEX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+
 /*
  * CPU model specific register (MSR) numbers.
  *
@@ -40,14 +42,14 @@
 /* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL		0x00000048 /* Speculation Control */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_IBRS			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT		1	   /* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictor (STIBP) bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_STIBP			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_STIBP_SHIFT)	/* STIBP mask */
 #define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT		2	   /* Speculative Store Bypass Disable bit */
-#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			(1 << SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
+#define SPEC_CTRL_SSBD			BIT(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD_SHIFT)	/* Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
-#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			(1 << 0)   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 
 #define MSR_PPIN_CTL			0x0000004e
 #define MSR_PPIN			0x0000004f
@@ -69,20 +71,25 @@
 #define MSR_MTRRcap			0x000000fe
 
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
-#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		(1 << 0)   /* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
-#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		(1 << 1)   /* Enhanced IBRS support */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	(1 << 3)   /* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
-#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			(1 << 4)   /*
-						    * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
-						    * control required.
-						    */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
+#define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
+#define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * attack, so no Speculative Store Bypass
+						 * control required.
+						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO			BIT(5)   /*
+						  * Not susceptible to
+						  * Microarchitectural Data
+						  * Sampling (MDS) vulnerabilities.
+						  */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
-#define L1D_FLUSH			(1 << 0)   /*
-						    * Writeback and invalidate the
-						    * L1 data cache.
-						    */
+#define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
+						 * Writeback and invalidate the
+						 * L1 data cache.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL		0x00000119
 #define MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL3		0x0000011e
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
index 39a2fb29378a..eb0f80ce8524 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mwait.h
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/sched/idle.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define MWAIT_SUBSTATE_MASK		0xf
 #define MWAIT_CSTATE_MASK		0xf
@@ -40,6 +41,8 @@ static inline void __monitorx(const void *eax, unsigned long ecx,
 
 static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "c" (ecx));
@@ -74,6 +77,8 @@ static inline void __mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 			    unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	/* No MDS buffer clear as this is AMD/HYGON only */
+
 	/* "mwaitx %eax, %ebx, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfb;"
 		     :: "a" (eax), "b" (ebx), "c" (ecx));
@@ -81,6 +86,8 @@ static inline void __mwaitx(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ebx,
 
 static inline void __sti_mwait(unsigned long eax, unsigned long ecx)
 {
+	mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers();
+
 	trace_hardirqs_on();
 	/* "mwait %eax, %ecx;" */
 	asm volatile("sti; .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xc9;"
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index dad12b767ba0..4e970390110f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -318,6 +318,56 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+
+#include <asm/segment.h>
+
+/**
+ * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
+ * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
+ * instruction is executed.
+ */
+static inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
+	 * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
+	 * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
+	 * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
+	 * data segment is the fastest variant.
+	 *
+	 * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
+	 */
+	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
+/**
+ * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
+ *
+ * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
+ */
+static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 2bb3a648fc12..31e9895db75e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -991,4 +991,10 @@ enum l1tf_mitigations {
 
 extern enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation;
 
+enum mds_mitigations {
+	MDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV,
+};
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_PROCESSOR_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b91b3bfa5cfb..03b4cc0ec3a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -63,6 +64,13 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+
 void __init check_bugs(void)
 {
 	identify_boot_cpu();
@@ -101,6 +109,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 
+	mds_select_mitigation();
+
+	arch_smt_update();
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
 	/*
 	 * Check whether we are able to run this kernel safely on SMP.
@@ -206,6 +218,61 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_OFF]	= "Vulnerable",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_FULL]	= "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+	[MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV]	= "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
+		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+			cpu_smt_disable(false);
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+		mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+		mds_nosmt = true;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
@@ -440,7 +507,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -574,9 +642,6 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
 	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
-
-	/* Enable STIBP if appropriate */
-	arch_smt_update();
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
@@ -610,6 +675,31 @@ static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
 		static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
 }
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+	 * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+	 *
+	 * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+	 * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+	 * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+	 */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+		return;
+
+	if (sched_smt_active())
+		static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+	else
+		static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+}
+
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+
 void arch_smt_update(void)
 {
 	/* Enhanced IBRS implies STIBP. No update required. */
@@ -631,6 +721,17 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mds_mitigation) {
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+		if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+			pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+		update_mds_branch_idle();
+		break;
+	case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
@@ -672,7 +773,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
@@ -1008,6 +1110,11 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
 		return;
 
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+		l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
 	override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
 
 	switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
@@ -1036,7 +1143,7 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
 				half_pa);
 		pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
-		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+		pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -1069,6 +1176,7 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
@@ -1107,6 +1215,23 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
 }
 #endif
 
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (!hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_NATIVE)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+			       mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+			       (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+			        sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
+	}
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+		       sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
@@ -1173,6 +1298,10 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
 			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
 		break;
+
+	case X86_BUG_MDS:
+		return mds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1204,4 +1333,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *b
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index cb28e98a0659..132a63dc5a76 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -948,61 +948,77 @@ static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 #endif
 }
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_speculation[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_BONNELL,	X86_FEATURE_ANY },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_NSC,	5 },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_ANY,	4 },
+#define NO_SPECULATION	BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN	BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB		BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF		BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS		BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY	BIT(5)
+
+#define VULNWL(_vendor, _family, _model, _whitelist)	\
+	{ X86_VENDOR_##_vendor, _family, _model, X86_FEATURE_ANY, _whitelist }
+
+#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist)		\
+	VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+	VULNWL(ANY,	4, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(CENTAUR,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(INTEL,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL(NSC,	5, X86_MODEL_ANY,	NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	/* Intel Family 6 */
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET,	NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL,		NO_SPECULATION),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID,		NO_SPECULATION),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_X,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID,	NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM,		NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH,		NO_SSB),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID,		NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY),
+
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_X,		NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+	VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS,	NO_MDS | NO_L1TF),
+
+	/* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x0f,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x10,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x11,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_AMD(0x12,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+
+	/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+	VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
+	VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY,	NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS),
 	{}
 };
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_meltdown[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD },
-	{ X86_VENDOR_HYGON },
-	{}
-};
-
-/* Only list CPUs which speculate but are non susceptible to SSB */
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_spec_store_bypass[] = {
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x12,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x11,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0x10,					},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_AMD,	0xf,					},
-	{}
-};
+static bool __init cpu_matches(unsigned long which)
+{
+	const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(cpu_vuln_whitelist);
 
-static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_no_l1tf[] = {
-	/* in addition to cpu_no_speculation */
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_MID	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_X	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS	},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL		},
-	{ X86_VENDOR_INTEL,	6,	INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM		},
-	{}
-};
+	return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
+}
 
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = 0;
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_speculation))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_SPECULATION))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
@@ -1011,15 +1027,20 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
 
-	if (!x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_spec_store_bypass) &&
-	   !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_SSB) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
 	   !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
 
 	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_meltdown))
+	if (!cpu_matches(NO_MDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+		if (cpu_matches(MSBDS_ONLY))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
 	/* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
@@ -1028,7 +1049,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
 
-	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_no_l1tf))
+	if (cpu_matches(NO_L1TF))
 		return;
 
 	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 18bc9b51ac9b..086cf1d1d71d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <asm/x86_init.h>
 #include <asm/reboot.h>
 #include <asm/cache.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
 #include <trace/events/nmi.h>
@@ -533,6 +534,9 @@ nmi_restart:
 		write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
+
+	if (user_mode(regs))
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_nmi);
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index d26f9e9c3d83..07c7bbe79e8b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
 #include <asm/trace/mpx.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/mpx.h>
 #include <asm/vm86.h>
 #include <asm/umip.h>
@@ -367,6 +368,13 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
 		regs->ip = (unsigned long)general_protection;
 		regs->sp = (unsigned long)&gpregs->orig_ax;
 
+		/*
+		 * This situation can be triggered by userspace via
+		 * modify_ldt(2) and the return does not take the regular
+		 * user space exit, so a CPU buffer clear is required when
+		 * MDS mitigation is enabled.
+		 */
+		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 		return;
 	}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index fd3951638ae4..bbbe611f0c49 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -410,7 +410,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
 	/* cpuid 7.0.edx*/
 	const u32 kvm_cpuid_7_0_edx_x86_features =
 		F(AVX512_4VNNIW) | F(AVX512_4FMAPS) | F(SPEC_CTRL) |
-		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP);
+		F(SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) | F(ARCH_CAPABILITIES) | F(INTEL_STIBP) |
+		F(MD_CLEAR);
 
 	/* all calls to cpuid_count() should be made on the same cpu */
 	get_cpu();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 0c955bb286ff..194c6ec11f4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6431,8 +6431,11 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
+	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
+	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 
 	if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2())
 		write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
@@ -6668,8 +6671,8 @@ free_partial_vcpu:
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
-#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
-#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
+#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
 
 static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
index 139b28a01ce4..d0255d64edce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pti.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ void __init pti_check_boottime_disable(void)
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		pti_mode = PTI_FORCE_OFF;
 		pti_print_if_insecure("disabled on command line.");
 		return;
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c b/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
index 1e2a10a06b9d..cf768608437e 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpi_lpss.c
@@ -1142,8 +1142,8 @@ static struct dev_pm_domain acpi_lpss_pm_domain = {
 		.thaw_noirq = acpi_subsys_thaw_noirq,
 		.poweroff = acpi_subsys_suspend,
 		.poweroff_late = acpi_lpss_suspend_late,
-		.poweroff_noirq = acpi_subsys_suspend_noirq,
-		.restore_noirq = acpi_subsys_resume_noirq,
+		.poweroff_noirq = acpi_lpss_suspend_noirq,
+		.restore_noirq = acpi_lpss_resume_noirq,
 		.restore_early = acpi_lpss_resume_early,
 #endif
 		.runtime_suspend = acpi_lpss_runtime_suspend,
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 668139cfa664..cc37511de866 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -548,11 +548,18 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
 	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_store_bypass, 0444, cpu_show_spec_store_bypass, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -560,6 +567,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_spectre_v2.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spec_store_bypass.attr,
 	&dev_attr_l1tf.attr,
+	&dev_attr_mds.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
index ddbe518c3e5b..b5d31d583d60 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/hci_bcm.c
@@ -228,9 +228,15 @@ static int bcm_gpio_set_power(struct bcm_device *dev, bool powered)
 	int err;
 
 	if (powered && !dev->res_enabled) {
-		err = regulator_bulk_enable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES, dev->supplies);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
+		/* Intel Macs use bcm_apple_get_resources() and don't
+		 * have regulator supplies configured.
+		 */
+		if (dev->supplies[0].supply) {
+			err = regulator_bulk_enable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES,
+						    dev->supplies);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
 
 		/* LPO clock needs to be 32.768 kHz */
 		err = clk_set_rate(dev->lpo_clk, 32768);
@@ -259,7 +265,13 @@ static int bcm_gpio_set_power(struct bcm_device *dev, bool powered)
 	if (!powered && dev->res_enabled) {
 		clk_disable_unprepare(dev->txco_clk);
 		clk_disable_unprepare(dev->lpo_clk);
-		regulator_bulk_disable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES, dev->supplies);
+
+		/* Intel Macs use bcm_apple_get_resources() and don't
+		 * have regulator supplies configured.
+		 */
+		if (dev->supplies[0].supply)
+			regulator_bulk_disable(BCM_NUM_SUPPLIES,
+					       dev->supplies);
 	}
 
 	/* wait for device to power on and come out of reset */
diff --git a/drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c b/drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c
index 75491fc841a6..0df16eb1eb3c 100644
--- a/drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c
+++ b/drivers/cpufreq/armada-37xx-cpufreq.c
@@ -359,11 +359,11 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 	struct armada_37xx_dvfs *dvfs;
 	struct platform_device *pdev;
 	unsigned long freq;
-	unsigned int cur_frequency;
+	unsigned int cur_frequency, base_frequency;
 	struct regmap *nb_pm_base, *avs_base;
 	struct device *cpu_dev;
 	int load_lvl, ret;
-	struct clk *clk;
+	struct clk *clk, *parent;
 
 	nb_pm_base =
 		syscon_regmap_lookup_by_compatible("marvell,armada-3700-nb-pm");
@@ -399,6 +399,22 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 		return PTR_ERR(clk);
 	}
 
+	parent = clk_get_parent(clk);
+	if (IS_ERR(parent)) {
+		dev_err(cpu_dev, "Cannot get parent clock for CPU0\n");
+		clk_put(clk);
+		return PTR_ERR(parent);
+	}
+
+	/* Get parent CPU frequency */
+	base_frequency =  clk_get_rate(parent);
+
+	if (!base_frequency) {
+		dev_err(cpu_dev, "Failed to get parent clock rate for CPU\n");
+		clk_put(clk);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/* Get nominal (current) CPU frequency */
 	cur_frequency = clk_get_rate(clk);
 	if (!cur_frequency) {
@@ -431,7 +447,7 @@ static int __init armada37xx_cpufreq_driver_init(void)
 	for (load_lvl = ARMADA_37XX_DVFS_LOAD_0; load_lvl < LOAD_LEVEL_NR;
 	     load_lvl++) {
 		unsigned long u_volt = avs_map[dvfs->avs[load_lvl]] * 1000;
-		freq = cur_frequency / dvfs->divider[load_lvl];
+		freq = base_frequency / dvfs->divider[load_lvl];
 		ret = dev_pm_opp_add(cpu_dev, freq, u_volt);
 		if (ret)
 			goto remove_opp;
diff --git a/drivers/hv/hv.c b/drivers/hv/hv.c
index 632d25674e7f..45653029ee18 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/hv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/hv.c
@@ -408,7 +408,6 @@ int hv_synic_cleanup(unsigned int cpu)
 
 		clockevents_unbind_device(hv_cpu->clk_evt, cpu);
 		hv_ce_shutdown(hv_cpu->clk_evt);
-		put_cpu_ptr(hv_cpu);
 	}
 
 	hv_get_synint_state(VMBUS_MESSAGE_SINT, shared_sint.as_uint64);
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/occ/sysfs.c b/drivers/hwmon/occ/sysfs.c
index fe3d15e416e7..a71ca94c789f 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/occ/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/occ/sysfs.c
@@ -42,16 +42,16 @@ static ssize_t occ_sysfs_show(struct device *dev,
 		val = !!(header->status & OCC_STAT_ACTIVE);
 		break;
 	case 2:
-		val = !!(header->status & OCC_EXT_STAT_DVFS_OT);
+		val = !!(header->ext_status & OCC_EXT_STAT_DVFS_OT);
 		break;
 	case 3:
-		val = !!(header->status & OCC_EXT_STAT_DVFS_POWER);
+		val = !!(header->ext_status & OCC_EXT_STAT_DVFS_POWER);
 		break;
 	case 4:
-		val = !!(header->status & OCC_EXT_STAT_MEM_THROTTLE);
+		val = !!(header->ext_status & OCC_EXT_STAT_MEM_THROTTLE);
 		break;
 	case 5:
-		val = !!(header->status & OCC_EXT_STAT_QUICK_DROP);
+		val = !!(header->ext_status & OCC_EXT_STAT_QUICK_DROP);
 		break;
 	case 6:
 		val = header->occ_state;
diff --git a/drivers/hwmon/pwm-fan.c b/drivers/hwmon/pwm-fan.c
index 167221c7628a..e4c5197417a8 100644
--- a/drivers/hwmon/pwm-fan.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/pwm-fan.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static int pwm_fan_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ret = pwm_fan_of_get_cooling_data(&pdev->dev, ctx);
 	if (ret)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_pwm_disable;
 
 	ctx->pwm_fan_state = ctx->pwm_fan_max_state;
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_THERMAL)) {
diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c
index 1cf6290d6435..70f2cb90adc5 100644
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c
@@ -165,6 +165,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_th_pci_id_table[] = {
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x34a6),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
+	{
+		/* Comet Lake */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x02a6),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
 	{ 0 },
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c
index 688aa3b5f3ac..2f0f88b79c4b 100644
--- a/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c
+++ b/drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c
@@ -1871,8 +1871,11 @@ int __i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msgs, int num)
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!msgs || num < 1))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	if (WARN_ON(test_bit(I2C_ALF_IS_SUSPENDED, &adap->locked_flags)))
+	if (test_bit(I2C_ALF_IS_SUSPENDED, &adap->locked_flags)) {
+		if (!test_and_set_bit(I2C_ALF_SUSPEND_REPORTED, &adap->locked_flags))
+			dev_WARN(&adap->dev, "Transfer while suspended\n");
 		return -ESHUTDOWN;
+	}
 
 	if (adap->quirks && i2c_check_for_quirks(adap, msgs, num))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/drivers/i3c/master.c b/drivers/i3c/master.c
index 1412abcff010..5f4bd52121fe 100644
--- a/drivers/i3c/master.c
+++ b/drivers/i3c/master.c
@@ -385,8 +385,9 @@ static void i3c_bus_set_addr_slot_status(struct i3c_bus *bus, u16 addr,
 		return;
 
 	ptr = bus->addrslots + (bitpos / BITS_PER_LONG);
-	*ptr &= ~(I3C_ADDR_SLOT_STATUS_MASK << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG));
-	*ptr |= status << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG);
+	*ptr &= ~((unsigned long)I3C_ADDR_SLOT_STATUS_MASK <<
+						(bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG));
+	*ptr |= (unsigned long)status << (bitpos % BITS_PER_LONG);
 }
 
 static bool i3c_bus_dev_addr_is_avail(struct i3c_bus *bus, u8 addr)
diff --git a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-spmi-adc5.c b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-spmi-adc5.c
index 6a866cc187f7..21fdcde77883 100644
--- a/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-spmi-adc5.c
+++ b/drivers/iio/adc/qcom-spmi-adc5.c
@@ -664,6 +664,7 @@ static const struct of_device_id adc5_match_table[] = {
 	},
 	{ }
 };
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, adc5_match_table);
 
 static int adc5_get_dt_data(struct adc5_chip *adc, struct device_node *node)
 {
diff --git a/drivers/isdn/gigaset/bas-gigaset.c b/drivers/isdn/gigaset/bas-gigaset.c
index ecdeb89645d0..149b1aca52a2 100644
--- a/drivers/isdn/gigaset/bas-gigaset.c
+++ b/drivers/isdn/gigaset/bas-gigaset.c
@@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ static void write_iso_callback(struct urb *urb)
  */
 static int starturbs(struct bc_state *bcs)
 {
+	struct usb_device *udev = bcs->cs->hw.bas->udev;
 	struct bas_bc_state *ubc = bcs->hw.bas;
 	struct urb *urb;
 	int j, k;
@@ -975,8 +976,8 @@ static int starturbs(struct bc_state *bcs)
 			rc = -EFAULT;
 			goto error;
 		}
-		usb_fill_int_urb(urb, bcs->cs->hw.bas->udev,
-				 usb_rcvisocpipe(urb->dev, 3 + 2 * bcs->channel),
+		usb_fill_int_urb(urb, udev,
+				 usb_rcvisocpipe(udev, 3 + 2 * bcs->channel),
 				 ubc->isoinbuf + k * BAS_INBUFSIZE,
 				 BAS_INBUFSIZE, read_iso_callback, bcs,
 				 BAS_FRAMETIME);
@@ -1006,8 +1007,8 @@ static int starturbs(struct bc_state *bcs)
 			rc = -EFAULT;
 			goto error;
 		}
-		usb_fill_int_urb(urb, bcs->cs->hw.bas->udev,
-				 usb_sndisocpipe(urb->dev, 4 + 2 * bcs->channel),
+		usb_fill_int_urb(urb, udev,
+				 usb_sndisocpipe(udev, 4 + 2 * bcs->channel),
 				 ubc->isooutbuf->data,
 				 sizeof(ubc->isooutbuf->data),
 				 write_iso_callback, &ubc->isoouturbs[k],
diff --git a/drivers/md/raid5.c b/drivers/md/raid5.c
index c033bfcb209e..364dd2f6fa1b 100644
--- a/drivers/md/raid5.c
+++ b/drivers/md/raid5.c
@@ -4223,26 +4223,15 @@ static void handle_parity_checks6(struct r5conf *conf, struct stripe_head *sh,
 	case check_state_check_result:
 		sh->check_state = check_state_idle;
 
+		if (s->failed > 1)
+			break;
 		/* handle a successful check operation, if parity is correct
 		 * we are done.  Otherwise update the mismatch count and repair
 		 * parity if !MD_RECOVERY_CHECK
 		 */
 		if (sh->ops.zero_sum_result == 0) {
-			/* both parities are correct */
-			if (!s->failed)
-				set_bit(STRIPE_INSYNC, &sh->state);
-			else {
-				/* in contrast to the raid5 case we can validate
-				 * parity, but still have a failure to write
-				 * back
-				 */
-				sh->check_state = check_state_compute_result;
-				/* Returning at this point means that we may go
-				 * off and bring p and/or q uptodate again so
-				 * we make sure to check zero_sum_result again
-				 * to verify if p or q need writeback
-				 */
-			}
+			/* Any parity checked was correct */
+			set_bit(STRIPE_INSYNC, &sh->state);
 		} else {
 			atomic64_add(STRIPE_SECTORS, &conf->mddev->resync_mismatches);
 			if (test_bit(MD_RECOVERY_CHECK, &conf->mddev->recovery)) {
diff --git a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
index da1fc17295d9..b996967af8d9 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c
@@ -1098,13 +1098,6 @@ static int bond_option_arp_validate_set(struct bonding *bond,
 {
 	netdev_dbg(bond->dev, "Setting arp_validate to %s (%llu)\n",
 		   newval->string, newval->value);
-
-	if (bond->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
-		if (!newval->value)
-			bond->recv_probe = NULL;
-		else if (bond->params.arp_interval)
-			bond->recv_probe = bond_arp_rcv;
-	}
 	bond->params.arp_validate = newval->value;
 
 	return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
index 3da2795e2486..a6535e226d84 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cadence/macb_main.c
@@ -2461,12 +2461,12 @@ static int macb_open(struct net_device *dev)
 		goto pm_exit;
 	}
 
-	bp->macbgem_ops.mog_init_rings(bp);
-	macb_init_hw(bp);
-
 	for (q = 0, queue = bp->queues; q < bp->num_queues; ++q, ++queue)
 		napi_enable(&queue->napi);
 
+	bp->macbgem_ops.mog_init_rings(bp);
+	macb_init_hw(bp);
+
 	/* schedule a link state check */
 	phy_start(dev->phydev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
index dfebc30c4841..d3f2408dc9e8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa/dpaa_eth.c
@@ -1648,7 +1648,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *dpaa_cleanup_tx_fd(const struct dpaa_priv *priv,
 				 qm_sg_entry_get_len(&sgt[0]), dma_dir);
 
 		/* remaining pages were mapped with skb_frag_dma_map() */
-		for (i = 1; i < nr_frags; i++) {
+		for (i = 1; i <= nr_frags; i++) {
 			WARN_ON(qm_sg_entry_is_ext(&sgt[i]));
 
 			dma_unmap_page(dev, qm_sg_addr(&sgt[i]),
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth_ethtool.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth_ethtool.c
index 0beee2cc2ddd..722b6de24816 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth_ethtool.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/ucc_geth_ethtool.c
@@ -252,14 +252,12 @@ uec_set_ringparam(struct net_device *netdev,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if (netif_running(netdev))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	ug_info->bdRingLenRx[queue] = ring->rx_pending;
 	ug_info->bdRingLenTx[queue] = ring->tx_pending;
 
-	if (netif_running(netdev)) {
-		/* FIXME: restart automatically */
-		netdev_info(netdev, "Please re-open the interface\n");
-	}
-
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c
index 70cce63a6081..696037d5ac3d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/seeq/sgiseeq.c
@@ -735,6 +735,7 @@ static int sgiseeq_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	}
 
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
+	SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &pdev->dev);
 	sp = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	/* Make private data page aligned */
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c
index 195669f550f0..ba124a4da793 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac-sun8i.c
@@ -1015,6 +1015,8 @@ static struct mac_device_info *sun8i_dwmac_setup(void *ppriv)
 	mac->mac = &sun8i_dwmac_ops;
 	mac->dma = &sun8i_dwmac_dma_ops;
 
+	priv->dev->priv_flags |= IFF_UNICAST_FLT;
+
 	/* The loopback bit seems to be re-set when link change
 	 * Simply mask it each time
 	 * Speed 10/100/1000 are set in BIT(2)/BIT(3)
diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
index 77068c545de0..cd5966b0db57 100644
--- a/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
+++ b/drivers/net/phy/phy_device.c
@@ -2044,11 +2044,14 @@ bool phy_validate_pause(struct phy_device *phydev,
 			struct ethtool_pauseparam *pp)
 {
 	if (!linkmode_test_bit(ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_Pause_BIT,
-			       phydev->supported) ||
-	    (!linkmode_test_bit(ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_Asym_Pause_BIT,
-				phydev->supported) &&
-	     pp->rx_pause != pp->tx_pause))
+			       phydev->supported) && pp->rx_pause)
 		return false;
+
+	if (!linkmode_test_bit(ETHTOOL_LINK_MODE_Asym_Pause_BIT,
+			       phydev->supported) &&
+	    pp->rx_pause != pp->tx_pause)
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(phy_validate_pause);
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index e9ca1c088d0b..f4c933ac6edf 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -596,13 +596,18 @@ static u16 tun_automq_select_queue(struct tun_struct *tun, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static u16 tun_ebpf_select_queue(struct tun_struct *tun, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct tun_prog *prog;
+	u32 numqueues;
 	u16 ret = 0;
 
+	numqueues = READ_ONCE(tun->numqueues);
+	if (!numqueues)
+		return 0;
+
 	prog = rcu_dereference(tun->steering_prog);
 	if (prog)
 		ret = bpf_prog_run_clear_cb(prog->prog, skb);
 
-	return ret % tun->numqueues;
+	return ret % numqueues;
 }
 
 static u16 tun_select_queue(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -700,6 +705,8 @@ static void __tun_detach(struct tun_file *tfile, bool clean)
 				   tun->tfiles[tun->numqueues - 1]);
 		ntfile = rtnl_dereference(tun->tfiles[index]);
 		ntfile->queue_index = index;
+		rcu_assign_pointer(tun->tfiles[tun->numqueues - 1],
+				   NULL);
 
 		--tun->numqueues;
 		if (clean) {
@@ -1082,7 +1089,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t tun_net_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
 	tfile = rcu_dereference(tun->tfiles[txq]);
 
 	/* Drop packet if interface is not attached */
-	if (txq >= tun->numqueues)
+	if (!tfile)
 		goto drop;
 
 	if (!rcu_dereference(tun->steering_prog))
@@ -1305,6 +1312,7 @@ static int tun_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int n,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
+resample:
 	numqueues = READ_ONCE(tun->numqueues);
 	if (!numqueues) {
 		rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -1313,6 +1321,8 @@ static int tun_xdp_xmit(struct net_device *dev, int n,
 
 	tfile = rcu_dereference(tun->tfiles[smp_processor_id() %
 					    numqueues]);
+	if (unlikely(!tfile))
+		goto resample;
 
 	spin_lock(&tfile->tx_ring.producer_lock);
 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
index 8e4e9b6919e0..ffc565ac2192 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwl8k.c
@@ -441,6 +441,9 @@ static const struct ieee80211_rate mwl8k_rates_50[] = {
 #define MWL8K_CMD_UPDATE_STADB		0x1123
 #define MWL8K_CMD_BASTREAM		0x1125
 
+#define MWL8K_LEGACY_5G_RATE_OFFSET \
+	(ARRAY_SIZE(mwl8k_rates_24) - ARRAY_SIZE(mwl8k_rates_50))
+
 static const char *mwl8k_cmd_name(__le16 cmd, char *buf, int bufsize)
 {
 	u16 command = le16_to_cpu(cmd);
@@ -1016,8 +1019,9 @@ mwl8k_rxd_ap_process(void *_rxd, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
 
 	if (rxd->channel > 14) {
 		status->band = NL80211_BAND_5GHZ;
-		if (!(status->encoding == RX_ENC_HT))
-			status->rate_idx -= 5;
+		if (!(status->encoding == RX_ENC_HT) &&
+		    status->rate_idx >= MWL8K_LEGACY_5G_RATE_OFFSET)
+			status->rate_idx -= MWL8K_LEGACY_5G_RATE_OFFSET;
 	} else {
 		status->band = NL80211_BAND_2GHZ;
 	}
@@ -1124,8 +1128,9 @@ mwl8k_rxd_sta_process(void *_rxd, struct ieee80211_rx_status *status,
 
 	if (rxd->channel > 14) {
 		status->band = NL80211_BAND_5GHZ;
-		if (!(status->encoding == RX_ENC_HT))
-			status->rate_idx -= 5;
+		if (!(status->encoding == RX_ENC_HT) &&
+		    status->rate_idx >= MWL8K_LEGACY_5G_RATE_OFFSET)
+			status->rate_idx -= MWL8K_LEGACY_5G_RATE_OFFSET;
 	} else {
 		status->band = NL80211_BAND_2GHZ;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8723ae/hw.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8723ae/hw.c
index 6bab162e1bb8..655460f61bbc 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8723ae/hw.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/rtl8723ae/hw.c
@@ -1675,6 +1675,7 @@ static void _rtl8723e_read_adapter_info(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
 					rtlhal->oem_id = RT_CID_819X_LENOVO;
 					break;
 				}
+				break;
 			case 0x1025:
 				rtlhal->oem_id = RT_CID_819X_ACER;
 				break;
diff --git a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
index 95441a35eceb..82acd6155adf 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c
@@ -1486,6 +1486,21 @@ static void hv_pci_assign_slots(struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus)
 	}
 }
 
+/*
+ * Remove entries in sysfs pci slot directory.
+ */
+static void hv_pci_remove_slots(struct hv_pcibus_device *hbus)
+{
+	struct hv_pci_dev *hpdev;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(hpdev, &hbus->children, list_entry) {
+		if (!hpdev->pci_slot)
+			continue;
+		pci_destroy_slot(hpdev->pci_slot);
+		hpdev->pci_slot = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
 /**
  * create_root_hv_pci_bus() - Expose a new root PCI bus
  * @hbus:	Root PCI bus, as understood by this driver
@@ -1761,6 +1776,10 @@ static void pci_devices_present_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		hpdev = list_first_entry(&removed, struct hv_pci_dev,
 					 list_entry);
 		list_del(&hpdev->list_entry);
+
+		if (hpdev->pci_slot)
+			pci_destroy_slot(hpdev->pci_slot);
+
 		put_pcichild(hpdev);
 	}
 
@@ -1900,6 +1919,9 @@ static void hv_eject_device_work(struct work_struct *work)
 			 sizeof(*ejct_pkt), (unsigned long)&ctxt.pkt,
 			 VM_PKT_DATA_INBAND, 0);
 
+	/* For the get_pcichild() in hv_pci_eject_device() */
+	put_pcichild(hpdev);
+	/* For the two refs got in new_pcichild_device() */
 	put_pcichild(hpdev);
 	put_pcichild(hpdev);
 	put_hvpcibus(hpdev->hbus);
@@ -2677,6 +2699,7 @@ static int hv_pci_remove(struct hv_device *hdev)
 		pci_lock_rescan_remove();
 		pci_stop_root_bus(hbus->pci_bus);
 		pci_remove_root_bus(hbus->pci_bus);
+		hv_pci_remove_slots(hbus);
 		pci_unlock_rescan_remove();
 		hbus->state = hv_pcibus_removed;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/dell-laptop.c b/drivers/platform/x86/dell-laptop.c
index 95e6ca116e00..a561f653cf13 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/dell-laptop.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/dell-laptop.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ static void dell_rfkill_query(struct rfkill *rfkill, void *data)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0, 0x2, 0, 0);
+	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0x2, 0, 0, 0);
 	ret = dell_send_request(&buffer, CLASS_INFO, SELECT_RFKILL);
 	hwswitch = buffer.output[1];
 
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static int dell_debugfs_show(struct seq_file *s, void *data)
 		return ret;
 	status = buffer.output[1];
 
-	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0, 0x2, 0, 0);
+	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0x2, 0, 0, 0);
 	hwswitch_ret = dell_send_request(&buffer, CLASS_INFO, SELECT_RFKILL);
 	if (hwswitch_ret)
 		return hwswitch_ret;
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ static void dell_update_rfkill(struct work_struct *ignored)
 	if (ret != 0)
 		return;
 
-	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0, 0x2, 0, 0);
+	dell_fill_request(&buffer, 0x2, 0, 0, 0);
 	ret = dell_send_request(&buffer, CLASS_INFO, SELECT_RFKILL);
 
 	if (ret == 0 && (status & BIT(0)))
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c b/drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c
index 4bfbfa3f78e6..2058445fc456 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/sony-laptop.c
@@ -4424,14 +4424,16 @@ sony_pic_read_possible_resource(struct acpi_resource *resource, void *context)
 			}
 			return AE_OK;
 		}
+
+	case ACPI_RESOURCE_TYPE_END_TAG:
+		return AE_OK;
+
 	default:
 		dprintk("Resource %d isn't an IRQ nor an IO port\n",
 			resource->type);
+		return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE;
 
-	case ACPI_RESOURCE_TYPE_END_TAG:
-		return AE_OK;
 	}
-	return AE_CTRL_TERMINATE;
 }
 
 static int sony_pic_possible_resources(struct acpi_device *device)
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
index 726341f2b638..89ce14b35adc 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
-#include <linux/pci_ids.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
 #include <linux/power_supply.h>
 #include <sound/core.h>
 #include <sound/control.h>
@@ -4501,6 +4501,74 @@ static void bluetooth_exit(void)
 	bluetooth_shutdown();
 }
 
+static const struct dmi_system_id bt_fwbug_list[] __initconst = {
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad E485",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20KU"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad E585",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20KV"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad A285 - 20MW",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20MW"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad A285 - 20MX",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20MX"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad A485 - 20MU",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20MU"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		.ident = "ThinkPad A485 - 20MV",
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "20MV"),
+		},
+	},
+	{}
+};
+
+static const struct pci_device_id fwbug_cards_ids[] __initconst = {
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x24F3) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x24FD) },
+	{ PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x2526) },
+	{}
+};
+
+
+static int __init have_bt_fwbug(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Some AMD based ThinkPads have a firmware bug that calling
+	 * "GBDC" will cause bluetooth on Intel wireless cards blocked
+	 */
+	if (dmi_check_system(bt_fwbug_list) && pci_dev_present(fwbug_cards_ids)) {
+		vdbg_printk(TPACPI_DBG_INIT | TPACPI_DBG_RFKILL,
+			FW_BUG "disable bluetooth subdriver for Intel cards\n");
+		return 1;
+	} else
+		return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init bluetooth_init(struct ibm_init_struct *iibm)
 {
 	int res;
@@ -4513,7 +4581,7 @@ static int __init bluetooth_init(struct ibm_init_struct *iibm)
 
 	/* bluetooth not supported on 570, 600e/x, 770e, 770x, A21e, A2xm/p,
 	   G4x, R30, R31, R40e, R50e, T20-22, X20-21 */
-	tp_features.bluetooth = hkey_handle &&
+	tp_features.bluetooth = !have_bt_fwbug() && hkey_handle &&
 	    acpi_evalf(hkey_handle, &status, "GBDC", "qd");
 
 	vdbg_printk(TPACPI_DBG_INIT | TPACPI_DBG_RFKILL,
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c
index ce3e541434dc..a09a742d7ec1 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_attr.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static ssize_t
 lpfc_drvr_version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		       char *buf)
 {
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, LPFC_MODULE_DESC "\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, LPFC_MODULE_DESC "\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -134,9 +134,9 @@ lpfc_enable_fip_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (phba->hba_flag & HBA_FIP_SUPPORT)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "1\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "1\n");
 	else
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0\n");
 }
 
 static ssize_t
@@ -564,14 +564,15 @@ lpfc_bg_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	if (phba->cfg_enable_bg)
+	if (phba->cfg_enable_bg) {
 		if (phba->sli3_options & LPFC_SLI3_BG_ENABLED)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "BlockGuard Enabled\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+					"BlockGuard Enabled\n");
 		else
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
 					"BlockGuard Not Supported\n");
-	else
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
+	} else
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE,
 					"BlockGuard Disabled\n");
 }
 
@@ -583,7 +584,7 @@ lpfc_bg_guard_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_guard_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -595,7 +596,7 @@ lpfc_bg_apptag_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_apptag_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -607,7 +608,7 @@ lpfc_bg_reftag_err_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%llu\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->bg_reftag_err_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -625,7 +626,7 @@ lpfc_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *host = class_to_shost(dev);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",lpfc_info(host));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", lpfc_info(host));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -644,7 +645,7 @@ lpfc_serialnum_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->SerialNumber);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->SerialNumber);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -666,7 +667,7 @@ lpfc_temp_sensor_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",phba->temp_sensor_support);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->temp_sensor_support);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -685,7 +686,7 @@ lpfc_modeldesc_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ModelDesc);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ModelDesc);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -704,7 +705,7 @@ lpfc_modelname_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ModelName);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ModelName);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -723,7 +724,7 @@ lpfc_programtype_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->ProgramType);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->ProgramType);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -741,7 +742,7 @@ lpfc_mlomgmt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 		(phba->sli.sli_flag & LPFC_MENLO_MAINT));
 }
 
@@ -761,7 +762,7 @@ lpfc_vportnum_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",phba->Port);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->Port);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -789,10 +790,10 @@ lpfc_fwrev_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	sli_family = phba->sli4_hba.pc_sli4_params.sli_family;
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d\n",
+		len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d\n",
 			       fwrev, phba->sli_rev);
 	else
-		len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d:%d:%x\n",
+		len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s, sli-%d:%d:%x\n",
 			       fwrev, phba->sli_rev, if_type, sli_family);
 
 	return len;
@@ -816,7 +817,7 @@ lpfc_hdw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	lpfc_vpd_t *vp = &phba->vpd;
 
 	lpfc_jedec_to_ascii(vp->rev.biuRev, hdw);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", hdw);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", hdw);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -837,10 +838,11 @@ lpfc_option_rom_version_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	char fwrev[FW_REV_STR_SIZE];
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", phba->OptionROMVersion);
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n",
+				phba->OptionROMVersion);
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(phba, fwrev, 1);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", fwrev);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", fwrev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -871,20 +873,20 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	case LPFC_LINK_DOWN:
 	case LPFC_HBA_ERROR:
 		if (phba->hba_flag & LINK_DISABLED)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"Link Down - User disabled\n");
 		else
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"Link Down\n");
 		break;
 	case LPFC_LINK_UP:
 	case LPFC_CLEAR_LA:
 	case LPFC_HBA_READY:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "Link Up - ");
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "Link Up - ");
 
 		switch (vport->port_state) {
 		case LPFC_LOCAL_CFG_LINK:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 					"Configuring Link\n");
 			break;
 		case LPFC_FDISC:
@@ -894,38 +896,40 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		case LPFC_NS_QRY:
 		case LPFC_BUILD_DISC_LIST:
 		case LPFC_DISC_AUTH:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Discovery\n");
 			break;
 		case LPFC_VPORT_READY:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "Ready\n");
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+					"Ready\n");
 			break;
 
 		case LPFC_VPORT_FAILED:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "Failed\n");
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+					"Failed\n");
 			break;
 
 		case LPFC_VPORT_UNKNOWN:
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Unknown\n");
 			break;
 		}
 		if (phba->sli.sli_flag & LPFC_MENLO_MAINT)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 					"   Menlo Maint Mode\n");
 		else if (phba->fc_topology == LPFC_TOPOLOGY_LOOP) {
 			if (vport->fc_flag & FC_PUBLIC_LOOP)
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Public Loop\n");
 			else
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Private Loop\n");
 		} else {
 			if (vport->fc_flag & FC_FABRIC)
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Fabric\n");
 			else
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 						"   Point-2-Point\n");
 		}
 	}
@@ -937,28 +941,28 @@ lpfc_link_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		struct lpfc_trunk_link link = phba->trunk_link;
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port0, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 0: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link0.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link0.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port1, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 1: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link1.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link1.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port2, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 2: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link2.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
 				trunk_errmsg[link.link2.fault]);
 
 		if (bf_get(lpfc_conf_trunk_port3, &phba->sli4_hba))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Trunk port 3: Link %s %s\n",
 				(link.link3.state == LPFC_LINK_UP) ?
 				 "Up" : "Down. ",
@@ -986,15 +990,15 @@ lpfc_sli4_protocol_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (phba->sli_rev < LPFC_SLI_REV4)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
 
 	if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_dv == LPFC_LNK_DAT_VAL) {
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_tp == LPFC_LNK_TYPE_GE)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fcoe\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fcoe\n");
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.lnk_info.lnk_tp == LPFC_LNK_TYPE_FC)
-			return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
+			return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "fc\n");
 	}
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "unknown\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1014,7 +1018,7 @@ lpfc_oas_supported_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			phba->sli4_hba.pc_sli4_params.oas_supported);
 }
 
@@ -1072,7 +1076,7 @@ lpfc_num_discovered_ports_show(struct device *dev,
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			vport->fc_map_cnt + vport->fc_unmap_cnt);
 }
 
@@ -1586,7 +1590,7 @@ lpfc_nport_evt_cnt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->nport_event_cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->nport_event_cnt);
 }
 
 int
@@ -1675,7 +1679,7 @@ lpfc_board_mode_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	else
 		state = "online";
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", state);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", state);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1901,8 +1905,8 @@ lpfc_max_rpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, &cnt, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1929,8 +1933,8 @@ lpfc_used_rpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, &cnt, &acnt, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1957,8 +1961,8 @@ lpfc_max_xri_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, &cnt, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1985,8 +1989,8 @@ lpfc_used_xri_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, &cnt, &acnt, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2013,8 +2017,8 @@ lpfc_max_vpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cnt, NULL))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", cnt);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2041,8 +2045,8 @@ lpfc_used_vpi_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	uint32_t cnt, acnt;
 
 	if (lpfc_get_hba_info(phba, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cnt, &acnt))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", (cnt - acnt));
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "Unknown\n");
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2067,10 +2071,10 @@ lpfc_npiv_info_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
 	if (!(phba->max_vpi))
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Not Supported\n");
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Not Supported\n");
 	if (vport->port_type == LPFC_PHYSICAL_PORT)
-		return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Physical\n");
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Virtual (VPI %d)\n", vport->vpi);
+		return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Physical\n");
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "NPIV Virtual (VPI %d)\n", vport->vpi);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2092,7 +2096,7 @@ lpfc_poll_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", phba->cfg_poll);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", phba->cfg_poll);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2196,7 +2200,7 @@ lpfc_fips_level_show(struct device *dev,  struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_level);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_level);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2215,7 +2219,7 @@ lpfc_fips_rev_show(struct device *dev,  struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_spec_rev);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->fips_spec_rev);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2234,7 +2238,7 @@ lpfc_dss_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s - %sOperational\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s - %sOperational\n",
 			(phba->cfg_enable_dss) ? "Enabled" : "Disabled",
 			(phba->sli3_options & LPFC_SLI3_DSS_ENABLED) ?
 				"" : "Not ");
@@ -2263,7 +2267,7 @@ lpfc_sriov_hw_max_virtfn_show(struct device *dev,
 	uint16_t max_nr_virtfn;
 
 	max_nr_virtfn = lpfc_sli_sriov_nr_virtfn_get(phba);
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", max_nr_virtfn);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", max_nr_virtfn);
 }
 
 static inline bool lpfc_rangecheck(uint val, uint min, uint max)
@@ -2323,7 +2327,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",\
 			phba->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
@@ -2351,7 +2355,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;\
 	uint val = 0;\
 	val = phba->cfg_##attr;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n",\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n",\
 			phba->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
@@ -2487,7 +2491,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 { \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2512,7 +2516,7 @@ lpfc_##attr##_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, \
 { \
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);\
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;\
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%#x\n", vport->cfg_##attr);\
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2784,7 +2788,7 @@ lpfc_soft_wwpn_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->cfg_soft_wwpn);
 }
 
@@ -2881,7 +2885,7 @@ lpfc_soft_wwnn_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 {
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			(unsigned long long)phba->cfg_soft_wwnn);
 }
 
@@ -2947,7 +2951,7 @@ lpfc_oas_tgt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			wwn_to_u64(phba->cfg_oas_tgt_wwpn));
 }
 
@@ -3015,7 +3019,7 @@ lpfc_oas_priority_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_priority);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_priority);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3078,7 +3082,7 @@ lpfc_oas_vpt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "0x%llx\n",
 			wwn_to_u64(phba->cfg_oas_vpt_wwpn));
 }
 
@@ -3149,7 +3153,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_state_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *)shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_state);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_state);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3213,7 +3217,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_status_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (!(phba->cfg_oas_flags & OAS_LUN_VALID))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_status);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->cfg_oas_lun_status);
 }
 static DEVICE_ATTR(lpfc_xlane_lun_status, S_IRUGO,
 		   lpfc_oas_lun_status_show, NULL);
@@ -3365,7 +3369,7 @@ lpfc_oas_lun_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	if (oas_lun != NOT_OAS_ENABLED_LUN)
 		phba->cfg_oas_flags |= OAS_LUN_VALID;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "0x%llx", oas_lun);
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len, "0x%llx", oas_lun);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -3499,7 +3503,7 @@ lpfc_iocb_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->iocb_max);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n", phba->iocb_max);
 }
 
 static DEVICE_ATTR(iocb_hw, S_IRUGO,
@@ -3511,7 +3515,7 @@ lpfc_txq_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 	struct lpfc_sli_ring *pring = lpfc_phba_elsring(phba);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			pring ? pring->txq_max : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3525,7 +3529,7 @@ lpfc_txcmplq_hw_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = ((struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata)->phba;
 	struct lpfc_sli_ring *pring = lpfc_phba_elsring(phba);
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",
 			pring ? pring->txcmplq_max : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3561,7 +3565,7 @@ lpfc_nodev_tmo_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct Scsi_Host  *shost = class_to_shost(dev);
 	struct lpfc_vport *vport = (struct lpfc_vport *) shost->hostdata;
 
-	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",	vport->cfg_devloss_tmo);
+	return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%d\n",	vport->cfg_devloss_tmo);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -5169,12 +5173,12 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 
 	switch (phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map) {
 	case 0:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"fcp_cpu_map: No mapping (%d)\n",
 				phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map);
 		return len;
 	case 1:
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"fcp_cpu_map: HBA centric mapping (%d): "
 				"%d of %d CPUs online from %d possible CPUs\n",
 				phba->cfg_fcp_cpu_map, num_online_cpus(),
@@ -5188,12 +5192,12 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		cpup = &phba->sli4_hba.cpu_map[phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu];
 
 		if (!cpu_present(phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu))
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d not present\n",
 					phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu);
 		else if (cpup->irq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY) {
 			if (cpup->hdwq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY)
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d hdwq None "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d\n",
@@ -5201,7 +5205,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->phys_id,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper);
 			else
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d EQ %04d hdwq %04d "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d\n",
@@ -5210,7 +5214,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper);
 		} else {
 			if (cpup->hdwq == LPFC_VECTOR_MAP_EMPTY)
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d hdwq None "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d IRQ %d\n",
@@ -5218,7 +5222,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 					cpup->phys_id,
 					cpup->core_id, cpup->hyper, cpup->irq);
 			else
-				len += snprintf(
+				len += scnprintf(
 					buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"CPU %02d EQ %04d hdwq %04d "
 					"physid %d coreid %d ht %d IRQ %d\n",
@@ -5233,7 +5237,7 @@ lpfc_fcp_cpu_map_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 		if (phba->sli4_hba.curr_disp_cpu <
 				phba->sli4_hba.num_possible_cpu &&
 				(len >= (PAGE_SIZE - 64))) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len,
 					PAGE_SIZE - len, "more...\n");
 			break;
 		}
@@ -5753,10 +5757,10 @@ lpfc_sg_seg_cnt_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 	struct lpfc_hba   *phba = vport->phba;
 	int len;
 
-	len = snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SGL sz: %d  total SGEs: %d\n",
+	len = scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "SGL sz: %d  total SGEs: %d\n",
 		       phba->cfg_sg_dma_buf_size, phba->cfg_total_seg_cnt);
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE, "Cfg: %d  SCSI: %d  NVME: %d\n",
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE, "Cfg: %d  SCSI: %d  NVME: %d\n",
 			phba->cfg_sg_seg_cnt, phba->cfg_scsi_seg_cnt,
 			phba->cfg_nvme_seg_cnt);
 	return len;
@@ -6755,7 +6759,7 @@ lpfc_show_rport_##field (struct device *dev,				\
 {									\
 	struct fc_rport *rport = transport_class_to_rport(dev);		\
 	struct lpfc_rport_data *rdata = rport->hostdata;		\
-	return snprintf(buf, sz, format_string,				\
+	return scnprintf(buf, sz, format_string,			\
 		(rdata->target) ? cast rdata->target->field : 0);	\
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c
index 7290573110fe..2e3949c6cd07 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_ct.c
@@ -1430,7 +1430,7 @@ lpfc_vport_symbolic_port_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *symbol,
 	 * Name object.  NPIV is not in play so this integer
 	 * value is sufficient and unique per FC-ID.
 	 */
-	n = snprintf(symbol, size, "%d", vport->phba->brd_no);
+	n = scnprintf(symbol, size, "%d", vport->phba->brd_no);
 	return n;
 }
 
@@ -1444,26 +1444,26 @@ lpfc_vport_symbolic_node_name(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *symbol,
 
 	lpfc_decode_firmware_rev(vport->phba, fwrev, 0);
 
-	n = snprintf(symbol, size, "Emulex %s", vport->phba->ModelName);
+	n = scnprintf(symbol, size, "Emulex %s", vport->phba->ModelName);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " FV%s", fwrev);
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " FV%s", fwrev);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " DV%s.",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " DV%s.",
 		      lpfc_release_version);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " HN:%s.",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " HN:%s.",
 		      init_utsname()->nodename);
 	if (size < n)
 		return n;
 
 	/* Note :- OS name is "Linux" */
-	n += snprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " OS:%s\n",
+	n += scnprintf(symbol + n, size - n, " OS:%s\n",
 		      init_utsname()->sysname);
 	return n;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c
index 1215eaa530db..d6410cf18f1c 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.c
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_disc_trc_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		snprintf(buffer,
 			LPFC_DEBUG_TRC_ENTRY_SIZE, "%010d:%010d ms:%s\n",
 			dtp->seq_cnt, ms, dtp->fmt);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < index; i++) {
@@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_disc_trc_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		snprintf(buffer,
 			LPFC_DEBUG_TRC_ENTRY_SIZE, "%010d:%010d ms:%s\n",
 			dtp->seq_cnt, ms, dtp->fmt);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 	}
 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_slow_ring_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		snprintf(buffer,
 			LPFC_DEBUG_TRC_ENTRY_SIZE, "%010d:%010d ms:%s\n",
 			dtp->seq_cnt, ms, dtp->fmt);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < index; i++) {
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_slow_ring_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		snprintf(buffer,
 			LPFC_DEBUG_TRC_ENTRY_SIZE, "%010d:%010d ms:%s\n",
 			dtp->seq_cnt, ms, dtp->fmt);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, buffer,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 	}
 
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_hbqinfo_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 
 	i = lpfc_debugfs_last_hbq;
 
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HBQ %d Info\n", i);
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HBQ %d Info\n", i);
 
 	hbqs =  &phba->hbqs[i];
 	posted = 0;
@@ -315,21 +315,21 @@ lpfc_debugfs_hbqinfo_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		posted++;
 
 	hip =  lpfc_hbq_defs[i];
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 		"idx:%d prof:%d rn:%d bufcnt:%d icnt:%d acnt:%d posted %d\n",
 		hip->hbq_index, hip->profile, hip->rn,
 		hip->buffer_count, hip->init_count, hip->add_count, posted);
 
 	raw_index = phba->hbq_get[i];
 	getidx = le32_to_cpu(raw_index);
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 		"entries:%d bufcnt:%d Put:%d nPut:%d localGet:%d hbaGet:%d\n",
 		hbqs->entry_count, hbqs->buffer_count, hbqs->hbqPutIdx,
 		hbqs->next_hbqPutIdx, hbqs->local_hbqGetIdx, getidx);
 
 	hbqe = (struct lpfc_hbq_entry *) phba->hbqs[i].hbq_virt;
 	for (j=0; j<hbqs->entry_count; j++) {
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 			"%03d: %08x %04x %05x ", j,
 			le32_to_cpu(hbqe->bde.addrLow),
 			le32_to_cpu(hbqe->bde.tus.w),
@@ -341,14 +341,16 @@ lpfc_debugfs_hbqinfo_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		low = hbqs->hbqPutIdx - posted;
 		if (low >= 0) {
 			if ((j >= hbqs->hbqPutIdx) || (j < low)) {
-				len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "Unused\n");
+				len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+						"Unused\n");
 				goto skipit;
 			}
 		}
 		else {
 			if ((j >= hbqs->hbqPutIdx) &&
 				(j < (hbqs->entry_count+low))) {
-				len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "Unused\n");
+				len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+						"Unused\n");
 				goto skipit;
 			}
 		}
@@ -358,7 +360,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_hbqinfo_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 			hbq_buf = container_of(d_buf, struct hbq_dmabuf, dbuf);
 			phys = ((uint64_t)hbq_buf->dbuf.phys & 0xffffffff);
 			if (phys == le32_to_cpu(hbqe->bde.addrLow)) {
-				len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+				len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 					"Buf%d: %p %06x\n", i,
 					hbq_buf->dbuf.virt, hbq_buf->tag);
 				found = 1;
@@ -367,7 +369,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_hbqinfo_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 			i++;
 		}
 		if (!found) {
-			len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "No DMAinfo?\n");
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "No DMAinfo?\n");
 		}
 skipit:
 		hbqe++;
@@ -413,14 +415,14 @@ lpfc_debugfs_commonxripools_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 			break;
 		qp = &phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[lpfc_debugfs_last_xripool];
 
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "HdwQ %d Info ", i);
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "HdwQ %d Info ", i);
 		spin_lock_irqsave(&qp->abts_scsi_buf_list_lock, iflag);
 		spin_lock(&qp->abts_nvme_buf_list_lock);
 		spin_lock(&qp->io_buf_list_get_lock);
 		spin_lock(&qp->io_buf_list_put_lock);
 		out = qp->total_io_bufs - (qp->get_io_bufs + qp->put_io_bufs +
 			qp->abts_scsi_io_bufs + qp->abts_nvme_io_bufs);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				 "tot:%d get:%d put:%d mt:%d "
 				 "ABTS scsi:%d nvme:%d Out:%d\n",
 			qp->total_io_bufs, qp->get_io_bufs, qp->put_io_bufs,
@@ -612,9 +614,9 @@ lpfc_debugfs_lockstat_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 			break;
 		qp = &phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[lpfc_debugfs_last_lock];
 
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "HdwQ %03d Lock ", i);
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "HdwQ %03d Lock ", i);
 		if (phba->cfg_xri_rebalancing) {
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "get_pvt:%d mv_pvt:%d "
 					 "mv2pub:%d mv2pvt:%d "
 					 "put_pvt:%d put_pub:%d wq:%d\n",
@@ -626,7 +628,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_lockstat_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 					 qp->lock_conflict.free_pub_pool,
 					 qp->lock_conflict.wq_access);
 		} else {
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "get:%d put:%d free:%d wq:%d\n",
 					 qp->lock_conflict.alloc_xri_get,
 					 qp->lock_conflict.alloc_xri_put,
@@ -678,7 +680,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHBASlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 	off = 0;
 	spin_lock_irq(&phba->hbalock);
 
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HBA SLIM\n");
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HBA SLIM\n");
 	lpfc_memcpy_from_slim(buffer,
 		phba->MBslimaddr + lpfc_debugfs_last_hba_slim_off, 1024);
 
@@ -692,7 +694,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHBASlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 
 	i = 1024;
 	while (i > 0) {
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 		"%08x: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
 		off, *ptr, *(ptr+1), *(ptr+2), *(ptr+3), *(ptr+4),
 		*(ptr+5), *(ptr+6), *(ptr+7));
@@ -736,11 +738,11 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHostSlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 	off = 0;
 	spin_lock_irq(&phba->hbalock);
 
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "SLIM Mailbox\n");
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "SLIM Mailbox\n");
 	ptr = (uint32_t *)phba->slim2p.virt;
 	i = sizeof(MAILBOX_t);
 	while (i > 0) {
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 		"%08x: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
 		off, *ptr, *(ptr+1), *(ptr+2), *(ptr+3), *(ptr+4),
 		*(ptr+5), *(ptr+6), *(ptr+7));
@@ -749,11 +751,11 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHostSlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		off += (8 * sizeof(uint32_t));
 	}
 
-	len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "SLIM PCB\n");
+	len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "SLIM PCB\n");
 	ptr = (uint32_t *)phba->pcb;
 	i = sizeof(PCB_t);
 	while (i > 0) {
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 		"%08x: %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
 		off, *ptr, *(ptr+1), *(ptr+2), *(ptr+3), *(ptr+4),
 		*(ptr+5), *(ptr+6), *(ptr+7));
@@ -766,7 +768,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHostSlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
 			pgpp = &phba->port_gp[i];
 			pring = &psli->sli3_ring[i];
-			len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 					 "Ring %d: CMD GetInx:%d "
 					 "(Max:%d Next:%d "
 					 "Local:%d flg:x%x)  "
@@ -783,7 +785,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dumpHostSlim_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		word1 = readl(phba->CAregaddr);
 		word2 = readl(phba->HSregaddr);
 		word3 = readl(phba->HCregaddr);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HA:%08x CA:%08x HS:%08x "
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "HA:%08x CA:%08x HS:%08x "
 				 "HC:%08x\n", word0, word1, word2, word3);
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irq(&phba->hbalock);
@@ -821,12 +823,12 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nodelist_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 	cnt = (LPFC_NODELIST_SIZE / LPFC_NODELIST_ENTRY_SIZE);
 	outio = 0;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "\nFCP Nodelist Entries ...\n");
+	len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "\nFCP Nodelist Entries ...\n");
 	spin_lock_irq(shost->host_lock);
 	list_for_each_entry(ndlp, &vport->fc_nodes, nlp_listp) {
 		iocnt = 0;
 		if (!cnt) {
-			len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 				"Missing Nodelist Entries\n");
 			break;
 		}
@@ -864,63 +866,63 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nodelist_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		default:
 			statep = "UNKNOWN";
 		}
-		len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "%s DID:x%06x ",
+		len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "%s DID:x%06x ",
 				statep, ndlp->nlp_DID);
-		len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 				"WWPN x%llx ",
 				wwn_to_u64(ndlp->nlp_portname.u.wwn));
-		len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len,
 				"WWNN x%llx ",
 				wwn_to_u64(ndlp->nlp_nodename.u.wwn));
 		if (ndlp->nlp_flag & NLP_RPI_REGISTERED)
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "RPI:%03d ",
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "RPI:%03d ",
 					ndlp->nlp_rpi);
 		else
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "RPI:none ");
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "flag:x%08x ",
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "RPI:none ");
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "flag:x%08x ",
 			ndlp->nlp_flag);
 		if (!ndlp->nlp_type)
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "UNKNOWN_TYPE ");
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "UNKNOWN_TYPE ");
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_FC_NODE)
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FC_NODE ");
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FC_NODE ");
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_FABRIC) {
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FABRIC ");
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FABRIC ");
 			iocnt = 0;
 		}
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_FCP_TARGET)
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FCP_TGT sid:%d ",
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FCP_TGT sid:%d ",
 				ndlp->nlp_sid);
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_FCP_INITIATOR)
-			len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FCP_INITIATOR ");
+			len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "FCP_INITIATOR ");
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_NVME_TARGET)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len,
 					size - len, "NVME_TGT sid:%d ",
 					NLP_NO_SID);
 		if (ndlp->nlp_type & NLP_NVME_INITIATOR)
-			len += snprintf(buf + len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len,
 					size - len, "NVME_INITIATOR ");
-		len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "usgmap:%x ",
+		len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "usgmap:%x ",
 			ndlp->nlp_usg_map);
-		len += snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "refcnt:%x",
+		len += scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "refcnt:%x",
 			kref_read(&ndlp->kref));
 		if (iocnt) {
 			i = atomic_read(&ndlp->cmd_pending);
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					" OutIO:x%x Qdepth x%x",
 					i, ndlp->cmd_qdepth);
 			outio += i;
 		}
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "defer:%x ",
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "defer:%x ",
 			ndlp->nlp_defer_did);
-		len +=  snprintf(buf+len, size-len, "\n");
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf+len, size-len, "\n");
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irq(shost->host_lock);
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 			"\nOutstanding IO x%x\n",  outio);
 
 	if (phba->nvmet_support && phba->targetport && (vport == phba->pport)) {
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"\nNVME Targetport Entry ...\n");
 
 		/* Port state is only one of two values for now. */
@@ -928,18 +930,18 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nodelist_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 			statep = "REGISTERED";
 		else
 			statep = "INIT";
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"TGT WWNN x%llx WWPN x%llx State %s\n",
 				wwn_to_u64(vport->fc_nodename.u.wwn),
 				wwn_to_u64(vport->fc_portname.u.wwn),
 				statep);
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"    Targetport DID x%06x\n",
 				phba->targetport->port_id);
 		goto out_exit;
 	}
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"\nNVME Lport/Rport Entries ...\n");
 
 	localport = vport->localport;
@@ -954,11 +956,11 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nodelist_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 	else
 		statep = "UNKNOWN ";
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 			"Lport DID x%06x PortState %s\n",
 			localport->port_id, statep);
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\tRport List:\n");
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\tRport List:\n");
 	list_for_each_entry(ndlp, &vport->fc_nodes, nlp_listp) {
 		/* local short-hand pointer. */
 		spin_lock(&phba->hbalock);
@@ -985,32 +987,32 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nodelist_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		}
 
 		/* Tab in to show lport ownership. */
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"\t%s Port ID:x%06x ",
 				statep, nrport->port_id);
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "WWPN x%llx ",
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "WWPN x%llx ",
 				nrport->port_name);
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "WWNN x%llx ",
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "WWNN x%llx ",
 				nrport->node_name);
 
 		/* An NVME rport can have multiple roles. */
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_INITIATOR)
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "INITIATOR ");
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET)
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "TARGET ");
 		if (nrport->port_role & FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_DISCOVERY)
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "DISCSRVC ");
 		if (nrport->port_role & ~(FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_INITIATOR |
 					  FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_TARGET |
 					  FC_PORT_ROLE_NVME_DISCOVERY))
-			len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					 "UNKNOWN ROLE x%x",
 					 nrport->port_role);
 		/* Terminate the string. */
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\n");
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\n");
 	}
 
 	spin_unlock_irq(shost->host_lock);
@@ -1049,35 +1051,35 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		if (!phba->targetport)
 			return len;
 		tgtp = (struct lpfc_nvmet_tgtport *)phba->targetport->private;
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"\nNVME Targetport Statistics\n");
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"LS: Rcv %08x Drop %08x Abort %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_in),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_drop),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_abort));
 		if (atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_in) !=
 		    atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_out)) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Rcv LS: in %08x != out %08x\n",
 					atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_in),
 					atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_ls_req_out));
 		}
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"LS: Xmt %08x Drop %08x Cmpl %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_rsp),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_drop),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_rsp_cmpl));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"LS: RSP Abort %08x xb %08x Err %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_rsp_aborted),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_rsp_xb_set),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_ls_rsp_error));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP: Rcv %08x Defer %08x Release %08x "
 				"Drop %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_in),
@@ -1087,13 +1089,13 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 
 		if (atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_in) !=
 		    atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_out)) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Rcv FCP: in %08x != out %08x\n",
 					atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_in),
 					atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_out));
 		}
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP Rsp: read %08x readrsp %08x "
 				"write %08x rsp %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_read),
@@ -1101,31 +1103,31 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_write),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP Rsp Cmpl: %08x err %08x drop %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp_cmpl),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp_error),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp_drop));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP Rsp Abort: %08x xb %08x xricqe  %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp_aborted),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_rsp_xb_set),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_xri_abort_cqe));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"ABORT: Xmt %08x Cmpl %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_abort),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_abort_cmpl));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"ABORT: Sol %08x  Usol %08x Err %08x Cmpl %08x",
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_abort_sol),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_abort_unsol),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_abort_rsp),
 				atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_abort_rsp_error));
 
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\n");
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, "\n");
 
 		cnt = 0;
 		spin_lock(&phba->sli4_hba.abts_nvmet_buf_list_lock);
@@ -1136,7 +1138,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&phba->sli4_hba.abts_nvmet_buf_list_lock);
 		if (cnt) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"ABORT: %d ctx entries\n", cnt);
 			spin_lock(&phba->sli4_hba.abts_nvmet_buf_list_lock);
 			list_for_each_entry_safe(ctxp, next_ctxp,
@@ -1144,7 +1146,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 				    list) {
 				if (len >= (size - LPFC_DEBUG_OUT_LINE_SZ))
 					break;
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 						"Entry: oxid %x state %x "
 						"flag %x\n",
 						ctxp->oxid, ctxp->state,
@@ -1158,7 +1160,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		tot += atomic_read(&tgtp->xmt_fcp_release);
 		tot = atomic_read(&tgtp->rcv_fcp_cmd_in) - tot;
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"IO_CTX: %08x  WAIT: cur %08x tot %08x\n"
 				"CTX Outstanding %08llx\n",
 				phba->sli4_hba.nvmet_xri_cnt,
@@ -1176,10 +1178,10 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		if (!lport)
 			return len;
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"\nNVME HDWQ Statistics\n");
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"LS: Xmt %016x Cmpl %016x\n",
 				atomic_read(&lport->fc4NvmeLsRequests),
 				atomic_read(&lport->fc4NvmeLsCmpls));
@@ -1199,20 +1201,20 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 			if (i >= 32)
 				continue;
 
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"HDWQ (%d): Rd %016llx Wr %016llx "
 					"IO %016llx ",
 					i, data1, data2, data3);
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Cmpl %016llx OutIO %016llx\n",
 					tot, ((data1 + data2 + data3) - tot));
 		}
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Total FCP Cmpl %016llx Issue %016llx "
 				"OutIO %016llx\n",
 				totin, totout, totout - totin);
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"LS Xmt Err: Abrt %08x Err %08x  "
 				"Cmpl Err: xb %08x Err %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&lport->xmt_ls_abort),
@@ -1220,7 +1222,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 				atomic_read(&lport->cmpl_ls_xb),
 				atomic_read(&lport->cmpl_ls_err));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP Xmt Err: noxri %06x nondlp %06x "
 				"qdepth %06x wqerr %06x err %06x Abrt %06x\n",
 				atomic_read(&lport->xmt_fcp_noxri),
@@ -1230,7 +1232,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmestat_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 				atomic_read(&lport->xmt_fcp_err),
 				atomic_read(&lport->xmt_fcp_abort));
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 				"FCP Cmpl Err: xb %08x Err %08x\n",
 				atomic_read(&lport->cmpl_fcp_xb),
 				atomic_read(&lport->cmpl_fcp_err));
@@ -1322,58 +1324,58 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmektime_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 
 	if (phba->nvmet_support == 0) {
 		/* NVME Initiator */
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"ktime %s: Total Samples: %lld\n",
 				(phba->ktime_on ?  "Enabled" : "Disabled"),
 				phba->ktime_data_samples);
 		if (phba->ktime_data_samples == 0)
 			return len;
 
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"Segment 1: Last NVME Cmd cmpl "
 			"done -to- Start of next NVME cnd (in driver)\n");
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg1_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg1_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg1_max);
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"Segment 2: Driver start of NVME cmd "
 			"-to- Firmware WQ doorbell\n");
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg2_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg2_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg2_max);
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"Segment 3: Firmware WQ doorbell -to- "
 			"MSI-X ISR cmpl\n");
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg3_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg3_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg3_max);
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"Segment 4: MSI-X ISR cmpl -to- "
 			"NVME cmpl done\n");
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg4_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg4_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg4_max);
-		len += snprintf(
+		len += scnprintf(
 			buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"Total IO avg time: %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg1_total +
@@ -1385,7 +1387,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmektime_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 	}
 
 	/* NVME Target */
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"ktime %s: Total Samples: %lld %lld\n",
 			(phba->ktime_on ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"),
 			phba->ktime_data_samples,
@@ -1393,46 +1395,46 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmektime_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 	if (phba->ktime_data_samples == 0)
 		return len;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 1: MSI-X ISR Rcv cmd -to- "
 			"cmd pass to NVME Layer\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg1_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg1_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg1_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 2: cmd pass to NVME Layer- "
 			"-to- Driver rcv cmd OP (action)\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg2_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg2_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg2_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 3: Driver rcv cmd OP -to- "
 			"Firmware WQ doorbell: cmd\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg3_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg3_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg3_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 4: Firmware WQ doorbell: cmd "
 			"-to- MSI-X ISR for cmd cmpl\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg4_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg4_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg4_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 5: MSI-X ISR for cmd cmpl "
 			"-to- NVME layer passed cmd done\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg5_total,
 				phba->ktime_data_samples),
@@ -1440,10 +1442,10 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmektime_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 			phba->ktime_seg5_max);
 
 	if (phba->ktime_status_samples == 0) {
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"Total: cmd received by MSI-X ISR "
 				"-to- cmd completed on wire\n");
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 				"avg:%08lld min:%08lld "
 				"max %08lld\n",
 				div_u64(phba->ktime_seg10_total,
@@ -1453,46 +1455,46 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmektime_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		return len;
 	}
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 6: NVME layer passed cmd done "
 			"-to- Driver rcv rsp status OP\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg6_total,
 				phba->ktime_status_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg6_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg6_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 7: Driver rcv rsp status OP "
 			"-to- Firmware WQ doorbell: status\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg7_total,
 				phba->ktime_status_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg7_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg7_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 8: Firmware WQ doorbell: status"
 			" -to- MSI-X ISR for status cmpl\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg8_total,
 				phba->ktime_status_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg8_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg8_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Segment 9: MSI-X ISR for status cmpl  "
 			"-to- NVME layer passed status done\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg9_total,
 				phba->ktime_status_samples),
 			phba->ktime_seg9_min,
 			phba->ktime_seg9_max);
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"Total: cmd received by MSI-X ISR -to- "
 			"cmd completed on wire\n");
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE-len,
 			"avg:%08lld min:%08lld max %08lld\n",
 			div_u64(phba->ktime_seg10_total,
 				phba->ktime_status_samples),
@@ -1527,7 +1529,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmeio_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		(phba->nvmeio_trc_size - 1);
 	skip = phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 			"%s IO Trace %s: next_idx %d skip %d size %d\n",
 			(phba->nvmet_support ? "NVME" : "NVMET"),
 			(state ? "Enabled" : "Disabled"),
@@ -1549,18 +1551,18 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmeio_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		if (!dtp->fmt)
 			continue;
 
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, dtp->fmt,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, dtp->fmt,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 
 		if (phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx >= phba->nvmeio_trc_size) {
 			phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx = 0;
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Trace Complete\n");
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		if (len >= (size - LPFC_DEBUG_OUT_LINE_SZ)) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Trace Continue (%d of %d)\n",
 					phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx,
 					phba->nvmeio_trc_size);
@@ -1578,18 +1580,18 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmeio_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		if (!dtp->fmt)
 			continue;
 
-		len +=  snprintf(buf + len, size - len, dtp->fmt,
+		len +=  scnprintf(buf + len, size - len, dtp->fmt,
 			dtp->data1, dtp->data2, dtp->data3);
 
 		if (phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx >= phba->nvmeio_trc_size) {
 			phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx = 0;
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Trace Complete\n");
 			goto out;
 		}
 
 		if (len >= (size - LPFC_DEBUG_OUT_LINE_SZ)) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 					"Trace Continue (%d of %d)\n",
 					phba->nvmeio_trc_output_idx,
 					phba->nvmeio_trc_size);
@@ -1597,7 +1599,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_nvmeio_trc_data(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *buf, int size)
 		}
 	}
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, size - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, size - len,
 			"Trace Done\n");
 out:
 	return len;
@@ -1627,17 +1629,17 @@ lpfc_debugfs_cpucheck_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 	uint32_t tot_rcv;
 	uint32_t tot_cmpl;
 
-	len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 			"CPUcheck %s ",
 			(phba->cpucheck_on & LPFC_CHECK_NVME_IO ?
 				"Enabled" : "Disabled"));
 	if (phba->nvmet_support) {
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"%s\n",
 				(phba->cpucheck_on & LPFC_CHECK_NVMET_RCV ?
 					"Rcv Enabled\n" : "Rcv Disabled\n"));
 	} else {
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "\n");
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len, "\n");
 	}
 	max_cnt = size - LPFC_DEBUG_OUT_LINE_SZ;
 
@@ -1658,7 +1660,7 @@ lpfc_debugfs_cpucheck_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 		if (!tot_xmt && !tot_cmpl && !tot_rcv)
 			continue;
 
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"HDWQ %03d: ", i);
 		for (j = 0; j < LPFC_CHECK_CPU_CNT; j++) {
 			/* Only display non-zero counters */
@@ -1667,22 +1669,22 @@ lpfc_debugfs_cpucheck_data(struct lpfc_vport *vport, char *buf, int size)
 			    !qp->cpucheck_rcv_io[j])
 				continue;
 			if (phba->nvmet_support) {
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 						"CPU %03d: %x/%x/%x ", j,
 						qp->cpucheck_rcv_io[j],
 						qp->cpucheck_xmt_io[j],
 						qp->cpucheck_cmpl_io[j]);
 			} else {
-				len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+				len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 						"CPU %03d: %x/%x ", j,
 						qp->cpucheck_xmt_io[j],
 						qp->cpucheck_cmpl_io[j]);
 			}
 		}
-		len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 				"Total: %x\n", tot_xmt);
 		if (len >= max_cnt) {
-			len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+			len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
 					"Truncated ...\n");
 			return len;
 		}
@@ -2258,28 +2260,29 @@ lpfc_debugfs_dif_err_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 	int cnt = 0;
 
 	if (dent == phba->debug_writeGuard)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wgrd_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wgrd_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_writeApp)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wapp_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wapp_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_writeRef)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wref_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_wref_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_readGuard)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rgrd_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rgrd_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_readApp)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rapp_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rapp_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_readRef)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rref_cnt);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "%u\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_rref_cnt);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_InjErrNPortID)
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%06x\n", phba->lpfc_injerr_nportid);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%06x\n",
+				phba->lpfc_injerr_nportid);
 	else if (dent == phba->debug_InjErrWWPN) {
 		memcpy(&tmp, &phba->lpfc_injerr_wwpn, sizeof(struct lpfc_name));
 		tmp = cpu_to_be64(tmp);
-		cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%016llx\n", tmp);
+		cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%016llx\n", tmp);
 	} else if (dent == phba->debug_InjErrLBA) {
 		if (phba->lpfc_injerr_lba == (sector_t)(-1))
-			cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "off\n");
+			cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "off\n");
 		else
-			cnt = snprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%llx\n",
+			cnt = scnprintf(cbuf, 32, "0x%llx\n",
 				 (uint64_t) phba->lpfc_injerr_lba);
 	} else
 		lpfc_printf_log(phba, KERN_ERR, LOG_INIT,
@@ -3224,17 +3227,17 @@ lpfc_idiag_pcicfg_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
 	switch (count) {
 	case SIZE_U8: /* byte (8 bits) */
 		pci_read_config_byte(pdev, where, &u8val);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 				"%03x: %02x\n", where, u8val);
 		break;
 	case SIZE_U16: /* word (16 bits) */
 		pci_read_config_word(pdev, where, &u16val);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 				"%03x: %04x\n", where, u16val);
 		break;
 	case SIZE_U32: /* double word (32 bits) */
 		pci_read_config_dword(pdev, where, &u32val);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 				"%03x: %08x\n", where, u32val);
 		break;
 	case LPFC_PCI_CFG_BROWSE: /* browse all */
@@ -3254,25 +3257,25 @@ pcicfg_browse:
 	offset = offset_label;
 
 	/* Read PCI config space */
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 			"%03x: ", offset_label);
 	while (index > 0) {
 		pci_read_config_dword(pdev, offset, &u32val);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 				"%08x ", u32val);
 		offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
 		if (offset >= LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE) {
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len, "\n");
 			break;
 		}
 		index -= sizeof(uint32_t);
 		if (!index)
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 					"\n");
 		else if (!(index % (8 * sizeof(uint32_t)))) {
 			offset_label += (8 * sizeof(uint32_t));
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_CFG_SIZE-len,
 					"\n%03x: ", offset_label);
 		}
 	}
@@ -3543,7 +3546,7 @@ lpfc_idiag_baracc_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
 	if (acc_range == SINGLE_WORD) {
 		offset_run = offset;
 		u32val = readl(mem_mapped_bar + offset_run);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"%05x: %08x\n", offset_run, u32val);
 	} else
 		goto baracc_browse;
@@ -3557,35 +3560,35 @@ baracc_browse:
 	offset_run = offset_label;
 
 	/* Read PCI bar memory mapped space */
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"%05x: ", offset_label);
 	index = LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_SIZE;
 	while (index > 0) {
 		u32val = readl(mem_mapped_bar + offset_run);
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"%08x ", u32val);
 		offset_run += sizeof(uint32_t);
 		if (acc_range == LPFC_PCI_BAR_BROWSE) {
 			if (offset_run >= bar_size) {
-				len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+				len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
 				break;
 			}
 		} else {
 			if (offset_run >= offset +
 			    (acc_range * sizeof(uint32_t))) {
-				len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+				len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 		index -= sizeof(uint32_t);
 		if (!index)
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
 		else if (!(index % (8 * sizeof(uint32_t)))) {
 			offset_label += (8 * sizeof(uint32_t));
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_PCI_BAR_RD_BUF_SIZE-len,
 					"\n%05x: ", offset_label);
 		}
@@ -3758,19 +3761,19 @@ __lpfc_idiag_print_wq(struct lpfc_queue *qp, char *wqtype,
 	if (!qp)
 		return len;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t\t%s WQ info: ", wqtype);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"AssocCQID[%04d]: WQ-STAT[oflow:x%x posted:x%llx]\n",
 			qp->assoc_qid, qp->q_cnt_1,
 			(unsigned long long)qp->q_cnt_4);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t\tWQID[%02d], QE-CNT[%04d], QE-SZ[%04d], "
 			"HST-IDX[%04d], PRT-IDX[%04d], NTFI[%03d]",
 			qp->queue_id, qp->entry_count,
 			qp->entry_size, qp->host_index,
 			qp->hba_index, qp->notify_interval);
-	len +=  snprintf(pbuffer + len,
+	len +=  scnprintf(pbuffer + len,
 			LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len, "\n");
 	return len;
 }
@@ -3810,21 +3813,22 @@ __lpfc_idiag_print_cq(struct lpfc_queue *qp, char *cqtype,
 	if (!qp)
 		return len;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t%s CQ info: ", cqtype);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"AssocEQID[%02d]: CQ STAT[max:x%x relw:x%x "
 			"xabt:x%x wq:x%llx]\n",
 			qp->assoc_qid, qp->q_cnt_1, qp->q_cnt_2,
 			qp->q_cnt_3, (unsigned long long)qp->q_cnt_4);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\tCQID[%02d], QE-CNT[%04d], QE-SZ[%04d], "
 			"HST-IDX[%04d], NTFI[%03d], PLMT[%03d]",
 			qp->queue_id, qp->entry_count,
 			qp->entry_size, qp->host_index,
 			qp->notify_interval, qp->max_proc_limit);
 
-	len +=  snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len, "\n");
+	len +=  scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+			"\n");
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -3836,19 +3840,19 @@ __lpfc_idiag_print_rqpair(struct lpfc_queue *qp, struct lpfc_queue *datqp,
 	if (!qp || !datqp)
 		return len;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t\t%s RQ info: ", rqtype);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"AssocCQID[%02d]: RQ-STAT[nopost:x%x nobuf:x%x "
 			"posted:x%x rcv:x%llx]\n",
 			qp->assoc_qid, qp->q_cnt_1, qp->q_cnt_2,
 			qp->q_cnt_3, (unsigned long long)qp->q_cnt_4);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t\tHQID[%02d], QE-CNT[%04d], QE-SZ[%04d], "
 			"HST-IDX[%04d], PRT-IDX[%04d], NTFI[%03d]\n",
 			qp->queue_id, qp->entry_count, qp->entry_size,
 			qp->host_index, qp->hba_index, qp->notify_interval);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\t\tDQID[%02d], QE-CNT[%04d], QE-SZ[%04d], "
 			"HST-IDX[%04d], PRT-IDX[%04d], NTFI[%03d]\n",
 			datqp->queue_id, datqp->entry_count,
@@ -3927,18 +3931,19 @@ __lpfc_idiag_print_eq(struct lpfc_queue *qp, char *eqtype,
 	if (!qp)
 		return len;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"\n%s EQ info: EQ-STAT[max:x%x noE:x%x "
 			"cqe_proc:x%x eqe_proc:x%llx eqd %d]\n",
 			eqtype, qp->q_cnt_1, qp->q_cnt_2, qp->q_cnt_3,
 			(unsigned long long)qp->q_cnt_4, qp->q_mode);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
 			"EQID[%02d], QE-CNT[%04d], QE-SZ[%04d], "
 			"HST-IDX[%04d], NTFI[%03d], PLMT[%03d], AFFIN[%03d]",
 			qp->queue_id, qp->entry_count, qp->entry_size,
 			qp->host_index, qp->notify_interval,
 			qp->max_proc_limit, qp->chann);
-	len +=  snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len, "\n");
+	len +=  scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+			"\n");
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -3991,9 +3996,10 @@ lpfc_idiag_queinfo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
 		if (phba->lpfc_idiag_last_eq >= phba->cfg_hdw_queue)
 			phba->lpfc_idiag_last_eq = 0;
 
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
-					"HDWQ %d out of %d HBA HDWQs\n",
-					x, phba->cfg_hdw_queue);
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len,
+				 LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len,
+				 "HDWQ %d out of %d HBA HDWQs\n",
+				 x, phba->cfg_hdw_queue);
 
 		/* Fast-path EQ */
 		qp = phba->sli4_hba.hdwq[x].hba_eq;
@@ -4075,7 +4081,7 @@ lpfc_idiag_queinfo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, nbytes, ppos, pbuffer, len);
 
 too_big:
-	len +=  snprintf(pbuffer + len,
+	len +=  scnprintf(pbuffer + len,
 		LPFC_QUE_INFO_GET_BUF_SIZE - len, "Truncated ...\n");
 out:
 	spin_unlock_irq(&phba->hbalock);
@@ -4131,22 +4137,22 @@ lpfc_idiag_queacc_read_qe(char *pbuffer, int len, struct lpfc_queue *pque,
 		return 0;
 
 	esize = pque->entry_size;
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"QE-INDEX[%04d]:\n", index);
 
 	offset = 0;
 	pentry = pque->qe[index].address;
 	while (esize > 0) {
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"%08x ", *pentry);
 		pentry++;
 		offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
 		esize -= sizeof(uint32_t);
 		if (esize > 0 && !(offset % (4 * sizeof(uint32_t))))
-			len += snprintf(pbuffer+len,
+			len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len,
 					LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
 	}
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_QUE_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len, "\n");
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -4526,27 +4532,27 @@ lpfc_idiag_drbacc_read_reg(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer,
 
 	switch (drbregid) {
 	case LPFC_DRB_EQ:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"EQ-DRB-REG: 0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.EQDBregaddr));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_DRB_CQ:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE - len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer + len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE - len,
 				"CQ-DRB-REG: 0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.CQDBregaddr));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_DRB_MQ:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"MQ-DRB-REG:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.MQDBregaddr));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_DRB_WQ:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"WQ-DRB-REG:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.WQDBregaddr));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_DRB_RQ:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_DRB_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"RQ-DRB-REG:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.RQDBregaddr));
 		break;
@@ -4736,37 +4742,37 @@ lpfc_idiag_ctlacc_read_reg(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer,
 
 	switch (ctlregid) {
 	case LPFC_CTL_PORT_SEM:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port SemReg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PORT_SEM_OFFSET));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_CTL_PORT_STA:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port StaReg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PORT_STA_OFFSET));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_CTL_PORT_CTL:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port CtlReg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PORT_CTL_OFFSET));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_CTL_PORT_ER1:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port Er1Reg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PORT_ER1_OFFSET));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_CTL_PORT_ER2:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port Er2Reg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PORT_ER2_OFFSET));
 		break;
 	case LPFC_CTL_PDEV_CTL:
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_CTL_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"PDev CtlReg:   0x%08x\n",
 				readl(phba->sli4_hba.conf_regs_memmap_p +
 				      LPFC_CTL_PDEV_CTL_OFFSET));
@@ -4959,13 +4965,13 @@ lpfc_idiag_mbxacc_get_setup(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer)
 	mbx_dump_cnt = idiag.cmd.data[IDIAG_MBXACC_DPCNT_INDX];
 	mbx_word_cnt = idiag.cmd.data[IDIAG_MBXACC_WDCNT_INDX];
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"mbx_dump_map: 0x%08x\n", mbx_dump_map);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"mbx_dump_cnt: %04d\n", mbx_dump_cnt);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"mbx_word_cnt: %04d\n", mbx_word_cnt);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"mbx_mbox_cmd: 0x%02x\n", mbx_mbox_cmd);
 
 	return len;
@@ -5114,35 +5120,35 @@ lpfc_idiag_extacc_avail_get(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer, int len)
 {
 	uint16_t ext_cnt, ext_size;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\nAvailable Extents Information:\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tPort Available VPI extents: ");
 	lpfc_sli4_get_avail_extnt_rsrc(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_VPI,
 				       &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"Count %3d, Size %3d\n", ext_cnt, ext_size);
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tPort Available VFI extents: ");
 	lpfc_sli4_get_avail_extnt_rsrc(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_VFI,
 				       &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"Count %3d, Size %3d\n", ext_cnt, ext_size);
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tPort Available RPI extents: ");
 	lpfc_sli4_get_avail_extnt_rsrc(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_RPI,
 				       &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"Count %3d, Size %3d\n", ext_cnt, ext_size);
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tPort Available XRI extents: ");
 	lpfc_sli4_get_avail_extnt_rsrc(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_XRI,
 				       &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"Count %3d, Size %3d\n", ext_cnt, ext_size);
 
 	return len;
@@ -5166,55 +5172,55 @@ lpfc_idiag_extacc_alloc_get(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer, int len)
 	uint16_t ext_cnt, ext_size;
 	int rc;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\nAllocated Extents Information:\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tHost Allocated VPI extents: ");
 	rc = lpfc_sli4_get_allocated_extnts(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_VPI,
 					    &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
 	if (!rc)
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port %d Extent %3d, Size %3d\n",
 				phba->brd_no, ext_cnt, ext_size);
 	else
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"N/A\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tHost Allocated VFI extents: ");
 	rc = lpfc_sli4_get_allocated_extnts(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_VFI,
 					    &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
 	if (!rc)
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port %d Extent %3d, Size %3d\n",
 				phba->brd_no, ext_cnt, ext_size);
 	else
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"N/A\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tHost Allocated RPI extents: ");
 	rc = lpfc_sli4_get_allocated_extnts(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_RPI,
 					    &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
 	if (!rc)
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port %d Extent %3d, Size %3d\n",
 				phba->brd_no, ext_cnt, ext_size);
 	else
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"N/A\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tHost Allocated XRI extents: ");
 	rc = lpfc_sli4_get_allocated_extnts(phba, LPFC_RSC_TYPE_FCOE_XRI,
 					    &ext_cnt, &ext_size);
 	if (!rc)
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"Port %d Extent %3d, Size %3d\n",
 				phba->brd_no, ext_cnt, ext_size);
 	else
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"N/A\n");
 
 	return len;
@@ -5238,49 +5244,49 @@ lpfc_idiag_extacc_drivr_get(struct lpfc_hba *phba, char *pbuffer, int len)
 	struct lpfc_rsrc_blks *rsrc_blks;
 	int index;
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\nDriver Extents Information:\n");
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tVPI extents:\n");
 	index = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry(rsrc_blks, &phba->lpfc_vpi_blk_list, list) {
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"\t\tBlock %3d: Start %4d, Count %4d\n",
 				index, rsrc_blks->rsrc_start,
 				rsrc_blks->rsrc_size);
 		index++;
 	}
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tVFI extents:\n");
 	index = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry(rsrc_blks, &phba->sli4_hba.lpfc_vfi_blk_list,
 			    list) {
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"\t\tBlock %3d: Start %4d, Count %4d\n",
 				index, rsrc_blks->rsrc_start,
 				rsrc_blks->rsrc_size);
 		index++;
 	}
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tRPI extents:\n");
 	index = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry(rsrc_blks, &phba->sli4_hba.lpfc_rpi_blk_list,
 			    list) {
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"\t\tBlock %3d: Start %4d, Count %4d\n",
 				index, rsrc_blks->rsrc_start,
 				rsrc_blks->rsrc_size);
 		index++;
 	}
 
-	len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+	len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 			"\tXRI extents:\n");
 	index = 0;
 	list_for_each_entry(rsrc_blks, &phba->sli4_hba.lpfc_xri_blk_list,
 			    list) {
-		len += snprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
+		len += scnprintf(pbuffer+len, LPFC_EXT_ACC_BUF_SIZE-len,
 				"\t\tBlock %3d: Start %4d, Count %4d\n",
 				index, rsrc_blks->rsrc_start,
 				rsrc_blks->rsrc_size);
@@ -5706,11 +5712,11 @@ lpfc_idiag_mbxacc_dump_bsg_mbox(struct lpfc_hba *phba, enum nemb_type nemb_tp,
 				if (i != 0)
 					pr_err("%s\n", line_buf);
 				len = 0;
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len,
 						LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%03d: ", i);
 			}
-			len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
+			len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 					"%08x ", (uint32_t)*pword);
 			pword++;
 		}
@@ -5773,11 +5779,11 @@ lpfc_idiag_mbxacc_dump_issue_mbox(struct lpfc_hba *phba, MAILBOX_t *pmbox)
 					pr_err("%s\n", line_buf);
 				len = 0;
 				memset(line_buf, 0, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ);
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len,
 						LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%03d: ", i);
 			}
-			len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
+			len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 					"%08x ",
 					((uint32_t)*pword) & 0xffffffff);
 			pword++;
@@ -5796,18 +5802,18 @@ lpfc_idiag_mbxacc_dump_issue_mbox(struct lpfc_hba *phba, MAILBOX_t *pmbox)
 					pr_err("%s\n", line_buf);
 				len = 0;
 				memset(line_buf, 0, LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ);
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len,
 						LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%03d: ", i);
 			}
 			for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len,
 						LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%02x",
 						((uint8_t)*pbyte) & 0xff);
 				pbyte++;
 			}
-			len += snprintf(line_buf+len,
+			len += scnprintf(line_buf+len,
 					LPFC_MBX_ACC_LBUF_SZ-len, " ");
 		}
 		if ((i - 1) % 8)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.h b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.h
index 93ab7dfb8ee0..2700f373b46a 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.h
+++ b/drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc_debugfs.h
@@ -348,7 +348,7 @@ lpfc_debug_dump_qe(struct lpfc_queue *q, uint32_t idx)
 	pword = q->qe[idx].address;
 
 	len = 0;
-	len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "QE[%04d]: ", idx);
+	len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "QE[%04d]: ", idx);
 	if (qe_word_cnt > 8)
 		printk(KERN_ERR "%s\n", line_buf);
 
@@ -359,11 +359,11 @@ lpfc_debug_dump_qe(struct lpfc_queue *q, uint32_t idx)
 			if (qe_word_cnt > 8) {
 				len = 0;
 				memset(line_buf, 0, LPFC_LBUF_SZ);
-				len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len,
+				len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len,
 						"%03d: ", i);
 			}
 		}
-		len += snprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "%08x ",
+		len += scnprintf(line_buf+len, LPFC_LBUF_SZ-len, "%08x ",
 				((uint32_t)*pword) & 0xffffffff);
 		pword++;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_attr.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_attr.c
index f928c4d3a1ef..70d92334e721 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_attr.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_attr.c
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ qla2x00_sysfs_write_optrom_ctl(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 		}
 
 		ha->optrom_region_start = start;
-		ha->optrom_region_size = start + size;
+		ha->optrom_region_size = size;
 
 		ha->optrom_state = QLA_SREADING;
 		ha->optrom_buffer = vmalloc(ha->optrom_region_size);
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ qla2x00_sysfs_write_optrom_ctl(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
 		}
 
 		ha->optrom_region_start = start;
-		ha->optrom_region_size = start + size;
+		ha->optrom_region_size = size;
 
 		ha->optrom_state = QLA_SWRITING;
 		ha->optrom_buffer = vmalloc(ha->optrom_region_size);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c
index 41c85da3ab32..34dd8bf3fb31 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c
@@ -615,7 +615,6 @@ static void qla_nvme_unregister_remote_port(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct fc_port *fcport = container_of(work, struct fc_port,
 	    nvme_del_work);
 	struct qla_nvme_rport *qla_rport, *trport;
-	scsi_qla_host_t *base_vha;
 
 	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NVME_FC))
 		return;
@@ -623,23 +622,19 @@ static void qla_nvme_unregister_remote_port(struct work_struct *work)
 	ql_log(ql_log_warn, NULL, 0x2112,
 	    "%s: unregister remoteport on %p\n",__func__, fcport);
 
-	base_vha = pci_get_drvdata(fcport->vha->hw->pdev);
-	if (test_bit(PFLG_DRIVER_REMOVING, &base_vha->pci_flags)) {
-		ql_dbg(ql_dbg_disc, fcport->vha, 0x2114,
-		    "%s: Notify FC-NVMe transport, set devloss=0\n",
-		    __func__);
-
-		nvme_fc_set_remoteport_devloss(fcport->nvme_remote_port, 0);
-	}
-
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(qla_rport, trport,
 	    &fcport->vha->nvme_rport_list, list) {
 		if (qla_rport->fcport == fcport) {
 			ql_log(ql_log_info, fcport->vha, 0x2113,
 			    "%s: fcport=%p\n", __func__, fcport);
+			nvme_fc_set_remoteport_devloss
+				(fcport->nvme_remote_port, 0);
 			init_completion(&fcport->nvme_del_done);
-			nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport(
-			    fcport->nvme_remote_port);
+			if (nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport
+			    (fcport->nvme_remote_port))
+				ql_log(ql_log_info, fcport->vha, 0x2114,
+				    "%s: Failed to unregister nvme_remote_port\n",
+				    __func__);
 			wait_for_completion(&fcport->nvme_del_done);
 			break;
 		}
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c
index 582d1663f971..697eee1d8847 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_target.c
@@ -980,6 +980,8 @@ void qlt_free_session_done(struct work_struct *work)
 		sess->send_els_logo);
 
 	if (!IS_SW_RESV_ADDR(sess->d_id)) {
+		qla2x00_mark_device_lost(vha, sess, 0, 0);
+
 		if (sess->send_els_logo) {
 			qlt_port_logo_t logo;
 
@@ -1160,8 +1162,6 @@ void qlt_unreg_sess(struct fc_port *sess)
 	if (sess->se_sess)
 		vha->hw->tgt.tgt_ops->clear_nacl_from_fcport_map(sess);
 
-	qla2x00_mark_device_lost(vha, sess, 0, 0);
-
 	sess->deleted = QLA_SESS_DELETION_IN_PROGRESS;
 	sess->disc_state = DSC_DELETE_PEND;
 	sess->last_rscn_gen = sess->rscn_gen;
diff --git a/drivers/soc/sunxi/Kconfig b/drivers/soc/sunxi/Kconfig
index 353b07e40176..e84eb4e59f58 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/sunxi/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/soc/sunxi/Kconfig
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 config SUNXI_SRAM
 	bool
 	default ARCH_SUNXI
+	select REGMAP_MMIO
 	help
 	  Say y here to enable the SRAM controller support. This
 	  device is responsible on mapping the SRAM in the sunXi SoCs
diff --git a/drivers/staging/greybus/power_supply.c b/drivers/staging/greybus/power_supply.c
index 0529e5628c24..ae5c0285a942 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/greybus/power_supply.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/greybus/power_supply.c
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ static int gb_power_supply_prop_descriptors_get(struct gb_power_supply *gbpsy)
 
 	op = gb_operation_create(connection,
 				 GB_POWER_SUPPLY_TYPE_GET_PROP_DESCRIPTORS,
-				 sizeof(req), sizeof(*resp) + props_count *
+				 sizeof(*req), sizeof(*resp) + props_count *
 				 sizeof(struct gb_power_supply_props_desc),
 				 GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!op)
diff --git a/drivers/staging/most/cdev/cdev.c b/drivers/staging/most/cdev/cdev.c
index f2b347cda8b7..d5f236889021 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/most/cdev/cdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/most/cdev/cdev.c
@@ -549,7 +549,7 @@ static void __exit mod_exit(void)
 		destroy_cdev(c);
 		destroy_channel(c);
 	}
-	unregister_chrdev_region(comp.devno, 1);
+	unregister_chrdev_region(comp.devno, CHRDEV_REGION_SIZE);
 	ida_destroy(&comp.minor_id);
 	class_destroy(comp.class);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/staging/most/sound/sound.c b/drivers/staging/most/sound/sound.c
index 79ab3a78c5ec..1e6f47cfe42c 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/most/sound/sound.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/most/sound/sound.c
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ static int audio_probe_channel(struct most_interface *iface, int channel_id,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&adpt->dev_list);
 	iface->priv = adpt;
 	list_add_tail(&adpt->list, &adpt_list);
-	ret = snd_card_new(&iface->dev, -1, "INIC", THIS_MODULE,
+	ret = snd_card_new(iface->driver_dev, -1, "INIC", THIS_MODULE,
 			   sizeof(*channel), &adpt->card);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto err_free_adpt;
diff --git a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
index 1787154ee088..ba78c08a17f1 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/wilc1000/wilc_netdev.c
@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ static void wilc_set_multicast_list(struct net_device *dev)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	mc_list = kmalloc_array(dev->mc.count, ETH_ALEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	mc_list = kmalloc_array(dev->mc.count, ETH_ALEN, GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!mc_list)
 		return;
 
diff --git a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
index ec666eb4b7b4..c03aa8550980 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/class/cdc-acm.c
@@ -470,12 +470,12 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	struct acm *acm = rb->instance;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int status = urb->status;
+	bool stopped = false;
+	bool stalled = false;
 
 	dev_vdbg(&acm->data->dev, "got urb %d, len %d, status %d\n",
 		rb->index, urb->actual_length, status);
 
-	set_bit(rb->index, &acm->read_urbs_free);
-
 	if (!acm->dev) {
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev, "%s - disconnected\n", __func__);
 		return;
@@ -488,15 +488,16 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 		break;
 	case -EPIPE:
 		set_bit(EVENT_RX_STALL, &acm->flags);
-		schedule_work(&acm->work);
-		return;
+		stalled = true;
+		break;
 	case -ENOENT:
 	case -ECONNRESET:
 	case -ESHUTDOWN:
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev,
 			"%s - urb shutting down with status: %d\n",
 			__func__, status);
-		return;
+		stopped = true;
+		break;
 	default:
 		dev_dbg(&acm->data->dev,
 			"%s - nonzero urb status received: %d\n",
@@ -505,10 +506,24 @@ static void acm_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Unthrottle may run on another CPU which needs to see events
-	 * in the same order. Submission has an implict barrier
+	 * Make sure URB processing is done before marking as free to avoid
+	 * racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the barriers
+	 * implied by the test_and_clear_bit() in acm_submit_read_urb().
 	 */
 	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	set_bit(rb->index, &acm->read_urbs_free);
+	/*
+	 * Make sure URB is marked as free before checking the throttled flag
+	 * to avoid racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the
+	 * smp_mb() in unthrottle().
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+	if (stopped || stalled) {
+		if (stalled)
+			schedule_work(&acm->work);
+		return;
+	}
 
 	/* throttle device if requested by tty */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&acm->read_lock, flags);
@@ -842,6 +857,9 @@ static void acm_tty_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	acm->throttle_req = 0;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&acm->read_lock);
 
+	/* Matches the smp_mb__after_atomic() in acm_read_bulk_callback(). */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	if (was_throttled)
 		acm_submit_read_urbs(acm, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/Kconfig b/drivers/usb/dwc3/Kconfig
index 2b1494460d0c..784309435916 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/Kconfig
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ comment "Platform Glue Driver Support"
 
 config USB_DWC3_OMAP
 	tristate "Texas Instruments OMAP5 and similar Platforms"
-	depends on EXTCON && (ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || COMPILE_TEST)
+	depends on ARCH_OMAP2PLUS || COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on EXTCON || !EXTCON
 	depends on OF
 	default USB_DWC3
 	help
@@ -115,7 +116,8 @@ config USB_DWC3_ST
 
 config USB_DWC3_QCOM
 	tristate "Qualcomm Platform"
-	depends on EXTCON && (ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST)
+	depends on ARCH_QCOM || COMPILE_TEST
+	depends on EXTCON || !EXTCON
 	depends on OF
 	default USB_DWC3
 	help
diff --git a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c
index a1b126f90261..f944cea4056b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c
@@ -1218,7 +1218,7 @@ static void dwc3_get_properties(struct dwc3 *dwc)
 	u8			tx_max_burst_prd;
 
 	/* default to highest possible threshold */
-	lpm_nyet_threshold = 0xff;
+	lpm_nyet_threshold = 0xf;
 
 	/* default to -3.5dB de-emphasis */
 	tx_de_emphasis = 1;
diff --git a/drivers/usb/musb/Kconfig b/drivers/usb/musb/Kconfig
index f742fddc5e2c..52f8e2b57ad5 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/musb/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/usb/musb/Kconfig
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ config USB_MUSB_SUNXI
 	depends on NOP_USB_XCEIV
 	depends on PHY_SUN4I_USB
 	depends on EXTCON
-	depends on GENERIC_PHY
+	select GENERIC_PHY
 	select SUNXI_SRAM
 
 config USB_MUSB_DAVINCI
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/f81232.c b/drivers/usb/serial/f81232.c
index 0dcdcb4b2cde..dee6f2caf9b5 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/f81232.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/f81232.c
@@ -556,9 +556,12 @@ static int f81232_open(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port)
 
 static void f81232_close(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 {
+	struct f81232_private *port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+
 	f81232_port_disable(port);
 	usb_serial_generic_close(port);
 	usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
+	flush_work(&port_priv->interrupt_work);
 }
 
 static void f81232_dtr_rts(struct usb_serial_port *port, int on)
@@ -632,6 +635,40 @@ static int f81232_port_remove(struct usb_serial_port *port)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int f81232_suspend(struct usb_serial *serial, pm_message_t message)
+{
+	struct usb_serial_port *port = serial->port[0];
+	struct f81232_private *port_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(port->read_urbs); ++i)
+		usb_kill_urb(port->read_urbs[i]);
+
+	usb_kill_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb);
+
+	if (port_priv)
+		flush_work(&port_priv->interrupt_work);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int f81232_resume(struct usb_serial *serial)
+{
+	struct usb_serial_port *port = serial->port[0];
+	int result;
+
+	if (tty_port_initialized(&port->port)) {
+		result = usb_submit_urb(port->interrupt_in_urb, GFP_NOIO);
+		if (result) {
+			dev_err(&port->dev, "submit interrupt urb failed: %d\n",
+					result);
+			return result;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return usb_serial_generic_resume(serial);
+}
+
 static struct usb_serial_driver f81232_device = {
 	.driver = {
 		.owner =	THIS_MODULE,
@@ -655,6 +692,8 @@ static struct usb_serial_driver f81232_device = {
 	.read_int_callback =	f81232_read_int_callback,
 	.port_probe =		f81232_port_probe,
 	.port_remove =		f81232_port_remove,
+	.suspend =		f81232_suspend,
+	.resume =		f81232_resume,
 };
 
 static struct usb_serial_driver * const serial_drivers[] = {
diff --git a/drivers/usb/serial/generic.c b/drivers/usb/serial/generic.c
index 2274d9625f63..0fff4968ea1b 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/serial/generic.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/serial/generic.c
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ void usb_serial_generic_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 	struct usb_serial_port *port = urb->context;
 	unsigned char *data = urb->transfer_buffer;
 	unsigned long flags;
+	bool stopped = false;
 	int status = urb->status;
 	int i;
 
@@ -383,33 +384,51 @@ void usb_serial_generic_read_bulk_callback(struct urb *urb)
 		if (urb == port->read_urbs[i])
 			break;
 	}
-	set_bit(i, &port->read_urbs_free);
 
 	dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - urb %d, len %d\n", __func__, i,
 							urb->actual_length);
 	switch (status) {
 	case 0:
+		usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length,
+							data);
+		port->serial->type->process_read_urb(urb);
 		break;
 	case -ENOENT:
 	case -ECONNRESET:
 	case -ESHUTDOWN:
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - urb stopped: %d\n",
 							__func__, status);
-		return;
+		stopped = true;
+		break;
 	case -EPIPE:
 		dev_err(&port->dev, "%s - urb stopped: %d\n",
 							__func__, status);
-		return;
+		stopped = true;
+		break;
 	default:
 		dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - nonzero urb status: %d\n",
 							__func__, status);
-		goto resubmit;
+		break;
 	}
 
-	usb_serial_debug_data(&port->dev, __func__, urb->actual_length, data);
-	port->serial->type->process_read_urb(urb);
+	/*
+	 * Make sure URB processing is done before marking as free to avoid
+	 * racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the barriers
+	 * implied by the test_and_clear_bit() in
+	 * usb_serial_generic_submit_read_urb().
+	 */
+	smp_mb__before_atomic();
+	set_bit(i, &port->read_urbs_free);
+	/*
+	 * Make sure URB is marked as free before checking the throttled flag
+	 * to avoid racing with unthrottle() on another CPU. Matches the
+	 * smp_mb() in unthrottle().
+	 */
+	smp_mb__after_atomic();
+
+	if (stopped)
+		return;
 
-resubmit:
 	/* Throttle the device if requested by tty */
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&port->lock, flags);
 	port->throttled = port->throttle_req;
@@ -484,6 +503,12 @@ void usb_serial_generic_unthrottle(struct tty_struct *tty)
 	port->throttled = port->throttle_req = 0;
 	spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
 
+	/*
+	 * Matches the smp_mb__after_atomic() in
+	 * usb_serial_generic_read_bulk_callback().
+	 */
+	smp_mb();
+
 	if (was_throttled)
 		usb_serial_generic_submit_read_urbs(port, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/scsiglue.c b/drivers/usb/storage/scsiglue.c
index a73ea495d5a7..59190d88fa9f 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/scsiglue.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/scsiglue.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ static const char* host_info(struct Scsi_Host *host)
 static int slave_alloc (struct scsi_device *sdev)
 {
 	struct us_data *us = host_to_us(sdev->host);
+	int maxp;
 
 	/*
 	 * Set the INQUIRY transfer length to 36.  We don't use any of
@@ -74,20 +75,17 @@ static int slave_alloc (struct scsi_device *sdev)
 	sdev->inquiry_len = 36;
 
 	/*
-	 * USB has unusual DMA-alignment requirements: Although the
-	 * starting address of each scatter-gather element doesn't matter,
-	 * the length of each element except the last must be divisible
-	 * by the Bulk maxpacket value.  There's currently no way to
-	 * express this by block-layer constraints, so we'll cop out
-	 * and simply require addresses to be aligned at 512-byte
-	 * boundaries.  This is okay since most block I/O involves
-	 * hardware sectors that are multiples of 512 bytes in length,
-	 * and since host controllers up through USB 2.0 have maxpacket
-	 * values no larger than 512.
-	 *
-	 * But it doesn't suffice for Wireless USB, where Bulk maxpacket
-	 * values can be as large as 2048.  To make that work properly
-	 * will require changes to the block layer.
+	 * USB has unusual scatter-gather requirements: the length of each
+	 * scatterlist element except the last must be divisible by the
+	 * Bulk maxpacket value.  Fortunately this value is always a
+	 * power of 2.  Inform the block layer about this requirement.
+	 */
+	maxp = usb_maxpacket(us->pusb_dev, us->recv_bulk_pipe, 0);
+	blk_queue_virt_boundary(sdev->request_queue, maxp - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Some host controllers may have alignment requirements.
+	 * We'll play it safe by requiring 512-byte alignment always.
 	 */
 	blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, (512 - 1));
 
diff --git a/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c b/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c
index a6d68191c861..047c5922618f 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c
@@ -789,24 +789,33 @@ static int uas_slave_alloc(struct scsi_device *sdev)
 {
 	struct uas_dev_info *devinfo =
 		(struct uas_dev_info *)sdev->host->hostdata;
+	int maxp;
 
 	sdev->hostdata = devinfo;
 
 	/*
-	 * USB has unusual DMA-alignment requirements: Although the
-	 * starting address of each scatter-gather element doesn't matter,
-	 * the length of each element except the last must be divisible
-	 * by the Bulk maxpacket value.  There's currently no way to
-	 * express this by block-layer constraints, so we'll cop out
-	 * and simply require addresses to be aligned at 512-byte
-	 * boundaries.  This is okay since most block I/O involves
-	 * hardware sectors that are multiples of 512 bytes in length,
-	 * and since host controllers up through USB 2.0 have maxpacket
-	 * values no larger than 512.
+	 * We have two requirements here. We must satisfy the requirements
+	 * of the physical HC and the demands of the protocol, as we
+	 * definitely want no additional memory allocation in this path
+	 * ruling out using bounce buffers.
 	 *
-	 * But it doesn't suffice for Wireless USB, where Bulk maxpacket
-	 * values can be as large as 2048.  To make that work properly
-	 * will require changes to the block layer.
+	 * For a transmission on USB to continue we must never send
+	 * a package that is smaller than maxpacket. Hence the length of each
+         * scatterlist element except the last must be divisible by the
+         * Bulk maxpacket value.
+	 * If the HC does not ensure that through SG,
+	 * the upper layer must do that. We must assume nothing
+	 * about the capabilities off the HC, so we use the most
+	 * pessimistic requirement.
+	 */
+
+	maxp = usb_maxpacket(devinfo->udev, devinfo->data_in_pipe, 0);
+	blk_queue_virt_boundary(sdev->request_queue, maxp - 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * The protocol has no requirements on alignment in the strict sense.
+	 * Controllers may or may not have alignment restrictions.
+	 * As this is not exported, we use an extremely conservative guess.
 	 */
 	blk_queue_update_dma_alignment(sdev->request_queue, (512 - 1));
 
diff --git a/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c b/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c
index 8ba726e600e9..1bbd910d4ddb 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/fsl_hypervisor.c
@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ static long ioctl_memcpy(struct fsl_hv_ioctl_memcpy __user *p)
 	 * hypervisor.
 	 */
 	lb_offset = param.local_vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+	if (param.count == 0 ||
+	    param.count > U64_MAX - lb_offset - PAGE_SIZE + 1)
+		return -EINVAL;
 	num_pages = (param.count + lb_offset + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
 
 	/* Allocate the buffers we need */
@@ -331,8 +334,8 @@ static long ioctl_dtprop(struct fsl_hv_ioctl_prop __user *p, int set)
 	struct fsl_hv_ioctl_prop param;
 	char __user *upath, *upropname;
 	void __user *upropval;
-	char *path = NULL, *propname = NULL;
-	void *propval = NULL;
+	char *path, *propname;
+	void *propval;
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	/* Get the parameters from the user. */
@@ -344,32 +347,30 @@ static long ioctl_dtprop(struct fsl_hv_ioctl_prop __user *p, int set)
 	upropval = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)param.propval;
 
 	path = strndup_user(upath, FH_DTPROP_MAX_PATHLEN);
-	if (IS_ERR(path)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(path);
-		goto out;
-	}
+	if (IS_ERR(path))
+		return PTR_ERR(path);
 
 	propname = strndup_user(upropname, FH_DTPROP_MAX_PATHLEN);
 	if (IS_ERR(propname)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(propname);
-		goto out;
+		goto err_free_path;
 	}
 
 	if (param.proplen > FH_DTPROP_MAX_PROPLEN) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
-		goto out;
+		goto err_free_propname;
 	}
 
 	propval = kmalloc(param.proplen, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!propval) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out;
+		goto err_free_propname;
 	}
 
 	if (set) {
 		if (copy_from_user(propval, upropval, param.proplen)) {
 			ret = -EFAULT;
-			goto out;
+			goto err_free_propval;
 		}
 
 		param.ret = fh_partition_set_dtprop(param.handle,
@@ -388,7 +389,7 @@ static long ioctl_dtprop(struct fsl_hv_ioctl_prop __user *p, int set)
 			if (copy_to_user(upropval, propval, param.proplen) ||
 			    put_user(param.proplen, &p->proplen)) {
 				ret = -EFAULT;
-				goto out;
+				goto err_free_propval;
 			}
 		}
 	}
@@ -396,10 +397,12 @@ static long ioctl_dtprop(struct fsl_hv_ioctl_prop __user *p, int set)
 	if (put_user(param.ret, &p->ret))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-out:
-	kfree(path);
+err_free_propval:
 	kfree(propval);
+err_free_propname:
 	kfree(propname);
+err_free_path:
+	kfree(path);
 
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_core.c b/drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_core.c
index 8ca333f21292..2307b0329aec 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_core.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/vboxguest/vboxguest_core.c
@@ -1298,6 +1298,20 @@ static int vbg_ioctl_hgcm_disconnect(struct vbg_dev *gdev,
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static bool vbg_param_valid(enum vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter_type type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_32BIT:
+	case VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_64BIT:
+	case VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LINADDR:
+	case VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LINADDR_IN:
+	case VMMDEV_HGCM_PARM_TYPE_LINADDR_OUT:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
 static int vbg_ioctl_hgcm_call(struct vbg_dev *gdev,
 			       struct vbg_session *session, bool f32bit,
 			       struct vbg_ioctl_hgcm_call *call)
@@ -1333,6 +1347,23 @@ static int vbg_ioctl_hgcm_call(struct vbg_dev *gdev,
 	}
 	call->hdr.size_out = actual_size;
 
+	/* Validate parameter types */
+	if (f32bit) {
+		struct vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter32 *parm =
+			VBG_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL_PARMS32(call);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < call->parm_count; i++)
+			if (!vbg_param_valid(parm[i].type))
+				return -EINVAL;
+	} else {
+		struct vmmdev_hgcm_function_parameter *parm =
+			VBG_IOCTL_HGCM_CALL_PARMS(call);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < call->parm_count; i++)
+			if (!vbg_param_valid(parm[i].type))
+				return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	/*
 	 * Validate the client id.
 	 */
diff --git a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
index 5df92c308286..021010424fa5 100644
--- a/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
+++ b/drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c
@@ -1004,6 +1004,7 @@ static int virtqueue_add_indirect_packed(struct vring_virtqueue *vq,
 
 	if (unlikely(vq->vq.num_free < 1)) {
 		pr_debug("Can't add buf len 1 - avail = 0\n");
+		kfree(desc);
 		END_USE(vq);
 		return -ENOSPC;
 	}
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index 9727944139f2..d87dfa5aa112 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -220,12 +220,14 @@ struct block_device *f2fs_target_device(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	struct block_device *bdev = sbi->sb->s_bdev;
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
-		if (FDEV(i).start_blk <= blk_addr &&
-					FDEV(i).end_blk >= blk_addr) {
-			blk_addr -= FDEV(i).start_blk;
-			bdev = FDEV(i).bdev;
-			break;
+	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
+			if (FDEV(i).start_blk <= blk_addr &&
+			    FDEV(i).end_blk >= blk_addr) {
+				blk_addr -= FDEV(i).start_blk;
+				bdev = FDEV(i).bdev;
+				break;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	if (bio) {
@@ -239,6 +241,9 @@ int f2fs_target_device_index(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, block_t blkaddr)
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
+		return 0;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++)
 		if (FDEV(i).start_blk <= blkaddr && FDEV(i).end_blk >= blkaddr)
 			return i;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index 87f75ebd2fd6..7bea1bc6589f 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -1366,6 +1366,17 @@ static inline bool time_to_inject(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int type)
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Test if the mounted volume is a multi-device volume.
+ *   - For a single regular disk volume, sbi->s_ndevs is 0.
+ *   - For a single zoned disk volume, sbi->s_ndevs is 1.
+ *   - For a multi-device volume, sbi->s_ndevs is always 2 or more.
+ */
+static inline bool f2fs_is_multi_device(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
+{
+	return sbi->s_ndevs > 1;
+}
+
 /* For write statistics. Suppose sector size is 512 bytes,
  * and the return value is in kbytes. s is of struct f2fs_sb_info.
  */
@@ -3615,7 +3626,7 @@ static inline bool f2fs_force_buffered_io(struct inode *inode,
 
 	if (f2fs_post_read_required(inode))
 		return true;
-	if (sbi->s_ndevs)
+	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
 		return true;
 	/*
 	 * for blkzoned device, fallback direct IO to buffered IO, so
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 5742ab8b57dc..30d49467578e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -2573,7 +2573,7 @@ static int f2fs_ioc_flush_device(struct file *filp, unsigned long arg)
 							sizeof(range)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (sbi->s_ndevs <= 1 || sbi->s_ndevs - 1 <= range.dev_num ||
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi) || sbi->s_ndevs - 1 <= range.dev_num ||
 			__is_large_section(sbi)) {
 		f2fs_msg(sbi->sb, KERN_WARNING,
 			"Can't flush %u in %d for segs_per_sec %u != 1\n",
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/gc.c b/fs/f2fs/gc.c
index 195cf0f9d9ef..ab764bd106de 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/gc.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/gc.c
@@ -1346,7 +1346,7 @@ void f2fs_build_gc_manager(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 	sbi->gc_pin_file_threshold = DEF_GC_FAILED_PINNED_FILES;
 
 	/* give warm/cold data area from slower device */
-	if (sbi->s_ndevs && !__is_large_section(sbi))
+	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi) && !__is_large_section(sbi))
 		SIT_I(sbi)->last_victim[ALLOC_NEXT] =
 				GET_SEGNO(sbi, FDEV(0).end_blk) + 1;
 }
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/segment.c b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
index aa7fe79b62b2..ddfa2eb7ec58 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/segment.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/segment.c
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ static int submit_flush_wait(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino)
 	int ret = 0;
 	int i;
 
-	if (!sbi->s_ndevs)
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
 		return __submit_flush_wait(sbi, sbi->sb->s_bdev);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
@@ -648,7 +648,8 @@ int f2fs_issue_flush(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t ino)
 		return ret;
 	}
 
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&fcc->queued_flush) == 1 || sbi->s_ndevs > 1) {
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&fcc->queued_flush) == 1 ||
+	    f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) {
 		ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi, ino);
 		atomic_dec(&fcc->queued_flush);
 
@@ -754,7 +755,7 @@ int f2fs_flush_device_cache(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
 {
 	int ret = 0, i;
 
-	if (!sbi->s_ndevs)
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
 		return 0;
 
 	for (i = 1; i < sbi->s_ndevs; i++) {
@@ -1369,7 +1370,7 @@ static int __queue_discard_cmd(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 
 	trace_f2fs_queue_discard(bdev, blkstart, blklen);
 
-	if (sbi->s_ndevs) {
+	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) {
 		int devi = f2fs_target_device_index(sbi, blkstart);
 
 		blkstart -= FDEV(devi).start_blk;
@@ -1732,7 +1733,7 @@ static int __f2fs_issue_discard_zone(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
 	block_t lblkstart = blkstart;
 	int devi = 0;
 
-	if (sbi->s_ndevs) {
+	if (f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi)) {
 		devi = f2fs_target_device_index(sbi, blkstart);
 		blkstart -= FDEV(devi).start_blk;
 	}
@@ -3089,7 +3090,7 @@ static void update_device_state(struct f2fs_io_info *fio)
 	struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = fio->sbi;
 	unsigned int devidx;
 
-	if (!sbi->s_ndevs)
+	if (!f2fs_is_multi_device(sbi))
 		return;
 
 	devidx = f2fs_target_device_index(sbi, fio->new_blkaddr);
diff --git a/fs/kernfs/dir.c b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
index b84d635567d3..1e7a74b8e064 100644
--- a/fs/kernfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/kernfs/dir.c
@@ -650,11 +650,10 @@ static struct kernfs_node *__kernfs_new_node(struct kernfs_root *root,
 	kn->id.generation = gen;
 
 	/*
-	 * set ino first. This barrier is paired with atomic_inc_not_zero in
+	 * set ino first. This RELEASE is paired with atomic_inc_not_zero in
 	 * kernfs_find_and_get_node_by_ino
 	 */
-	smp_mb__before_atomic();
-	atomic_set(&kn->count, 1);
+	atomic_set_release(&kn->count, 1);
 	atomic_set(&kn->active, KN_DEACTIVATED_BIAS);
 	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&kn->rb);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 5041357d0297..57ae83c4d5f4 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
 					  struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev,
 			     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev,
+			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
@@ -187,4 +189,28 @@ static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
 static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
+/* mitigations=auto,nosmt */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/i2c.h b/include/linux/i2c.h
index 383510b4f083..646dd962d6a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/i2c.h
+++ b/include/linux/i2c.h
@@ -682,7 +682,8 @@ struct i2c_adapter {
 	int retries;
 	struct device dev;		/* the adapter device */
 	unsigned long locked_flags;	/* owned by the I2C core */
-#define I2C_ALF_IS_SUSPENDED	0
+#define I2C_ALF_IS_SUSPENDED		0
+#define I2C_ALF_SUSPEND_REPORTED	1
 
 	int nr;
 	char name[48];
diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
index 094e61e07030..05b1b96f4d9e 100644
--- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
+++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ struct adv_info {
 
 #define HCI_MAX_SHORT_NAME_LENGTH	10
 
+/* Min encryption key size to match with SMP */
+#define HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE		7
+
 /* Default LE RPA expiry time, 15 minutes */
 #define HCI_DEFAULT_RPA_TIMEOUT		(15 * 60)
 
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index 6754f3ecfd94..43e741e88691 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -2304,3 +2304,18 @@ void __init boot_cpu_hotplug_init(void)
 #endif
 	this_cpu_write(cpuhp_state.state, CPUHP_ONLINE);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations __ro_after_init = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto,nosmt"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO_NOSMT;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 9e40cf7be606..6262f1534ac9 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1311,13 +1311,15 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval,
 
 static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
 {
+	int err;
 	u32 uninitialized_var(curval);
 
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
-		return -EFAULT;
+	err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
 	/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
 	return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
@@ -1502,10 +1504,8 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, struct futex_pi_state *pi_
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-
-	} else if (curval != uval) {
+	ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {
 		/*
 		 * If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
 		 * try the TID->0 transition) raced with a waiter setting the
@@ -1700,32 +1700,32 @@ retry_private:
 	double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 	op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
 	if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
-
 		double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
-		/*
-		 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have an MMU,
-		 * but we might get them from range checking
-		 */
-		ret = op_ret;
-		goto out_put_keys;
-#endif
-
-		if (unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT)) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) ||
+		    unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT && op_ret != -EAGAIN)) {
+			/*
+			 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have
+			 * an MMU, but we might get them from range checking
+			 */
 			ret = op_ret;
 			goto out_put_keys;
 		}
 
-		ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out_put_keys;
+		if (op_ret == -EFAULT) {
+			ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out_put_keys;
+		}
 
-		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
+		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED)) {
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry_private;
+		}
 
 		put_futex_key(&key2);
 		put_futex_key(&key1);
+		cond_resched();
 		goto retry;
 	}
 
@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static int fixup_pi_state_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, struct futex_q *q,
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(curval), newval;
 	struct task_struct *oldowner, *newowner;
 	u32 newtid;
-	int ret;
+	int ret, err = 0;
 
 	lockdep_assert_held(q->lock_ptr);
 
@@ -2421,14 +2421,17 @@ retry:
 	if (!pi_state->owner)
 		newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
 
-	if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr))
-		goto handle_fault;
+	err = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
+	if (err)
+		goto handle_err;
 
 	for (;;) {
 		newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
 
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval))
-			goto handle_fault;
+		err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+		if (err)
+			goto handle_err;
+
 		if (curval == uval)
 			break;
 		uval = curval;
@@ -2456,23 +2459,37 @@ retry:
 	return 0;
 
 	/*
-	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the locks here. That gives
-	 * the other task (either the highest priority waiter itself or the
-	 * task which stole the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the
-	 * pi_state. So once we are back from handling the fault we need to
-	 * check the pi_state after reacquiring the locks and before trying to
-	 * do another fixup. When the fixup has been done already we simply
-	 * return.
+	 * In order to reschedule or handle a page fault, we need to drop the
+	 * locks here. In the case of a fault, this gives the other task
+	 * (either the highest priority waiter itself or the task which stole
+	 * the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we
+	 * are back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state after
+	 * reacquiring the locks and before trying to do another fixup. When
+	 * the fixup has been done already we simply return.
 	 *
 	 * Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
 	 * drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
 	 * Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
 	 */
-handle_fault:
+handle_err:
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
 
-	ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+	switch (err) {
+	case -EFAULT:
+		ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+		break;
+
+	case -EAGAIN:
+		cond_resched();
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		ret = err;
+		break;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
@@ -3041,10 +3058,8 @@ retry:
 		 * A unconditional UNLOCK_PI op raced against a waiter
 		 * setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. Try again.
 		 */
-		if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
-			put_futex_key(&key);
-			goto retry;
-		}
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+			goto pi_retry;
 		/*
 		 * wake_futex_pi has detected invalid state. Tell user
 		 * space.
@@ -3059,9 +3074,19 @@ retry:
 	 * preserve the WAITERS bit not the OWNER_DIED one. We are the
 	 * owner.
 	 */
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0)) {
+	if ((ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0))) {
 		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
-		goto pi_faulted;
+		switch (ret) {
+		case -EFAULT:
+			goto pi_faulted;
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			goto pi_retry;
+
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			goto out_putkey;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -3075,6 +3100,11 @@ out_putkey:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 	return ret;
 
+pi_retry:
+	put_futex_key(&key);
+	cond_resched();
+	goto retry;
+
 pi_faulted:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 
@@ -3435,6 +3465,7 @@ err_unlock:
 static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
+	int err;
 
 	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
 	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
@@ -3444,42 +3475,57 @@ retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;
 
-	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == task_pid_vnr(curr)) {
-		/*
-		 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
-		 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
-		 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
-		 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
-		 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
-		 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
-		 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
-		 * userspace.
-		 */
-		mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
-		/*
-		 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
-		 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
-		 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
-		 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
-		 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
-		 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
-		 * give up and leave the futex locked.
-		 */
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval)) {
+	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
+	 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
+	 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
+	 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
+	 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
+	 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
+	 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
+	 * userspace.
+	 */
+	mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
+	 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
+	 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
+	 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
+	 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
+	 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
+	 * give up and leave the futex locked.
+	 */
+	if ((err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
+		switch (err) {
+		case -EFAULT:
 			if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
 				return -1;
 			goto retry;
-		}
-		if (nval != uval)
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry;
 
-		/*
-		 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
-		 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
-		 */
-		if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
-			futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
+
+	if (nval != uval)
+		goto retry;
+
+	/*
+	 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
+	 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
+	 */
+	if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
+		futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
diff --git a/kernel/irq/manage.c b/kernel/irq/manage.c
index 1401afa0d58a..53a081392115 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/manage.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/manage.c
@@ -357,8 +357,10 @@ irq_set_affinity_notifier(unsigned int irq, struct irq_affinity_notify *notify)
 	desc->affinity_notify = notify;
 	raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&desc->lock, flags);
 
-	if (old_notify)
+	if (old_notify) {
+		cancel_work_sync(&old_notify->work);
 		kref_put(&old_notify->kref, old_notify->release);
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/lib/ubsan.c b/lib/ubsan.c
index e4162f59a81c..1e9e2ab25539 100644
--- a/lib/ubsan.c
+++ b/lib/ubsan.c
@@ -86,11 +86,13 @@ static bool is_inline_int(struct type_descriptor *type)
 	return bits <= inline_bits;
 }
 
-static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	if (is_inline_int(type)) {
 		unsigned extra_bits = sizeof(s_max)*8 - type_bit_width(type);
-		return ((s_max)val) << extra_bits >> extra_bits;
+		unsigned long ulong_val = (unsigned long)val;
+
+		return ((s_max)ulong_val) << extra_bits >> extra_bits;
 	}
 
 	if (type_bit_width(type) == 64)
@@ -99,15 +101,15 @@ static s_max get_signed_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
 	return *(s_max *)val;
 }
 
-static bool val_is_negative(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static bool val_is_negative(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	return type_is_signed(type) && get_signed_val(type, val) < 0;
 }
 
-static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
+static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, void *val)
 {
 	if (is_inline_int(type))
-		return val;
+		return (unsigned long)val;
 
 	if (type_bit_width(type) == 64)
 		return *(u64 *)val;
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ static u_max get_unsigned_val(struct type_descriptor *type, unsigned long val)
 }
 
 static void val_to_string(char *str, size_t size, struct type_descriptor *type,
-	unsigned long value)
+			void *value)
 {
 	if (type_is_int(type)) {
 		if (type_bit_width(type) == 128) {
@@ -163,8 +165,8 @@ static void ubsan_epilogue(unsigned long *flags)
 	current->in_ubsan--;
 }
 
-static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, unsigned long lhs,
-			unsigned long rhs, char op)
+static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, void *lhs,
+			void *rhs, char op)
 {
 
 	struct type_descriptor *type = data->type;
@@ -191,8 +193,7 @@ static void handle_overflow(struct overflow_data *data, unsigned long lhs,
 }
 
 void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '+');
@@ -200,23 +201,21 @@ void __ubsan_handle_add_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_add_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_sub_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '-');
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_sub_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_mul_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	handle_overflow(data, lhs, rhs, '*');
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_mul_overflow);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_negate_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long old_val)
+				void *old_val)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char old_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -237,8 +236,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow);
 
 
 void __ubsan_handle_divrem_overflow(struct overflow_data *data,
-				unsigned long lhs,
-				unsigned long rhs)
+				void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char rhs_val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -323,7 +321,7 @@ static void ubsan_type_mismatch_common(struct type_mismatch_data_common *data,
 }
 
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data,
-				unsigned long ptr)
+				void *ptr)
 {
 	struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = {
 		.location = &data->location,
@@ -332,12 +330,12 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch(struct type_mismatch_data *data,
 		.type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind
 	};
 
-	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr);
+	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, (unsigned long)ptr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data,
-				unsigned long ptr)
+				void *ptr)
 {
 
 	struct type_mismatch_data_common common_data = {
@@ -347,12 +345,12 @@ void __ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1(struct type_mismatch_data_v1 *data,
 		.type_check_kind = data->type_check_kind
 	};
 
-	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, ptr);
+	ubsan_type_mismatch_common(&common_data, (unsigned long)ptr);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_type_mismatch_v1);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive(struct vla_bound_data *data,
-					unsigned long bound)
+					void *bound)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char bound_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -369,8 +367,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive(struct vla_bound_data *data,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_vla_bound_not_positive);
 
-void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data,
-				unsigned long index)
+void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data, void *index)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char index_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
@@ -388,7 +385,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds(struct out_of_bounds_data *data,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds(struct shift_out_of_bounds_data *data,
-					unsigned long lhs, unsigned long rhs)
+					void *lhs, void *rhs)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	struct type_descriptor *rhs_type = data->rhs_type;
@@ -439,7 +436,7 @@ void __ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable(struct unreachable_data *data)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__ubsan_handle_builtin_unreachable);
 
 void __ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value(struct invalid_value_data *data,
-				unsigned long val)
+				void *val)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	char val_str[VALUE_LENGTH];
diff --git a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c
index 8d77b6ee4477..eb98be23423e 100644
--- a/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c
+++ b/net/8021q/vlan_dev.c
@@ -367,10 +367,12 @@ static int vlan_dev_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct ifreq *ifr, int cmd)
 	ifrr.ifr_ifru = ifr->ifr_ifru;
 
 	switch (cmd) {
+	case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
+		if (!net_eq(dev_net(dev), &init_net))
+			break;
 	case SIOCGMIIPHY:
 	case SIOCGMIIREG:
 	case SIOCSMIIREG:
-	case SIOCSHWTSTAMP:
 	case SIOCGHWTSTAMP:
 		if (netif_device_present(real_dev) && ops->ndo_do_ioctl)
 			err = ops->ndo_do_ioctl(real_dev, &ifrr, cmd);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
index bd4978ce8c45..3cf0764d5793 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c
@@ -1276,6 +1276,14 @@ int hci_conn_check_link_mode(struct hci_conn *conn)
 	    !test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &conn->flags))
 		return 0;
 
+	/* The minimum encryption key size needs to be enforced by the
+	 * host stack before establishing any L2CAP connections. The
+	 * specification in theory allows a minimum of 1, but to align
+	 * BR/EDR and LE transports, a minimum of 7 is chosen.
+	 */
+	if (conn->enc_key_size < HCI_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE)
+		return 0;
+
 	return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
index 9f85a1943be9..2151913892ce 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hidp/sock.c
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static int do_hidp_sock_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, void __user
 			sockfd_put(csock);
 			return err;
 		}
+		ca.name[sizeof(ca.name)-1] = 0;
 
 		err = hidp_connection_add(&ca, csock, isock);
 		if (!err && copy_to_user(argp, &ca, sizeof(ca)))
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index f17e393b43b4..b53acd6c9a3d 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -510,12 +510,12 @@ void l2cap_chan_set_defaults(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l2cap_chan_set_defaults);
 
-static void l2cap_le_flowctl_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+static void l2cap_le_flowctl_init(struct l2cap_chan *chan, u16 tx_credits)
 {
 	chan->sdu = NULL;
 	chan->sdu_last_frag = NULL;
 	chan->sdu_len = 0;
-	chan->tx_credits = 0;
+	chan->tx_credits = tx_credits;
 	/* Derive MPS from connection MTU to stop HCI fragmentation */
 	chan->mps = min_t(u16, chan->imtu, chan->conn->mtu - L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
 	/* Give enough credits for a full packet */
@@ -1281,7 +1281,7 @@ static void l2cap_le_connect(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 	if (test_and_set_bit(FLAG_LE_CONN_REQ_SENT, &chan->flags))
 		return;
 
-	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan);
+	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan, 0);
 
 	req.psm     = chan->psm;
 	req.scid    = cpu_to_le16(chan->scid);
@@ -5532,11 +5532,10 @@ static int l2cap_le_connect_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	chan->dcid = scid;
 	chan->omtu = mtu;
 	chan->remote_mps = mps;
-	chan->tx_credits = __le16_to_cpu(req->credits);
 
 	__l2cap_chan_add(conn, chan);
 
-	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan);
+	l2cap_le_flowctl_init(chan, __le16_to_cpu(req->credits));
 
 	dcid = chan->scid;
 	credits = chan->rx_credits;
diff --git a/net/bridge/br_if.c b/net/bridge/br_if.c
index 41f0a696a65f..0cb0aa0313a8 100644
--- a/net/bridge/br_if.c
+++ b/net/bridge/br_if.c
@@ -602,13 +602,15 @@ int br_add_if(struct net_bridge *br, struct net_device *dev,
 	call_netdevice_notifiers(NETDEV_JOIN, dev);
 
 	err = dev_set_allmulti(dev, 1);
-	if (err)
-		goto put_back;
+	if (err) {
+		kfree(p);	/* kobject not yet init'd, manually free */
+		goto err1;
+	}
 
 	err = kobject_init_and_add(&p->kobj, &brport_ktype, &(dev->dev.kobj),
 				   SYSFS_BRIDGE_PORT_ATTR);
 	if (err)
-		goto err1;
+		goto err2;
 
 	err = br_sysfs_addif(p);
 	if (err)
@@ -700,12 +702,9 @@ err3:
 	sysfs_remove_link(br->ifobj, p->dev->name);
 err2:
 	kobject_put(&p->kobj);
-	p = NULL; /* kobject_put frees */
-err1:
 	dev_set_allmulti(dev, -1);
-put_back:
+err1:
 	dev_put(dev);
-	kfree(p);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/core/fib_rules.c b/net/core/fib_rules.c
index ffbb827723a2..c49b752ea7eb 100644
--- a/net/core/fib_rules.c
+++ b/net/core/fib_rules.c
@@ -756,9 +756,9 @@ int fib_nl_newrule(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	if (err)
 		goto errout;
 
-	if ((nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL) &&
-	    rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
-		err = -EEXIST;
+	if (rule_exists(ops, frh, tb, rule)) {
+		if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
+			err = -EEXIST;
 		goto errout_free;
 	}
 
diff --git a/net/core/flow_dissector.c b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
index 94a450b2191a..139470d8d3c0 100644
--- a/net/core/flow_dissector.c
+++ b/net/core/flow_dissector.c
@@ -712,7 +712,10 @@ bool __skb_flow_bpf_dissect(struct bpf_prog *prog,
 	flow_keys->thoff = flow_keys->nhoff;
 
 	bpf_compute_data_pointers((struct sk_buff *)skb);
+
+	preempt_disable();
 	result = BPF_PROG_RUN(prog, skb);
+	preempt_enable();
 
 	/* Restore state */
 	memcpy(cb, &cb_saved, sizeof(cb_saved));
diff --git a/net/dsa/dsa.c b/net/dsa/dsa.c
index 36de4f2a3366..cb080efdc7b3 100644
--- a/net/dsa/dsa.c
+++ b/net/dsa/dsa.c
@@ -344,15 +344,22 @@ static int __init dsa_init_module(void)
 
 	rc = dsa_slave_register_notifier();
 	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+		goto register_notifier_fail;
 
 	rc = dsa_legacy_register();
 	if (rc)
-		return rc;
+		goto legacy_register_fail;
 
 	dev_add_pack(&dsa_pack_type);
 
 	return 0;
+
+legacy_register_fail:
+	dsa_slave_unregister_notifier();
+register_notifier_fail:
+	destroy_workqueue(dsa_owq);
+
+	return rc;
 }
 module_init(dsa_init_module);
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index c55a5432cf37..dc91c27bb788 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static int icmp_filter(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int raw_v4_input(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph, int hash)
 {
 	int sdif = inet_sdif(skb);
+	int dif = inet_iif(skb);
 	struct sock *sk;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	int delivered = 0;
@@ -185,8 +186,7 @@ static int raw_v4_input(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iphdr *iph, int hash)
 
 	net = dev_net(skb->dev);
 	sk = __raw_v4_lookup(net, __sk_head(head), iph->protocol,
-			     iph->saddr, iph->daddr,
-			     skb->dev->ifindex, sdif);
+			     iph->saddr, iph->daddr, dif, sdif);
 
 	while (sk) {
 		delivered = 1;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/sit.c b/net/ipv6/sit.c
index b2109b74857d..971d60bf9640 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/sit.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/sit.c
@@ -1084,7 +1084,7 @@ static void ipip6_tunnel_bind_dev(struct net_device *dev)
 	if (!tdev && tunnel->parms.link)
 		tdev = __dev_get_by_index(tunnel->net, tunnel->parms.link);
 
-	if (tdev) {
+	if (tdev && !netif_is_l3_master(tdev)) {
 		int t_hlen = tunnel->hlen + sizeof(struct iphdr);
 
 		dev->hard_header_len = tdev->hard_header_len + sizeof(struct iphdr);
diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index 9b81813dd16a..59da6f5b717d 100644
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -4603,14 +4603,29 @@ static void __exit packet_exit(void)
 
 static int __init packet_init(void)
 {
-	int rc = proto_register(&packet_proto, 0);
+	int rc;
 
-	if (rc != 0)
+	rc = proto_register(&packet_proto, 0);
+	if (rc)
 		goto out;
+	rc = sock_register(&packet_family_ops);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_proto;
+	rc = register_pernet_subsys(&packet_net_ops);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_sock;
+	rc = register_netdevice_notifier(&packet_netdev_notifier);
+	if (rc)
+		goto out_pernet;
 
-	sock_register(&packet_family_ops);
-	register_pernet_subsys(&packet_net_ops);
-	register_netdevice_notifier(&packet_netdev_notifier);
+	return 0;
+
+out_pernet:
+	unregister_pernet_subsys(&packet_net_ops);
+out_sock:
+	sock_unregister(PF_PACKET);
+out_proto:
+	proto_unregister(&packet_proto);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/net/tipc/socket.c b/net/tipc/socket.c
index b542f14ed444..2851937f6e32 100644
--- a/net/tipc/socket.c
+++ b/net/tipc/socket.c
@@ -734,11 +734,11 @@ static __poll_t tipc_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
 
 	switch (sk->sk_state) {
 	case TIPC_ESTABLISHED:
-	case TIPC_CONNECTING:
 		if (!tsk->cong_link_cnt && !tsk_conn_cong(tsk))
 			revents |= EPOLLOUT;
 		/* fall through */
 	case TIPC_LISTEN:
+	case TIPC_CONNECTING:
 		if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue))
 			revents |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
 		break;
@@ -2041,7 +2041,7 @@ static bool tipc_sk_filter_connect(struct tipc_sock *tsk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			if (msg_data_sz(hdr))
 				return true;
 			/* Empty ACK-, - wake up sleeping connect() and drop */
-			sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+			sk->sk_state_change(sk);
 			msg_set_dest_droppable(hdr, 1);
 			return false;
 		}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1d0b37af2444..28bff30c2f15 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4572,7 +4572,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
-		unsigned short snum;
+		unsigned short snum = 0;
 		u32 sid, perm;
 
 		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
@@ -4595,12 +4595,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
 			break;
 		default:
 			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
-			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 * others must handle this at the protocol level:
+			 * connect(AF_UNSPEC) on a connected socket is
+			 * a documented way disconnect the socket.
 			 */
 			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
 				return -EINVAL;
-			else
-				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 		}
 
 		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
diff --git a/sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c b/sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c
index 1e067504b604..f830e59f93ea 100644
--- a/sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c
+++ b/sound/soc/intel/common/sst-firmware.c
@@ -1251,11 +1251,15 @@ struct sst_dsp *sst_dsp_new(struct device *dev,
 		goto irq_err;
 
 	err = sst_dma_new(sst);
-	if (err)
-		dev_warn(dev, "sst_dma_new failed %d\n", err);
+	if (err)  {
+		dev_err(dev, "sst_dma_new failed %d\n", err);
+		goto dma_err;
+	}
 
 	return sst;
 
+dma_err:
+	free_irq(sst->irq, sst);
 irq_err:
 	if (sst->ops->free)
 		sst->ops->free(sst);
diff --git a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
index 1598b4fa0b11..045f5f7d68ab 100644
--- a/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
+++ b/tools/power/x86/turbostat/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 turbostat : turbostat.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 override CFLAGS +=	-DINTEL_FAMILY_HEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h"'
 
diff --git a/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile b/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
index ae7a0e09b722..1fdeef864e7c 100644
--- a/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
+++ b/tools/power/x86/x86_energy_perf_policy/Makefile
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ ifeq ("$(origin O)", "command line")
 endif
 
 x86_energy_perf_policy : x86_energy_perf_policy.c
-override CFLAGS +=	-Wall
+override CFLAGS +=	-Wall -I../../../include
 override CFLAGS +=	-DMSRHEADER='"../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h"'
 
 %: %.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
index 5019cdae5d0b..0fad0dc62338 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/seccomp/seccomp_bpf.c
@@ -3095,9 +3095,9 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic)
 
 	/* Check that we get -ENOSYS with no listener attached */
 	if (pid == 0) {
-		if (user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, 0) < 0)
+		if (user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid, 0) < 0)
 			exit(1);
-		ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+		ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
 		exit(ret >= 0 || errno != ENOSYS);
 	}
 
@@ -3112,12 +3112,12 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic)
 	EXPECT_EQ(seccomp(SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog), 0);
 
 	/* Check that the basic notification machinery works */
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
 				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
 	/* Installing a second listener in the chain should EBUSY */
-	EXPECT_EQ(user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+	EXPECT_EQ(user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
 				    SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER),
 		  -1);
 	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
@@ -3126,7 +3126,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic)
 	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
 
 	if (pid == 0) {
-		ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+		ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
 		exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
 	}
 
@@ -3144,7 +3144,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_basic)
 	EXPECT_GT(poll(&pollfd, 1, -1), 0);
 	EXPECT_EQ(pollfd.revents, POLLOUT);
 
-	EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr,  __NR_getpid);
+	EXPECT_EQ(req.data.nr,  __NR_getppid);
 
 	resp.id = req.id;
 	resp.error = 0;
@@ -3176,7 +3176,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_kill_in_middle)
 		TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
 	}
 
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
 				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
@@ -3188,7 +3188,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_kill_in_middle)
 	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
 
 	if (pid == 0) {
-		ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+		ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
 		exit(ret != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
 	}
 
@@ -3298,7 +3298,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_closed_listener)
 		TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
 	}
 
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid,
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
 				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
@@ -3309,7 +3309,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_closed_listener)
 	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
 	if (pid == 0) {
 		close(listener);
-		ret = syscall(__NR_getpid);
+		ret = syscall(__NR_getppid);
 		exit(ret != -1 && errno != ENOSYS);
 	}
 
@@ -3332,14 +3332,15 @@ TEST(user_notification_child_pid_ns)
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
 
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
 	pid = fork();
 	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
 
 	if (pid == 0)
-		exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+		exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
 
 	EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
 	EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, pid);
@@ -3371,7 +3372,8 @@ TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
 		TH_LOG("Kernel does not support PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS!");
 	}
 
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
 	pid = fork();
@@ -3384,7 +3386,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
 		ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
 
 		if (pid2 == 0)
-			exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+			exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
 
 		EXPECT_EQ(waitpid(pid2, &status, 0), pid2);
 		EXPECT_EQ(true, WIFEXITED(status));
@@ -3393,11 +3395,11 @@ TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
 	}
 
 	/* Create the sibling ns, and sibling in it. */
-	EXPECT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
-	EXPECT_EQ(errno, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWPID), 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(errno, 0);
 
 	pid2 = fork();
-	EXPECT_GE(pid2, 0);
+	ASSERT_GE(pid2, 0);
 
 	if (pid2 == 0) {
 		ASSERT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, &req), 0);
@@ -3405,7 +3407,7 @@ TEST(user_notification_sibling_pid_ns)
 		 * The pid should be 0, i.e. the task is in some namespace that
 		 * we can't "see".
 		 */
-		ASSERT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(req.pid, 0);
 
 		resp.id = req.id;
 		resp.error = 0;
@@ -3435,14 +3437,15 @@ TEST(user_notification_fault_recv)
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER), 0);
 
-	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getpid, SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
+	listener = user_trap_syscall(__NR_getppid,
+				     SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER);
 	ASSERT_GE(listener, 0);
 
 	pid = fork();
 	ASSERT_GE(pid, 0);
 
 	if (pid == 0)
-		exit(syscall(__NR_getpid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
+		exit(syscall(__NR_getppid) != USER_NOTIF_MAGIC);
 
 	/* Do a bad recv() */
 	EXPECT_EQ(ioctl(listener, SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV, NULL), -1);
